Author: Lee M.

  • Office hours

    Derek of Haligweorc has a nice essay up at the new “Epsicopal Cafe” on the Daily Office and Anglican identity.

    I confess to having more or less fallen off the Daily Office wagon. What discipline I’ve managed to keep up has consisted of a Bible reading plan combined with a couple of Psalms each day framed by a few prayers from this book, so I guess I’m being somewhat true to the spirit of the Office. My rationale is that I find reading two or three very brief lessons rather disjointed and actually prefer a kind of lectio continua approach. I also just haven’t been able to make praying the Office twice a day work, which is really the way to go if you want to get the full effect of the standard BCP office. I find that a once-a-day time of prayer and Bible reading is about the best I can shoot for.

  • The triumph of anti-Constantinianism

    Over at Faith and Theology there’s a (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) poll on the “worst theological invention.” What’s interesting is not just that only one of the “inventions” is an actual heresy, but that “Christendom” and “just war theory” got enough nominations to make the poll. (Though, in fairness, biblical inerrancy and “the Rapture” are the current leading contenders for worst.)

    I say this is interesting not so much to disagree but to wonder at the fact that, at least in certain theological circles, the radical reformation/free church revisionist account of Christian history has triumphed almost completely and with little opposition. The story is that the early church was radically countercultural and pacifist until the conversion of the Emperor Constantine (who didn’t make Christianity the state religion as is sometimes asserted, but did institute religious toleration and opened the door for eventual establishment). From there the story is one of steep decline wherein the church becomes complicit in war, imperialism, crusades, slavery, genocide, you name it, roughly until, well, now. Just war theory is one manifestation of the Christendom’s attitude of compromise toward worldly powers. Granted there are always dissenters upheld as heirs of the true anti-Constantinian gospel such as anabaptists, but the overall picutre is a pretty bleak one. The prescription that usually follows this re-telling of the history is for the church to return to its countercultural roots in order to provide a radical witness against war, capitalism, consumerism, “radical individualism” and other ills of the modern age.

    In much of the recent academic theology I’ve read (which is admittedly a limited sample) this story seems to be taken almost for granted. The only major theologian I can think of who has really contested this account is Oliver O’Donovan. But I can’t help but wonder why magisterial Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians (for whom the Emperor Constantine is in fact a saint) haven’t been more ready to look critically at this anti-Constantinian/anti-Christendom narrative. After all, doesn’t it imply that the church went deeply and radically wrong for pretty much most of its history? What does this imply for the doctrine of providence, for instance? And what does it say about the practice of infant baptism, which seems like it fits better with the quasi-state church model as opposed to the practice of believer’s baptism associate with the free churches? And what about the Christologica dogmas formulated in many cases under the watchful eye of the emperor? Can they still be deemed legitimate?

    Again, I’m not saying the revisionist story is out and out false. I’m just not convinced that mainline Christians haven’t been too quick to jump on the anti-Constantinian bandwagon rather than sifting the wheat from the chaff when it comes to the legacy of Christendom.

  • Ethical seriousness without self-absorption

    Hugo has a reflective post on his journey “further up and further in” to the vegan lifestyle and contemplates the importance of gradual change. And here’s an insightful post on how the quest for moral improvement can become ironically self-absorbed.

    The last point is an important one, I think. In our society, obsessed as it is with “self-help,” ethics can easily get confused with self-improvement. Someone who’s so concerned with their own moral purity is, not unlike the Pharisees in the New Testament, missing the point.

    What I’ve always liked about the Reformation doctrine of justification by faith is that it leads, or ought to lead, to a kind of self-forgetfulness. D.M. Baillie identifies the distinctive teaching of Christianity as the “paradox of grace.” This paradox is that we are most free when God’s grace is acting in and through us, and that, though we are responsible beings, we can’t take credit for our good actions. “Not I…but the grace of God in me” is the proper attitude of the Christian. Luther, in his Freedom of a Christian, points out how justification by faith frees us from concern with our own standing before God and frees us for service to our neighbor.

    That’s the key I think. Service to our neighbor (and I would include all of creation there), not self-betterment, is the test for our ethics. There have been movements within Christianity which have been at times morbidly introspective. But it’s hard to think of something more pointless than constantly taking your spiritual and moral temperature. Not that we should avoid self-examination, confession, and repentance, but that we should sit a bit lightly to our quest for “sanctification.”

    For whatever reason, it seems that people sensitive to animal rights face a particular temptation to self-righteousness and self-preoccupation. This may be a result of what is ultimately an illusory quest for a kind of moral purity. If you have made significant changes in your lifestyle such as giving up animal products you may be inclined to look down your nose at others who haven’t. But, as Andrew Linzey, probably the most well-known Christian advocate of animal rights, has pointed out, there is no “pure land” where we can claim to have extricated ourselves from the system of animal exploitation:

    [W]e need to dispel the myth of absolute consistency or ‘pure land’ theology. ‘Western society is so bound up with the use and abuse of animals in so many fields of human endeavour,’ I have argued elsewhere, ‘that it is impossible for anyone to claim that they are not party, directly or indirectly, to this exploitation either through the products they buy, the food they eat, or the taxes they pay.’ Vegans are right to prick the consciences of those who find some recourse to animal by-products inevitable, but they can mislead us if they claim some absolutely pure land which only they inhabit. Self-righteousness can be a killer not only of moral sense but also of moral encouragement.

    Instead, he says

    [w]hat we need is progressive disengagement from injury to animals. The urgent and essential task is to invite, encourage, support and welcome those who want to take some steps along the road to a more peaceful world with the non-human creation. We do not all have to agree upon the most vital steps, or indeed the most practical ones. What is important is that we all move some way on, if only by one step at a time, however falteringly. If someone is prepared to boycott factory-farmed foods, at least they have made a start. If that is all the humanity that person can muster at least some creatures have been saved from suffering. If someone is prepared to give up only red meat, at least some animals will suffer and die less as a consequence. If someone is prepared to abandon just meat and fish, at least some other creatures have a chance of living in peace. The enemy of progress is the view that everything must be changed before some real gains can be secured. There can be areas of genuine disagreement even among those who are committed to a new world of animal rights. But what is essential for this new world to emerge is the sense that each of us can change our individual worlds, however slightly, to live more peaceably with our non-human neighbours.

    Connecting this with the point above about justification by faith: I don’t need to justify myself in the eyes of God by attaining some level of moral purity, which is impossible anyway. God has justified us by making peace with us through the Cross of his Son. But, this frees me to creatively explore ways in which I might live less violently, not in order to earn God’s favor, but out of gratitude for what he has done.

    And, it’s important to recall, we live in a fallen world. There won’t be an end to suffering, death, predation, competition for resources, and violence until the Lord returns in glory (whatever that’s going to look like!). Moral perfection isn’t an option in such a world. But we can witness to the hope and promise of a new heaven and new earth. What that looks like for each of us will, as Linzey says, vary from person to person. The point is to leave behind our self-preoccupation and to serve others in the liberty of the children of God. We can “sin boldly” knowing that that by God’s grace we are accepted and cherished.

  • Globo-democracy?

    In making the case for a “global parliament,” George Monibot concedes something that seems to undercut his entire argument:

    Global democracy has a special problem – the scale on which it must operate. The bigger the electorate, the less democratic a parliamentary body will be. True democracy could exist only in the village, where representatives are subject to constant oversight by their electorate. But an imperfect system is better than no system at all. Even the most pig-headed Eurosceptics would have trouble arguing that the European Union would be better off without a parliament.

    But if, by Monibot’s own admission, the size of the electorate is inversely proportional to how democratic a parliamentary body is, then it’s far from clear that “an imperfect system is better than no system at all.” In fact, I can imagine that it would be worse: what you might well end up with is a body that is undemocratic in substance but has all the prestige and perceived legitimacy of a “democratic” “global” body. It’s also worth pointing out that proponents of such schemes often envision their global government superceding in authority the regional, national, and local entities that actually are somewhat accountable to their subjects.

    Clearly international law and cooperation are desirable. But I don’t see how the creation of a largely unaccountable world governmental body would be an effective means to this end. It’s puzzling how radicals like Monibot, who take the maximally suspicious and skeptical view of existing institutions (often justifiably so!) can simultaneously be so utopian about dreamed-up new ones.

    (Link via Gaius.)

  • Our farm policy: bad for animals, bad for the environment, bad for the poor, bad for our waistlines…

    Michael Pollan writes about how US farm policy keeps the prices of fattening and unhealthy foods artificially low, while allowing prices on things like fruits and vegetables to rise. Why, he asks, would we want to encourage such a situation, especially if we face an “epidemic” of obesity?

    He also points out how this connects to a variety of social and environmental ill: subsidized grain helps make industrial meat production possible (by substituting corn-based feed for more natual grass), artificially low prices provide unfair competition to impoverished foreign growers, it affects the health of the soil by promoting “chemical and feedlot agriculture,” and so on.

    His contention is that farm policy needs to be reworked with the interests of eaters in mind, not just the interests of big producers from a handful of agricultural states. “[M]ost of us assume that, true to its name, the farm bill is about “farming,” an increasingly quaint activity that involves no one we know and in which few of us think we have a stake. This leaves our own representatives free to ignore the farm bill, to treat it as a parochial piece of legislation affecting a handful of their Midwestern colleagues.”

    Since the status quo is far from being the inevitable outworkings of a free market, Pollan suggests that food policy be reworked to “encourage farmers to focus on taking care of the land rather than all-out production, on growing real food for eaters rather than industrial raw materials for food processors and on rebuilding local food economies” and “to promote the quality of our food (and farming) over and above its quantity.”

  • Once more into the breach…

    At the risk of boring readers to tears, Robert Jenson’s article on the atonement prompted me to write something about the oft-made criticism that Anselm imports the conceptual apparatus of feudal law into his theory of atonement and that this distorts the idea of God by replacing it with a deity who is an easily offended feudal lord writ large demanding his pound of flesh.

    But, as John McIntyre demonstrates in his excellent book St. Anselm and His Critics, those who’ve made this criticism often fail to read Anselm closely and don’t seem to realize that he’s pouring his own meaning into terms that seem to be drawn from feudal social arrangements such as “honor” and “satisfaction.”

    Anselm’s account of the atonement is rooted from first to last in his understanding of the divine nature, and he reworks the notions of honor and satisfaction accordingly. McIntyre argues that a, if not the, key to understanding CDH is the concept of God’s aseity. This is theological jargon referring to the idea that God exists in and through himself, utterly independent of anything else. There is nothing “external” to God which constrains him to act in certain ways.

    Thus, there isn’t an order of justice that has to be satisfied by God before he can be merciful to us, as though God were caught in some web of rules. And God’s “honor” for Anselm doesn’t refer to his wounded pride. God’s justice and purpose in creating the world are entirely internal to his nature, and his justice isn’t separate from his love. I think Anselm would agree with N.T. Wright’s point that “wrath,” understood as God’s hatred of sin, is inseparable from his love. How can God not hate that which destroys and corrupts his good creation?

    That’s why, for Anselm, the atonement is entirely a provision of God’s love, and not something “imposed” on God from without. Such an idea is absurd in the strongest possible sense. In the Incarnation of the Son God provides for the satisfaction of justice by restoring the harmony and beauty of his creation which has been defaced by sin. But this is rooted in God’s love – love for his creation and inexorable desire that it be brought to fulfillment. Where Anselm differs from Wright and other proponents of a “penal” substitution is that Anselm sees satisfaction as the alternative to punishment. Christ isn’t punished in our place; the self-offering of the God-man provides for a gift so beautiful and good that it effaces or “outweighs” the disorder created by sin. Therefore anyone who “pleads the sacrifice of Christ” is brought into reconciliation with God.

    Indeed, the concepts of honor and satisfaction are stretched beyond anything that would really make sense in a human social or legal relationship. God’s honor can’t be damaged, as Anselm points out, because God is unlimited bliss. The best we can say is that his “honor” refers to his unchangeable will to bring creation to its intended consummation. And “satisfaction” is no longer a kind of tit-for-tat proportionate recompense for discrete offenses. The gift of the God-man posesses infinite worth, completely outstripping the evil of human sin. Interesting, McIntyre argues that Anselm in fact subverts the medieval penitential system which prescribed specific penances for particular sins and lays the groundwork for justification by faith: the sacrifice of Christ truly is a once and for all response to human sin.

    So, Anselm’s theory isn’t best understood as an attempt to project a feudal social order onto the Christian story even if he employed the language of feudalism. It’s based first and foremost on Anselm’s understanding of God. Admittedly, this is an understanding that is both deeply Christian and deeply influenced by Platonism, making it suspect to a lot of contemporary theology, but that’s a different issue.

  • D.M. Baillie on the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith

    This weekend I re-read Donald Baillie‘s brief book God Was In Christ. Though originally published in 1948 it still strikes me as fresh and contemporary, not least in the way that it treats the problem of the “historical Jesus” and/vs. the “Christ of Faith.”

    Baillie is waging a two-front war here. On the one side are “liberals” who, so intoxicated by research into the historical Jesus, want to keep Jesus but jettison Christology. Why not be content, they ask, with the “simple religion of Jesus” rather than the religion about Jesus, which overlays the message of God’s fatherly love with obscure Christological dogma.

    On the other side are those who Baillie calls “neo-confessionalists.” He has in mind here folks like Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann, who, in spite of their differences, downplay the importance of the Jesus of history in favor of the Christological dogmas about Jesus. They ironically accept the most radical biblical criticism of their day, but use it to undermine the optimistic liberal version of the historical Jesus and to buttress the authority of the church’s proclamation of the God-man.

    What’s interesting here is that these two poles are in many ways still with us. A liberal like Marcus Borg or John Dominic Crossan would have us abandon the church’s proclamation about Jesus with its Christological baggage and focus instead on Jesus as an exemplar of religious consciousness and an advocate for social justice.

    Meanwhile, Christians overly impressed with some strands of postmodernism dismiss “historical Jesus” research and, in light of various epistemological critiques, see the church’s web of belief and practice as epistemically prior to any purely historical questions about “what really happened” back in 1st century Palestine. Thus the church’s proclamation about Christ and its portraits of him in the Gospels are rendered immune to challenge from purely secular sources of knowledge.

    Baillie, however, is unhappy with both approaches and seeks to thread a middle way. He deploys a rather ingenious argument against the “liberal” position. He points out that “the faith of Jesus” can’t be so easily disentangled from claims about who Jesus was/is. In other words, any adequate theology will require a Christology. This is because the God that Jesus reveals is not a remote deity to which humans must ascend by their own efforts, but a gracious father who takes the initiative and seeks the lost. To see Jesus as an examplar, even the supreme exemplar, of this quest fails to do justice to the faith of Jesus himself:

    If Jesus was right in what He reported, if God is really such as Jesus said, then we are involved in saying something more about Jesus Himself and His relation to God, and we must pass beyond words like ‘discovery’ and even ‘revelation’ to words like ‘incarnation.’ ‘In order to give us authentic tidings of the character of God’, I quoted from a philosopher, ‘Jesus did not require actually to be God.’ Is that, then, all that Jesus did–to bring us authentic tidings, as from a distant realm, of a God who takes no initiative Himself to seek us out? If God is like that, then Jesus was wrong about Him, the tidings He brought were not authentic, and He was not even a true discoverer. But if He was right, then there is something more to be said, something Christological; and if we leave it out, we are leaving out not only something vital about Jesus, but something vital about God. That is to say, if we have not a sound Christology, we cannot have a sound theology either. (pp. 64-5)

    Baillie has a different bone to pick with those he calls the “neo-confessionalists.” Skeptical about the ability of historical research to tell us much at all about the life and personality of Jesus, it falls back on the church’s proclamation of Christological dogma. Thus it makes a virtue out of necessity, even going so far to say that knowledge of the life and career of Jesus would be positively no help in coming to faith. Kierkegaard, who had influenced this neo-confessionalist strain, went so far as to say that “If the contemporary generation had left behind them nothing but the words, ‘we have believed that in such and such a year God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant, that He lived and taught in our community, and finally died,’ it would be more than enough” (quoted by Baillie, p. 49).

    But, Baillie asks, is the sheer brute fact of the Incarnation a sufficient foundation on which to build an adequate Christology? He is happy to concede that the various “historical Jesus” schools have overreached both in what we can really know about Jesus and in trying to isolate the “history” from the divine drama of redemption. But at the same time, to take the Incarnation seriously means that it matters what kind of life God in the flesh lived on earth. The personality or character of Jesus is itself a revelation of the nature of God. “[Barth] has reacted so violently against the ‘Jesus of history’ movement that he does not seem interested in the historical Jesus at all. His theology has become so austerely a theology of the Word that (if one may venture with the greatest respect to say so) it is hardly a theology of the Word-made-Flesh” (p. 53).

    I’m not in a position to assess whether this is a fair critique of Barth, but what I take two points away from this. First, the personality or character of Jesus matters. If the Christian message were confined to the mere report of the dying and rising of the God-man and made no mention of the kind of man he was, it would be radically incomplete. Secondly, it matters whether Jesus really did do and say the kinds of things ascribed to him in the Gospels. However much legitimate criticism there is to be made of the methods and conclusions various “historical Jesus” reconstructions, Christians can’t simply shrug off the historical question by taking refuge in the church’s confession. Honest seekers will always want to know what relationship the story of Christ that the church tells bears to reality.

    With all its emphasis on the incursion of the Divine into human life once for all in Jesus Christ, [neo-confessionalist theology] has no interest in studying the resultant life as an historical phenomenon; and this is not because it would put back the hands of the clock by rejecting modern historical criticism (far from it!) but because ‘the Jesus of history is not the same as the Christ of faith’ (Brunner). I do not believe that this can be a stable position for theology. It would ultimately stultify the whole doctrine of the Incarnation. ‘If righteousness is by the Law,’ said St. Paul to the first Christian generation, ‘then Christ died for nothing’; and we might now say, in this twentieth century: If revelation is by the Word alone, then Christ lived for nothing, and the Word was made flesh in vain. That is the ultimate answer to our question as to whether we can dispense with the Jesus of history. (pp. 53-4)

    Baillie’s point is that it’s not enough to take refuge in the dogmas, tradition, language, or practices of the church, however essential those are. Although current theology is more interested in Jesus’ character and teachings, there is a tendency among the heirs of Barth to insulate the church’s story from the issue of historical veracity, often by appeal to a kind of postmodern relativism of epistemologies. If no one has access to the unmediated truth of things, then the church’s version of events is no worse off (and, of course, no better off) than anyone else’s version. The question is whether safety from external critique is purchased at the price of universal relevance. If the Incarnation was a public event, a revelation of the divine character and purpose in the life of an actual historical human being, then it matters what that life was like. It seems to me that we risk embracing a new kind of gnosticism if we say that knowledge of Jesus is only possible within the “narrative” of the Christian community.

    Baillie contends that, even taking into consideration the results of historical criticism, it’s still possible to discern the character of the historical Jesus. Against the “form criticism” school that tries to understand the Gospel elements in terms of the rhetorical or homiletical purposes, Baillie points out that this doesn’t exclude “biographical” information about Jesus. It’s become a cliche to say that the Gospel writers weren’t interested in writing history or biography in the modern sense, but it hardly follows that they had no interest in historical recollections about Jesus. As Baillie says, “surely we should expect those men, believing what they did about Jesus, to be immensely interested in recalling anything that He had said or done, simply because He had said or done it, however remote they might be from the modern ‘biographical’ interest” (p. 57).

    Thus I cannot believe that there is any good reason for the defeatism of those who give up all hope of penetrating the tradition and reaching an assured knowledge of the historical personality of Jesus. Surely such defeatism is a transient nightmare of Gospel criticism, from which we are now awaking to a more sober confidence in our quest of the Jesus of history. (p. 58)

    While I think there’s a lot to be said for the kind of critique of the “historical Jesus” industry offered by someone like Luke Timothy Johnson, I think Baillie is correct that a truly incarnational faith can’t detach itself from its roots in history. At the same time, he’s also correct that the “Jesus of history” is insufficient as the basis for a living faith. The church’s experience of Easter and Pentecost, as well as its ongoing life, are surely indispensable for understanding the meaning of Jesus in the divine drama of our salvation.