Author: Lee M.

  • Orwell and Just War

    Michael Bowen of the Gutless Pacifist has been posting some thoughts on Orwell on his blog A Minority of One. Here he quotes Orwell’s well-known argument that pacifism is “objectively pro-fascist”:

    Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common sense. If you hamper the war effort of one side you automatically help that of the other. Nor is there any real way of remaining outside such a war as the present one. In practice, ‘he that is not with me is against me’. The idea that you can somehow remain aloof from and superior to the struggle, while living on food which British sailors have to risk their lives to bring you, is a bourgeois illusion bred of money and security.

    Orwell has become a kind of secular saint, a sort of generalized moral authority, due largely to his brave stand against the horrors of Stalinism at a time when many of his comrades on the Left saw the USSR as the great hope of mankind and his general opposition to all forms of deception in politics. Michael wonders if Orwell “might have had a different view about some of the later wars in the 20th and 21st centuries, including the current war on terror.”

    What is interesting to me about Orwell is that, not only was he an enemy of pacifism, but he also flatly rejected any kind of just war theory, at least as far as “jus in bello” considerations are concerned. In May of 1944 Orwell wrote an article in response to a critic of Allied bombing of German cities. He rejects concerns to impose moral restraints on the conduct of war as so much sentimentalism:

    Now, no one in his senses regards bombing, or any other operation of war, with anything but disgust. On the other hand, no decent person cares tuppence for the opinion of posterity. And there is something very distasteful in accepting war as an instrument and at the same time wanting to dodge responsibility for its more obviously barbarous features. Pacifism is a tenable position; provided that you are willing to take the consequences. But all talk of ‘limiting’ or ‘humanizing’ war is sheer humbug, based on the fact that the average human being never bothers to examine catchwords. […]

    When you look a bit closer, the first question that strikes you is: Why is it worse to kill civilians than soldiers? Obviously one must not kill children if it is in any way avoidable, but it is only in propaganda pamphlets that every bomb drops on a school or an orphanage. A bomb kills a cross-section of the population; but not quite a representative selection, because the children and expectant mothers are usually the first to be evacuated, and some of the young men will be away in the army. Probably a disproportionately large number of bomb victims will be middle-aged. (Up to date, German bombs have killed between six and seven thousand children in this country. This is, I believe, less than the number killed in road accidents in the same period.) On the other hand, ‘normal’ or ‘legitimate’ warfare picks out and slaughters all the healthiest and bravest of the young male population. Every time a German submarine goes to the bottom about fifty young men of fine physique and good nerves are suffocated. Yet people who would hold up their hands at the very words ‘civilian bombing’ will repeat with satisfaction such phrases as ‘We are winning the Battle of the Atlantic’. Heaven knows how many people our blitz on Germany and the occupied countries has killed and will kill, but you can be quite certain it will never come anywhere near the slaughter that has happened on the Russian front.

    Orwell is here taking the extreme “realist” position that “war is hell” and once you’ve started you should do whatever it takes to “get the job done.” This places war in a zone beyond the reach of morality. He makes the curious argument that admitting this may actually make war more unlikely:

    War is not avoidable at this stage of history, and since it has to happen it does not seem to me a bad thing that others should be killed besides young men. I wrote in 1937: ‘Sometimes it is a comfort to me to think that the aeroplane is altering the conditions of war. Perhaps when the next great war comes we may see that sight unprecedented in all history, a jingo with a bullet hole in him.’ We haven’t yet seen that (it is perhaps a contradiction in terms), but at any rate the suffering of this war has been shared out more evenly than the last one was. The immunity of the civilian, one of the things that have made war possible, has been shattered. Unlike Miss Brittain, I don’t regret that. I can’t feel that war is ‘humanized’ by being confined to the slaughter of the young and becomes ‘barbarous’ when the old get killed as well.

    As to international agreements to ‘limit’ war, they are never kept when it pays to break them. … War is of its nature barbarous, it is better to admit that. If we see ourselves as the savages we are, some improvement is possible, or at least thinkable.

    We have seen these very same arguments made by some of the more extreme advocates of a “maximalist” understanding of the “war on terror” – “Hey, war is hell, and, anyway, they started it, and we should do whatever it takes to finish it, even if that means torturing prisoners, killing civilians, nuking Mecca…”

    Personally I’m skeptical that placing war in a category “beyond” moral evaluation has made it less frequent than it would otherwise have been. But more fundamentally, all human actions are subject to moral evaluation, even those done in service to a good cause. In fact, maybe that’s when we need to be most vigilant since it’s in service to a cause we deem to be good that we’re most tempted to ignore moral limits.

  • My Station and Its Duties

    In comments to this post, “Joshie” (who is much better read theologically than I am) criticized (rightly, I think) any doctrine of vocation that would encourage us “to stay in our little corners of the world and ‘do our thing.’” Part of the problem is that I don’t think I adequately presented Forde’s position, which I then tried to clarify.

    But the whole discussion raises the issue of how we find a balance between caring for those who are closest to us (both physically and emotionally) and caring for the world at large. Virtually every system of ethics concocted by philosophers tells us that we should treat every person as counting for one and no more than one — that bonds of personal affection, blood relation, physical proximity, etc. are morally irrelevant to determining how we treat people. And yet, virtually every non-philosopher would say that they have greater obligations toward their family and friends, neighbors and countrymen than they do toward strangers.

    For Christianity this tension becomes particularly acute, since the ethic propounded by Jesus so clearly requires us to reach out to those beyond our immediate circle of relations, including reaching out to those who wish us ill. So, any notion of vocation that leaves us content to care only for those near and dear to us cannot pass muster as a Christian doctrine.

    On the other hand, even though we all (well, except for Christopher Hitchens) admire people like Mother Teresa for leaving their home and family to dedicate their lives to serving those most in need, we don’t usually think that we are all required to do the same. Luther’s idea of vocation grew out of his conviction that one served God best by loving one’s neighbor where we are placed – i.e. within the spheres of everyday activity such as work and family life.

    This notion of vocation is uderwritten in part by a particular understanding of God’s providence. God cares for his creation by means of the institutions of human life – economy, family, government, etc. and it is precisely in and through those “places” that we find opportunities to serve our neighbor. This introduces an element of contingency into our obligations to others, whereas philosophical ethics has always tried to delineate the obligations we have to anyone and everyone, regardless of how we happen to be related to them (e.g. Rawls’ original position).

    Here’s Augustine:

    Further, all men are to be loved equally. But since you cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you. For, suppose that you had a great deal of some commodity, and felt bound to give it away to somebody who had none, and that it could not be given to more than one person; if two persons presented themselves, neither of whom had either from need or relationship a greater claim upon you than the other, you could do nothing fairer than choose by lot to which you would give what could not be given to both. Just so among men: since you cannot consult for the good of them all, you must take the matter as decided for you by a sort of lot, according as each man happens for the time being to be more closely connected with you. (On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, Ch. 29)

    You could see the doctrine of vocation in part as an answer to how we decide who we are to help. Since we already find ourselves enmeshed in complex and overlapping webs of relationships (our families, our workplaces, our communities, etc.), that is where we can begin our service. And, more often than not, this will give us plenty to do! As Luther put it in comments on I Corinthians 7:20 (“Everyone should remain in the state in which he was called”):

    How is it possible that you are not called? You have always been in some state or station; you have always been a husband or wife, or boy or girl, or servant. Picture before you the humblest estate. Are you a husband, and you think you have not enough to do in that sphere to govern your wife, children, domestics, and property so that all may be obedient to God and you do no one any harm? Yea, if you had five heads and ten hands, even then you would be too weak for your task, so that you would never dare to think of making a pilgrimage or doing any kind of saintly work. (quoted here.)

    But truly learing to love those closest to us can impel us to move beyond the boundaries of our own little corner of the world. Gilbert Meilaender suggests that our particular stations in life serve as a kind of school of virtue, teaching us how to love others (and to mortify our own sinful selves). And this has the effect of forming us into the kind of people who will extend love more readily to those we are not related to in any special way:

    Thus I marry my wife not because my love for her is a specification of some more universal regard for neighbors but because I am drawn to her in particular. But having committed myself to her, attempting to care for her well-being in particular, I may gradually become a person more ready to care for the good of any neighbor. (Gilbert Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness, p. 53)

    Someone who has been formed by the practice of genuinely loving others will be more sensitive to the call of need from outside their normal sphere. Thus love always points us beyond our present set of concerns. But it never escapes the concrete and the particular.

    Meilaender again:

    If the heart that trusts God does not seek unlimited responsibility for achieving what is best overall, neither can it be closed to the call for love and service in new ways. … Such decisions are always personal and particular. They cannot be made for anyone else. They cannot be willed universally for all similarly situated people. They cannot be made from an impersonal, objective standpoint that is nowhere in particular–for we never hear the call of God except at the place where we stand. (p. 103)

    According to Meilaender, it’s not our job to take care of the entire world – that’s God’s job and to think otherwise would be a denial of our finitude and God’s providence. On the other hand, we need to be open to calls for greater commitment, calls which will arise from our particular situation in the world. This means neither an attempt to transcend our finitude (as with various psuedo-eschatologies for setting the world to rights) nor a complacent attitude of doing the bare minimum.

  • Monday Morning Round Up

    Hugo Schwyzer on moving towards veganism as part of a consistent ethic of life.

    Jim Henley on why he’s still a libertarian:

    What I come back to everytime is that I am viscerally anti-bully and government still seems like the biggest bully around. I don’t believe government is inherently a force for good. I do not accept that democracy is a process by which “we” govern “ourselves.” I believe it is a process by which a larger group imposes its will on the smaller, and the most energetic and glib busybodies impose their will on the larger. …

    Josh at Armagideon Time writes in defense of Constantine:

    In seminary, one thing many students and professors were found of saying was that Constantine’s conversion to Christianity was good for Constantine, bad for the church. I believe nothing could be farther from the truth. Constantine was the best thing that could happen to the church.

  • Vocation and the Disciplines of Place

    Here’s another nugget from Fr. Jape on “practicing the discipline of place”:

    It is the idea that to suffer one’s place and one’s people in the particularity of its and their needs is the only true basis for finding love, friendship, and an authentic, meaningful life. This is nothing less than the key to the pursuit of Christian holiness, which is the whole of the Christian adventure: live in love with the frailty and limits of one’s existence, suffering the places, customs, rites, joys, and sorrows of the people who are in close relation to you by family, friendship, and community–all in service of the truth, goodness, and beauty that is best experienced directly. The discipline of place teaches that it is more than enough to care skillfully and lovingly for one’s own little circle, and this is the model for the good life, not the limitless jurisdiction of the ego, granted by a doctrine of choice, that is ever seeking its own fulfillment, pleasure, and satiation. The Puritan heritage of America has long chafed against this discipline as it necessarily limits one to a small field of action in a world with seemingly little hope for eschatological fulfillment.

    This resonates with Luther’s doctrine of vocation, at least as Lutheran theologian Gerhard Forde explains it (see, A More Radical Gospel: Essays on Eschatology, Authority, Atonement, and Ecumenism). According to Forde, what justification by faith does is put an end to all our projects for journeying out of the world, trying to reach God by our own efforts, along some path of “spiritual development” or moral and/or political overreaching. God’s kingdom comes to us as a gift and not by our efforts. Justification by faith spells the death of the old self, the self that is constantly trying to justify itself, and brings to life a new self that lives by faith.

    What this does, Forde argues, is turn us back into the world – the concrete, eveyday world – freed from the need to escape the world via some project of transcendence. Because there’s nothing left for us to do “before God” we journey back into the world in all its quotidian messiness. Forde rejects the dictum that God became man so that we could become gods in favor of the idea that God became man so that we could become truly human. By which he means live within the limits of what it means to be a creature, caring for creation and our neighbors “for the time being.”

    We do this primarily through our various tasks in the orders of creation: household, work, politics, culture, etc. “Vocation” in the Lutheran sense is not about “self-fulfillment”, much less making oneself pleasing to God, but about serving others in the specific needs. And since serving the needs of the neighbor is the telos of these orders, they can be altered as those needs change or in order to better meet them. Forde advocates the “political” or “civil” use of the law, not as a natural law that reflects an eternal law (as in some Catholic thought), but as the basic conditions for human life and community in the world.

    The disciplines of place are, as a Lutheran would understand it, the opportunities we are given to serve our neighbors, which we can do with grateful hearts once we are freed from the anxiety of trying to justify ourselves and endow our lives with a self-created “meaning.”

  • Speaking of creating traditions…

    So, I noticed among the much-discussed Time magazine list of the “25 Most Influential Evangelicals” is Brian McLaren who, it appears, is the founder/guru/grand poobah of something called the “Emerging (emergent?) church.” Can somebody fill me in on what this is all about? From what I’ve been able to glean, it seems to be made up of a lot of evangelicals disaffected with the mega-church style and looking for something more “authentic,” including a recovery of traditional patterns of worship (daily office! liturgical worship! candles!). There also seems to be a lot of talk about “postmodernism” and how it’s changed everything (a claim of which I remain suspicious – “modernism” is/was never the monolith a lot of people seem to claim it is/was).

    So, is this a new kind of church, a new kind of gospel (heaven forfend) or just new wineskins? As a Lutheran I have what you might call a very thin ecclesiology (some would call it no ecclesiology at all!) that comes straight out of the Augsburg Confession (Article 7 to be exact):

    Also they [i.e. the evangelical churches] teach that one holy Church is to continue forever. The Church is the congregation of saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the Sacraments are rightly administered.

    And to the true unity of the Church it is enough to agree concerning the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments. Nor is it necessary that human traditions, that is, rites or ceremonies, instituted by men, should be everywhere alike. As Paul says: One faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all, etc. Eph. 4, 5. 6.

    (emphasis added)

    So, I have no objection, in principle, to experimenting with different “human traditions…rites or ceremonies.” I don’t get bent out of shape about the debates between “traditional” and “contemporary” styles of worship (though I certainly have my preferences!).

    However, I’m curious if the emerging church sees itself as something more than that. Also, how, if at all, is it related to the “post-constantinian” church envisioned by people like Hauerwas?

  • New Pantagruel 3.1

    The New Pantagruel 3.1 is up and, as usual, it offers a feast of meaty articles from a variety of perspectives. I haven’t has a chance to dig in yet, but this article on the resurrection of Caelum et Terra looks good, as does this piece by Michael Baxter on the notion of “one nation under God.”

    Also, “Fr. Jape” is his usual saucy self in dissecting the foibles of various sects within Christendom. Of particular interest to me was this bit on Mark Noll’s desire to create an “evangelical tradition”:

    “Culturally adaptive biblical experimentalism,” as Noll has in the past described the Evangelical ethos, has always sounded to me like “making it up as we go along and turning out to be just like everyone else.” That idea can’t have escaped Noll’s attention. Alan Wolfe, Ron Sider, and Christian Smith (among others) have recently charted Evangelicalism’s dipping into what Smith has called the “heresies” of “moralistic therapeutic deism.” (Carla Barnhill might stand as a case in point.) And certainly Noll has chafed at Evangelicals’ penchant for a right-wing politics that he found impossible to support in the past several presidential elections. In this regard Noll was not alone, and aside from my deep disagreement with Christians (including some of our compatriots at tNP) who abstained from voting or who opposed the incumbent (and despite my sympathy for their motives), it says something singularly significant that Noll finds himself so politically and ecclesially alienated from both his Evangelical brethren and his “classical” Protestant cousins. Wanting a “tradition” but not content with any particular tradition as it actually exists–including Evangelicalism as it is–Noll seems afflicted with the very poverty of coherence that he knows is the fruit of “life without tradition.”

  • Thought for the Day

    Is suffering redemptive? There is certainly no rule to say it is. If there were, it would only be a new law, a new way. We are not promised, however, a life free from suffering for the time being. Indeed, we are led to expect that anyone who sets out on a journey of faith in the gospel can expect to suffer. But as Luther always insisted, suffering may, indeed will, come, but is not to be sought. It is not a new way, a “negative theology of glory.” Not the law, but Christ, crucified and risen, is the redeemer, the one who takes our place and gives us his. — Gerhard O. Forde, “In Our Place”

  • "I don’t care if it hurts/I wanna have control"

    Via Hugo I found a link to Home, Throne & Altar, the blog of John, a conservative, royalist, pentecostal-holiness New Zealander! (Ain’t the blog-world grand? (N.B. I refuse to employ the barbaric neologism “blogosphere.” Trying saying that out loud and see how dumb it sounds.))

    Anyhoo, John has a post on abortion and how he came to his present views. He suffers from cerbral palsy and talks about how his condition can be threatening to those who want to believe that they are in charge of their destiny (and that’s all of us at sometime or another, isn’t it?):

    Two years ago, I was put into a wheel-chair for a month or two, to recover from corrective surgery. Then, the hatred got obvious, so I couldn’t explain it away. It wasn’t in action, but in attitude, in looks, in eyes. People didn’t like to look at me. I made them afraid. With more mature eyes, I began to understand. People were afraid of me because I was a reminder. They hated me because I demonstrated something they tried very hard to forget. They are not in control. A car crash, ten minutes without Oxygen, a natural disaster, and as I am, thou shalt be. That’s an uncomfortable thought. We like our lives controllable, in little boxes, safe, and comfortable. We live on a knife-edge, partying away over the abyss, not wanting to think about how close we are to the edge of it. I was a reminder of that, of the fact that there are uncontrollable factors, that we are not, as we have taught ourselves to think, gods. So, people tried to make me go away. And when I wasn’t, when I obstinately refused to go from their eyeline, they lashed out. They got angry.

    He sees the same desire for control in abortion and related aspects of the “culture of death”:

    At the root of the culture of death is a desire for control, a fear. Control of one’s womb, heedless of he or she inside it. Euthenasia is a fear of dying “like a dog”, a desire to control death, to make the problem go away, with a nice drug. Embryonic Stem Cell research is a desire for control; a desperate searching in the dark, for the fountain of youth. We will not live forever, but we would like to try, even at the cost of ourselves. Shuffling the dying off to the Kevorkians of the world, shuffling the aging to homes, to age in a place where we don’t have to see them; institutionalising the mentally ill and disabled; at the root of the culture of death is fear, and pride, and selfishness. We are afraid. Groping in the dark, we have let go of Father’s hand. And because we have forgotten God, we have no-one to whom to trust the future. Having forgotten God, we also begin to forget each other.

    Now, leaving aside the issue of abortion (though I think it’s clear I’m in great sympathy with John’s views), what struck me when reading this is how it illuminated the question of torture, which I’ve been thinking about lately. In comments to this post, Camassia said that I may have given short shrift to the view that killing someone on the battlefield is less dehumanizing than torturing them. And I think that’s right for reasons not unlike John’s reasons for opposing abortion.

    Torture is the expression of a desire to subject that other person to our complete control, to invade the inner citadel of the self and conquer it. On the battlefield your opponent still retains his moral agency (however qualified), whereas in the torturer’s chair the object is to erase that moral agency. It is to try and usurp the place of God (as Camassia pointed out here).

    More than this, though, the resort to torture, even in a good cause, is, it seems to me, an expression of deep fear, a refusal to relinquish control over our lives, to recognize that no one gets out of here alive (or as Paul Ramsey said, “God intends to kill us all in the end.”). The modern (or post-modern) world still lives on the promise of technology. We think that if we are ingenious enough in the use of our techniques we can (someday) prevent anything bad from ever happening. Drawing moral lines always threatens that promise because it says that some things are “off limits.”

    The promise that we can control the future is, of course, the second-oldest one in the book: “Ye shall be as gods.” But it’s not the one we’re supposed to put our faith in, and doing so has, so we’re told, led to all kinds of mischief.