Author: Lee M.

  • McKibbon, Roepke, and John Paul II

    Caleb Stegall reviews Bill McKibbon’s Deep Economy (which I still haven’t read) in a recent issue of The American Conservative. In the course of the review he mentions this great exchange between economists Wilhelm Roepke and Ludwig von Mises:

    In 1947, two titans of 20th-century economic theory, Ludwig von Mises and Wilhelm Röpke, met in Röpke’s home of Geneva, Switzerland. During the war, the Genevan fathers coped with shortages by providing citizens with small garden allotments outside the city for growing vegtables. These citizen gardens became so popular with the people of Geneva that the practice was continued even after the war and the return to abundance. Röpke was particularly proud of these citizen farmers, and so he took Mises on a tour of the gardens. “A very inefficient way of producing foodstuffs!” Mises noted disapprovingly. “Perhaps so, but a very efficient way of producing human happiness” was Röpke’s rejoinder.

    Roepke was a free market economist, widely credited with Germany’s post-war economic recovery. He was also a deeply conservative thinker in the best sense who recognized that life is more than the market. His A Humane Economy argues that the market requires strong social, cultural and legal frameworks in order to function as it should without reducing social values to market values.

    Here’s a snippet:

    The questionable things of this world come to grief on their nature, the good ones on their own excesses. Conservative respect for the past and its preservation are indispensable conditions of a sound society, but to cling exclusively to tradition, history, and established customs is an exaggeration leading to intolerable rigidity. The liberal predilection for movement and progress is an equally indispensable counterweight, but if it sets no limits and recognizes nothing as lasting and worth preserving, it ends in disintegration and destruction. The rights of the community are no less imperative than those of the individual, but exaggeration of the rights of the community in the form of collectivism is just as dangerous as exaggerated individualism and its extreme form, anarchism. Ownership ends up in plutocracy, authority in bondage and despotism, democracy in arbitrariness and demagogy. Whatever political tendencies or currents we choose as examples, it will be found that they always sow the seed of their own destruction when they lose their sense of proportion and overstep their limits. In this field, suicide is the normal cause of death.

    The market economy is no exception to the rule. Indeed, its advocates, in so far as they are at all intellectually fastidious, have always recognized that the sphere of the market, of competition, of the system where supply and demand move prices and thereby govern production, may be regarded and defended only as part of a wider general order encompassing ethics, law, the natural conditions of life and happiness, the state, politics, and power. Society as a whole cannot be ruled by the laws of supply and demand, and the state is more than a sort of business company, as has been the conviction of the best conservative opinion since the time of Burke. Individuals who compete on the market and there pursue their own advantage stand all the more in need of the social and moral bonds of community, without which competition degenerates most grievously. As we have said before, the market economy is not everything. It must find its place in a higher order of things which is not ruled by supply and demand, free prices, and competition. It must be firmly contained within an all-embracing order of society in which the imperfections and harshness of economic freedom are corrected by law and in which man is not denied conditions of life appropriate to his nature. Man can wholly fulfill his nature only by freely becoming part of a community and having a sense of solidarity with it. Otherwise he leads a miserable existence and he knows it. (A Humane Economy, pp. 90-91)

    Here Roepke sounds a bit like John Paul II, who recognized the value and importance of markets for production and exchange, but the equal or greater importance of maintaining the value of things, especially human life, that cannot be reduced to exchange value. As he wrote in the encyclical Centesimus annus:

    It would appear that, on the level of individual nations and of international relations, the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs. But this is true only for those needs which are “solvent”, insofar as they are endowed with purchasing power, and for those resources which are “marketable”, insofar as they are capable of obtaining a satisfactory price. But there are many human needs which find no place on the market. It is a strict duty of justice and truth not to allow fundamental human needs to remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those burdened by such needs to perish. It is also necessary to help these needy people to acquire expertise, to enter the circle of exchange, and to develop their skills in order to make the best use of their capacities and resources. Even prior to the logic of a fair exchange of goods and the forms of justice appropriate to it, there exists something which is due to man because he is man, by reason of his lofty dignity. Inseparable from that required “something” is the possibility to survive and, at the same time, to make an active contribution to the common good of humanity. (Para. 34)

    It’s probably no coincidence that Roepke, the son of a Lutheran pastor, enunciated a similar kind of Christian Democratic vision. American conservatism has, unfortunately, tended toward a kind of “vulgar libertarianism” in theory, which valorizes “the market” as the solution to all social problems. And in practice it has ironically tended toward corporatism – favors for big business that actually end up shielding them from the vicissitudes of the market.

    The interesting question to me is whether there is a space for Roepke-style “humane conservatism” to join with McKibbon-style grass-roots progressivism in offering an alternative to the kind of neoliberal version of globalization that many would argue threatens the social, moral, political, and ecological health of our society.

  • Why creation?

    (Talk about a presumptuous title!)

    In this post I touched briefly on the question of why God creates the universe in the first place. Keith Ward, following Hegel, suggests that in creating God is able to realize a kind of love and relationship, one with creatures capable of not responding to God, that would otherwise be impossible, and that this constitutes a great good.

    It may be that there is no more impious or fruitlessly speculative question than asking why God created the world. Still, the Christian tradition has certainly grappled with it, and it’s intimately bound up with questions about the divine nature, the purpose of our existence, and our ultimate redemption, so maybe some reflection isn’t entirely out of order.

    My impression is that the tradition has, in thinking about creation, tried to hold together two ideas that are, or at least appear to be, in some kind of tension. The first is the idea of creation ex nihilo and its corollary of creation as the free act of God. Unlike some of its pagan competitors, biblical religion has held from early on that God brings the world into being out of nothing, that is, there is no preexistent material or chaos that limits God’s creative will. And God is not constrained by any external force or reality to create; creation is an utterly free act of God.

    The second idea that stands, I think, in some tension with creation ex nihilo and the freedom of God is the notion that God’s nature is love and that creation is in some sense an expression of the divine nature. Love, it can be said, longs to share itself and the creation of something other than God for God to share the divine self with seems “natural” or “fitting” if not necessary.

    In this view it shouldn’t be said that God creates because God “lacks” something, but because it is of the divine nature to share itself. A popular image has been that of a fountain of being that almost can’t help but overflow, bringing other contingent beings into existence. The worry here, however, is that this looks like a kind of neoplatonic doctrine of “emanation” in which creation is a kind of divine effulgence rather than the result of a free purposive choice.

    So, we have what looks like a paradox of sorts: we want to say both that creation is a free choice of God and that it is an expression of the divine nature which is love. Whether or not this is an irresolvable paradox will depend, among other things, on how we understand divine freedom. Do we think of freedom as the ability to choose A or B such that God could have just as easily chosen not to create? Or is freedom better thought of as the ability to express one’s nature without being in any way constrained by external forces or realities?

    It should be noted here that we run into a similar paradox with the idea of grace. Grace is God’s unmerited favor and freely bestowed on us without our doing anything to earn or deserve it. And yet, graciousness isn’t, we think, just an accidental property of God as though God could’ve just as easily chosen not to be gracious. God’s freedom doesn’t mean the freedom to not be good, loving, and holy, or at least that’s what I think most Christians would want to say if they thought about it.

    Interestingly, the contemporary Lutheran theologian Oswald Bayer explicitly makes the connection between God’s graciousness in justifying sinners and God’s graciousness in creation.

    He writes:

    The world was not called into being because of any this-worldly necessity, but out of pure freedom and goodness. Creation out of nothing means that all that is exists out of pure goodness; it is unmerited: “All this is done out of pure, fatherly, and divine goodness and mercy, without any merit or worthiness of mine at all!” (Bayer, “Justification as the Basis and Boundary of Theology,” Lutheran Quarterly, Fall 2001, p. 277; the quote is from Luther’s commentary on the first article of the creed in his catechism)

    So, God’s freedom in creation means at least that God isn’t constrained by anything outside of God, but at the same time creation is an expression of God’s grace and goodness. Creation and redemption aren’t two different stories, but part of the same story of God’s self-communication to that which is not God.

    Another tradition that saw God’s purposes in creation and redemption closely aligned is the so-called Franciscan tradition (because of its association with Franciscan thinkers like Duns Scotus and Bonaventure). In this view, the Incarnation, the manifestation and communication of the divine nature, becomes itself the purpose of creation. In other words, the Incarnation isn’t simply God’s afterthought or Plan B for dealing with human sin; there would’ve been an Incarnation even in an unfallen world. And creation is a kind of theatre for God’s self-manifestation. You might say that Jesus doesn’t exist for us, but we, and everything else, exist for him!

    This tradition draws on John’s logos Christology as well as the cosmic Christ imagery from Colossians in viewing the creation itself as a visible reflection of the divine Word, which is both the reflection of the Father and the archetype for the created world. Created being, in its multitude of forms, refracts the light of the logos in an unlimited variety of ways:

    He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. (Col. 1:15-17)

    What this suggests, of course, is that the Incarnation isn’t some kind of deus ex machina inserted late in the story to salvage a plot gone badly awry, but the underlying theme of the entire story from the very beginning. Christ is the image of the Father, and creation is, in a manner of speaking, the image of Christ.

    But if (part of) God’s purpose in creating is to share the divine self with creation, with what is not God, then it’s fitting that it be shared in the manner most fitting to the particular kind of creature. The medievals had the principle that there must be a certain affinity between the knower and the object of knowledge in order for true knowledge to take place. In light of that an Incarnation would seem to be the ideal way for personal beings like ourselves to know God, i.e. a fully personal mode of knowledge. A line of reasoning similar to this led thinkers in this tradition to suppose that God would’ve become Incarnate to share himself with his creatures even had sin never entered the world.

    But as we know all too well there is sin in the world, so the Incarnation necessarily takes a redemptive form in our world. In a fallen world, the communication of divine love has a cruciform shape. But the divine nature that takes human form in the Incarnation is the same divine nature that is reflected (if imperfectly) in the rest of creation.

    I think one of the helpful aspects of seeing creation as an expression or reflection of the divine nature is that it helps us to see non-human creation as something possessing value in its own right. Our perspective on creation has made it increasingly difficult for us to see the entire cosmos as existing for the sake of human beings alone, as a mere backdrop to the human drama of fall and redemption.* In his book Pascal’s Fire: Scientific Faith and Religious Understanding, Ward writes:

    [A]nyone who believes in a creator God can affirm that the cosmos is created so that God can enjoy its beauty. After all, theists believe that the cosmos is a product of the divine mind, so its creation can be compared to the work of a supreme artist, enjoyable and worthwhile for its own sake, without any reference to possible finite persons at all. The universe could still have a point, and that point would be its expression of the power and wisdom of the creator, and God’s enjoyment both of the process of creating and of the created universe itself. This is part of the traditional view — the Hebrew Bible depicts the divine Wisdom as ‘rejoicing in his [God’s] inhabited world, and delighting in the human race’ (Proverbs 8:30). And if Wisdom delights in the human race, it surely also delights in the beauty of the stars. If there is a God, the universe has a point, as the creative expression of the master creator, and the object of divine delight. (pp. 15-16)

    Needless to say, I would add that God delights in his other non-human living creatures and that these creatures don’t exist solely to fulfill human needs and wants. Seeing all created being as an expression of the divine Logos should move us toward a more theocentric perspective and a less anthropocentric one.

    And yet it remains the case that we believe that God became human, and that the Incarnation represents something like the pinnacle of creation, that in Jesus the divine finds expression in way that is different in kind from the way it is expressed elsewhere. Or to put it another way, that the story finds its climax in this event even if the theme has been present all along.

    But holding that all of creation is or can be an expression of the divine nature and glory doesn’t commit us to the view that all parts of creation are of equal value. Personal life does seem to have qualities and capabilities that make it more valuable in some respects. And our tradition has consistently taught that God is personal (or tri-personal), or at least that personal language is the least misleading language we can use about God. Which would seem to imply that, within creation, God could only find adequate expression as a person and could only adequately relate to his personal creatures in this way.

    So where, if anywhere, have we gotten to? We started by asking if we could shed any light on why God creates. Does God need to create in some sense, in order to determine the divine identity, say, or to enrich the divine experience? Following the tradition I ruled out the possibility that God is constrained to create by anything external to the divine nature, but I suggested that maybe there is something “natural” or “fitting” in the fact that God, in the fecundity of the divine being, creates a world both as an expression of the divine being and as something to which God can communicate divine love. In this perspective, the Incarnation can be seen as the climax or focal point of the divine self-communication rather than a late add-on to the divine plan or a contingency measure (allowing, of course, that the form the Incarnation takes is partly determined by the exigency of human sin). God wills to share the divine being with creation and will go to whatever lengths necessary to do so, even, as we see in our own case, to the point of death on a cross.

    Obviously this is all fairly speculative, open to revision, and to be taken with more than a grain of salt. 😉
    ——————————————————————-
    *It’s worth mentioning, however, that there are those who maintain that, given the constraints of very fundamental aspects of the laws governing the physical world, a universe roughly the size and age of our own would be necessary for the emergence of intelligent life on even one planet. Even if that’s right, though, it in no way rule out God choosing the rest of the cosmos for its own sake since God, presumably, can be quite parsimonious in choosing means to realize his ends.

  • Friday metal – Suicidal Tendencies, “You Can’t Bring Me Down”

    Though probably best known for their early punk material (“Institutionalized,” “I Saw Your Mommy”), ST’s two best albums (IMO), How Will I Laugh Tomorrow… and Lights, Camera, Revolution are pretty much pure thrash metal. This clip is from the latter.

    It’s not entirely clear from the video why the authorities are cracking down on ST. We can only assume it’s because they rock that hard.

    p.s. Bassist Robert Trujillo is, of course, now in Metallica.

  • Asking the right questions

    “Eco-economist” Herman Daly tries to inject some clarity into the debate on climate change. Even if some of the details are up in the air, he says, the trajectory is clear and we need to ask if this is the direction we want to be going in.

    It seems to me that a lot of the climate change “skepticism” (which I put in scarequotes because much of it is an industry-funded attempt to muddy the waters, not a good faith pursuit of the truth; see the chapter on climate change skepticism/denial in George Monbiot’s Heat for some damning details) is about pouncing on uncertainty at the level of detail, whereas the big picture remains pretty clear. Take for instance the way that skeptics jumped on some recent minor revision by NASA of some temperature rankings for the US (see this post for some clarification, via Confessing Evangelical).

    As Daly says, if the big picture is clear, then by asking the right questions, like “can we systematically continue to emit increasing amounts of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere without eventually provoking unacceptable climate changes?” or “what is it that is causing us to systematically emit ever more CO2 into the atmosphere?” or “does growth in GDP at the current margin and scale in the U.S. really make us richer? Might it not be increasing environmental and social costs faster than it increases production benefits, thereby making us poorer?” can yield a fairly definitive answer to the question of what direction we should be going in.

    As he puts it:

    Setting policy in accord with first principles allows us to act now without getting mired in endless delays caused by the uncertainties of complex empirical measurements and predictions. Of course, the uncertainties do not disappear. We will experience them as surprising consequences, both agreeable and disagreeable, necessitating mid-course correction to the policies enacted on the basis of first principles. But at least we will have begun moving in the right direction.

    I discussed Daly and theologian John Cobb’s book For the Common Good a bit here and here.

    In a similar vein, D.W. Congdon is asking some questions for churches about consumerism, which is surely relevant to this topic.

  • Bad Protestant

    I’m late posting on this obviously but last night I went to a Mass in honor of Our Lady’s Glorious Assumption. It was heart-breakingly beautiful in parts, set as it was to music from Mozart’s Spatzen-Messe, KV 220 (Those words mean nothing to me; I copied them directly from the bulletin. All I know is that the music was amazing).

    Here I wrote that my theology had shifted away from Lutheranism over the last couple of years. One of the respects in which that’s the case is in my attitude toward devotion to the Blessed Virgin (and the Saints in general). I worked through the theological arguments to my own satisfaction some time ago, but more recently it’s become an increasingly important part of my own devotional life.

    I know that there are Lutherans who accept devotion to Mary and the other Saints, but the fact of the matter is that it’s simply not part of the practice of any Lutheran church I’ve ever been to. At some point it becomes exhausting to try and maintain such practices without the support of a church community. Not that this would necessarily be a “deal-breaker” for me, but I like being part of a congregation that can pray the Ave together or sing “Ye Who Own the Faith of Jesus.”

  • The “Progs for Paul” myth redux

    I’ve never bought into the “Progressives for Paul” myth – the idea that there was a burgeoning groundswell of support on the anti-war Left for maverick GOP congressman Ron Paul.

    Gaius links to this rather silly piece saying that Paul’s “support” on the Left may be shot now that he’s “revealed” his radical small-government views.

    Look, Ron Paul is a staunch decentralist, small-government libertarian (paleo division). He hasn’t exactly kept that a secret and talks about his desire to drastically reduce the size and scope of the federal government at pretty much every available opportunity.

    Now, sure, some anti-war writers on the Left have given Paul some good press. And for good reason: he’s a voice of sanity in the la-la land inhabited by the rest of the GOP field. Progressives and other anti-war types ought to be glad whenever Paul gets some attention paid to his “extremist” views on foreign policy (extreme outside of the DC “bipartisan consensus” that is).

    But how likely was it that lefties were ever going to vote en masse for Paul? There is a perfectly good progressive anti-war candidate running for the Democratic ticket. His name’s Dennis Kucinich. Though not exactly a progressive myself, or a registered Democrat for that matter, I think there’s a lot to like about him. And, there’s also the curmudgeonly Mike Gravel and Bill Richardson as options for the liberal anti-war voter.

    Ron Paul is against the war in Iraq and our imperialist foreign policy more generally. And he’s also shares certain other positions with liberals: he’s against the drug war, for instance. And the post-9/11 expansion of the national security state. But he’s not a liberal or a progressive, and I imagine folks on the Left are smart enough to know that.

  • Re-thinking Hegel

    In the second half (or maybe last third) of Keith Ward’s Re-Thinking Christianity he discusses some of the post-Enlightenment developments of Christian thought and the prospects for a 21st century liberal-yet-orthodox Christianity.

    Interestingly, Ward attempts a partial rehabilitation of one of the currently most unfashionable theological thinkers of the post-Enlightenment era: Hegel. Since at least Kierkegaard Hegel has been the poster boy for hubristic metaphysical system-building and the attempt to reduce Christian particularity to philosophical generality. But Ward thinks that Hegel still has valuable contributions to make to Christian theology.

    Ward concedes that Hegel overreached in identifying the progress of history with the unfolding of Absolute Spirit, and in his confidence in speculative reason. However, he argues that Christianity necessarily involves doing metaphysics and the strictures against “Hellenism” by German liberal theologians like Harnack, et al. aren’t sustainable. On the positive side Hegel contributed a new understanding of God that departed from the static deity of classical Greek philosophy and is more congenial to the biblical picture of God as deeply involved in history. Thus a “chastened” Hegelianism that properly qualifies Hegel’s historical optimism and his inattention to the particularity and importance of Jesus, can still be of some use:

    For Hegel, history both expresses and changes God, as it realises aspects of the divine that would otherwise have remained potential in the divine being, and as God truly relates to these aspects in new and creative ways. It is compatible with this view to say that God also has a proper divine actuality even without creation, and certainly without this specific universe. So we may not wish to say that this universe is necessary if God is to be conscious of the divine nature. However, there is a great deal of force in the thought that, if God is to realise the divine nature as love — in the sense of relation to truly free personal agents — then the creation of some universe in which true freedom is possible will be needed.

    The sort of love that obtains between God and created persons — a kenotic love that enters into humility and suffering, that seeks those who are lost and reconciles those who are estranged — is not possible solely within the being of God itself. Because of that, the creation of a universe is the necessary condition of the actualisation of kenotic love in God. A stronger stress on the value of personal relationships leads to involving God more in time and change than classical theologians like Aquinas thought. We may not want to follow Hegel in the detail of his philosophy, but this is a move that he was the first major philosopher to make. (p. 156)

    This sort of thing is apt to make more traditional thinkers nervous. It seems to imply that the divine being in itself is somehow incomplete and requires the creation of something in addition to God in order for the divine potentiality to be actualized.

    There’s a connection here to the doctrine of the Trinity: Ward is suspicious of more “social” versions of the Trinity that emphasize the fully personal existence of each trinitarian person. These models see the “inner” life of the Trinity as a fully complete interchange of self-giving love; consequently, there is no need for creation to actualize God’s nature as love.

    Ward writes, in criticism of this kind of view:

    In any case, it is hard to see what sort of love could exist between persons who are all parts of the same being. It is as if different parts of a human being with three different personalities could all be said to love one another. That would be a very peculiar, even pathological, sort of love.

    […]

    If the love of Jesus is our model for the love of God, then God, as love, must go out to persons who are other than God, who are capable of rejecting God, but who can be healed by divine love and united to the divine life by compassion nad co-operation. This is not a love of one hypostasis of God for another hypostasis of God. It is a love for what is other than God but can be united to the life of God in fellowship. It is a love that requires a created other, perhaps, but not a love that can be operative within the divine being itself, where there is no possible scope for rejection, compassion, healing or a real autonomy of the other. (pp. 76-77)

    This is an interesting argument because it suggests that the intra-trinitarian divine love is in some sense inferior to the extra-trinitarian reconciling love that seeks the lost. In some sense I can see the force of this: it does seem that a love where there is literally no possibility of the beloved not reciprocating is somehow diminished in that there is no risk or vulnerability involved.

    On the other hand, it is somewhat worrisome to say that God must create a world in which there is a risk of rejection and estrangement in order to actualize this aspect of the divine love. For one thing, this seems to suggest that evil is necessary for God’s being to be fully actualized: for a world in which rejection and estrangement are a live possibility is one that would seem to (necessarily?) contain suffering. This is the same worry I have about Robert Jenson’s theology, that God’s self-determination is so bound up with the historical process that evil becomes part of the very being of God.

    Maybe there can be a mediating position: perhaps it’s possible (at least logically) for God to create creatures who are capable of estrangement without necessarily falling into it. In other words, the kind of risky love demonstrated in God’s decision to create free creatures who may fail to respond to the divine love does differ from God’s self-love, and is thus something good to be actualized, but it doesn’t necessarily entail the existence of evil.

    Regardless of what we want to say about this, I do think Ward is right to distinguish between the kind of love we might imagine between the persons of the Trinity and the kind of love that exists between God and finite persons, or between finite persons themselves. Some theologians have taken to seeing the relationship between the persons of the Trinity as a model for human community, but this seems like a bad idea for a couple of reasons.

    First, a lot of the descriptions of the nature of the love between the Persons is, let’s face it, rank speculation. And using fancy Greek terms like “perichoresis” doesn’t really change the fact that we have only the dimmest idea of what the “inner” life of God is like, much less does it provide some kind of blueprint for human relationships.

    Secondly, the life of the Trinity, we’re told, instantiates a perfect union of wills, a unity of wills in fact. The three Persons will all and only the same things. But this is a very bad model of human relationships. There is never perfect agreement of will in human communities, and to try and ensure such unity would be a recipe for tyranny. Conflict is an essential part of human living, due both to our differing interests and limited knowledge about what is good. Human beings are different from each other in a way that the Persons of the Trinity aren’t. So, it is, I would suggest, an inadequate model for human relationships to say the least.

  • Macquarrie on Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament

    I returned from Florida yesterday afternoon to find some actual decent weather here in DC. I mean, it’s hot, but not stiflingly, oppressively humid like it has been. And Capitol Hill is noticeably quiet with the congressional recess.

    Having missed Mass yesterday morning we went to last night’s Evensong and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament service at St. Paul’s, the parish we’ve been attending.

    Evensong was lovely, but I wasn’t sure what to expect from the Benediction service as I’d never been to one before. Though few things could be more calculated to offend one’s Protestant sensibilities, I found it to be very moving: it was a quiet, reflective service of thanksgiving, meditation, and adoration.

    For those not familiar with this type of service (as I wasn’t until last night), it consists of kneeling in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament exposed in a monstrance while singing hymns (in this case two beautiful hymns by Thomas Aquinas traditionally used for Benediction and Corpus Christi) between which there was a brief meditation by the priest; then the priest blesses the congregation with the Sacrament, making the sign of the cross over them with the monstrance; finally, the congregation responds in prayer using a version of the Divine Praises and the singing of Psalm 117 with an appropriate antiphon.

    By the door there was a helpful pamphlet written by none other than the late John Macquarrie, explaining the meaning and value of the Benediction service. Macquarrie breaks it into three essential parts: contemplation, the blessing, and thanksgiving/adoration. He calls it an “amazingly simple and beautifully proportioned act of worship, and although it is very brief, it has a wonderful completeness.” I have to agree with that judgment.

    Macquarrie writes:

    God does not leave us with just some vague general knowledge of himself. It is true that St. Thomas believed that there is a “natural theology” and that every thinking man can form some idea of God. But beyond this, we believe also in God’s “revelation” by which he has extended and purified our knowledge of him. We may think of revelation as meaning that at particular times and places and in particular events and persons, God, as it were, has focused his presence and has caused to shine brightly and clearly before us that knowledge of himself which otherwise we can only dimly grasp. The great events in Israel’s history were “revelations” of this kind. Above all, Jesus Christ was “the true light that lightens every man” (John 1:9), the great focus of God’s presence and acting in history. But Christ in turn appointed the bread and wine of the Eucharist to be the focus in which generations to come would find anew his presence. Anglican theologians have wisely avoided trying to give too precise a formulation of Christ’s “real presence” in the Eucharist, but they have consistently affirmed it and it is, of course, implicit in our liturgy. It is in terms of this focusing of our Lord’s presence that the service of Benediction is to be understood — and also justified, if anyone thinks it needs justifying. Psychologically speaking, we need some concrete, visible manifestation toward which to direct our devotion; theologically speaking, this is already provided for us by our Lord’s gracious focusing of his presence in the Blessed Scarament.

    When this is understood, complaints about “idolatry” or “fetichism” are seen to be beside the point. Let us assure any who may be perturbed over such matters that we are not being so stupid as to worship a wafer, nor do we have such an archaic and myth-laden mentality that we believe the object before us to be charged with magical power. Rather, it is in and through the Sacrament that we adore Christ, because we, being men and not angels, have need of an earthly manifestation of the divine presence, and because he, in his grace and mercy, has promised to grant us his presence in this particular manifestation.

  • Only a suffering God can help(?)

    In an earlier post I mentioned that Keith Ward, unlike many contemporary theologians, has a generally positive view of the influence of Greek philosophy and thought-forms on the development of Christian theology. In his view Hellenistic thought allowed the early Christian theologians to deepen their understanding of Jesus as not only the Son of God but the cosmic Word who holds all things together.

    However, in agreement with many contemporary theologians, Ward thinks that the influence of certain forms of Platonism resulted in a mistaken affirmation of the impassibility of God:

    One of the chief influences of Platonism was that God, the Supreme Good, was generally conceived as immutable and impassible. Being perfect, God could not change, and divine perfection could not be affected by the sufferings and imperfections of the world. This creates major difficulties for any doctrine of incarnation, and especially for a doctrine that holds the eternal Word to be the only true subject of Jesus’ acts and experiences. (Re-Thinking Christianity, p. 69)

    How, Ward asks, can we conceive of a genuine union between a being that is unchangeable and a changeable and changing human being? Moreover, is this view of divine impassibility and immutability “adequate to belief in an incarnate and suffering God”?

    Nicea and Chalcedon produced statements about the person of Christ that most (not all) subsequent Christians have found ot define the limits of an adequate idea of the incarnation of God in Jesus. But many more recent theologians have thought that the Platonic idea of a totally changeless God is not really adequate to the Christian perception of a God who becomes incarnate and who suffers for the sake of humanity. A process of further re-thinking about God is positively mandated by the puzzles the ecumenical councils leave unresolved. (p. 70)

    Ward seems here to be taking sides in the debate over divine impassibility. Many recent theologians of a variety of perspectives and confessions have been willing to throw divine impassibility overboard, to the point where in an article from back in 1986 Ronald Goetz writing in the Christian Century was able to call the idea of a suffering God “the new orthodoxy.”

    Apart from the question of making sense of the union of the divine and human natures in Jesus, much of the value of the idea of a God who suffers has been taken to reside in its effects on the problem of evil and the doctrine of the Atonement. It’s been suggested that theodicy requires God to be the “fellow-sufferer who understands” (in A.N. Whitehead’s phrase), a perspective frequently emphasized by process theologians.

    Regarding the cross, instead of being the place where satisfaction is made, or Jesus is punished in our stead, it’s taken to reveal the solidarity of God with all who suffer. The atonement becomes more of a response to human pain than to human sin, and God is revealed supremely as a God of compassion (“suffering-with”).

    Now, I think this may be good as far as it goes, but I’m not sure it goes far enough. Leaving aside whether or not we can meaningfully speak of God suffering in the divine nature (and I’m not sure we can), it’s not clear to me that the value of a suffering God, morally and religiously, is as great as some have claimed.

    There’s no doubt that sharing in someone else’s suffering can have value, but I think one should be careful about ascribing too much value to suffering as such. Ironically, this is what critics of more traditional atonement theories often argue: that they valorize suffering and are complicit in oppression. But whatever else we might say about those traditional models, suffering is usually seen as instrumentally, not intrinsically, valuable. The sufferings of Christ are praiseworthy because they make possible forgiveness and liberation from sin.

    I worry that to focus too much on the suffering of God can actually exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem of evil. Is it really better if God is trapped in the web of suffering too? Doesn’t that actually just make things worse? Some process theologians compound the problem by denying the actuality of personal immortality, thus rendering God impotent to redeem suffering, except insofar as it is somehow incorporated into the divine being as a necessary part of realizing certain values.

    In other words, even if we want to affirm that God shares our suffering, the Christian hope has traditionally been one of victory over and liberation from suffering. Again, just as traditional atonement theories are criticized for focusing on the death of Christ to the exclusion of his earthly ministry on the one hand and his resurrection and ascension on the other, the “suffering God” motif can become excessively cross-centered while downplaying the victory over death and suffering that Jesus won and has promised to share with us.

    To his credit Ward doesn’t really do this. He sees the suffering of God as the price that had to be paid to unite humanity to divinity, to take the life of a human being irrevocably into the Godhead, which in turn makes possible our participation in the life of God.

    Recent theology has, probably rightly, been wary of “triumphalism,” but Jesus’ triumph over sin and death is the cornerstone of Christian faith. Certainly God identifies with the victims of injustice, violence, and sin, but he does so in order to lift them to new life.

    Christianity, it seems to me, is ambiguous about power: Jesus relinquishes all earthly power to the point where he becomes a passive object, beaten, tortured, spat upon and finally crucified. But the power of the divine life is such that the bonds of death are unable to contain it. God triumphs over the powers of evil, and ultimately this victory will be consummated when the entire creation is freed from bondage and reconciled with God. So suffering and victimization are just one part of the story, however important. The ultimate promise isn’t simply that God shares our tears but that he will wipe them away:

    Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and the sea was no more. And I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying,
    “See, the home of God is among mortals.
    He will dwell with them;
    they will be his peoples,
    and God himself will be with them
    he will wipe every tear from their eyes.
    Death will be no more;
    mourning and crying and pain will be no more,
    for the first things have passed away.” (Rev. 21:4)

    Connecting this back to the work of Christ, it seems to me that suffering with us is at best part of the story. Christ comes to be God with us (Emmanuel) in order to share our condition, but also to transform it. He comes to be in the place of sin and suffering with us, but in doing so he changes the character of that “place.” Not in the sense that we no longer have to suffer or die, but that the character of that suffering, and of our own deaths, is changed. This might be expressed in the Eastern idea of theosis – that God became human so that humans could participate in the divine life.

    In his book Jesus Our Redeemer, the Australian Jesuit Gerald O’Collins writes:

    Simply by itself the suffering which Jesus endured out of love did not bring about redemption. To be sure, many people have found comfort through seeing the crucified Jesus as their fellow-sufferer. He did not suffer on the cross alone but between two others who underwent the same death by slow torture (all four Gospels) and with his mother standing near to him (the Gospel of John). That scene has been applied and appreciated down through the centuries. Like many other soldiers who fought in France and Belgium during the First World War, my own father found himself in a terrain of wayside shrines, representations of Christ on the cross with the Virgin Mary keeping lonely vigil at the feet of her crucified Son. Often scarred and badly damaged by shells and bullets, those shrines gave soldiers on both sides the feeling of Jesus as their brother in the terrible pain and suffering they faced. Jesus had drawn close to them and they knew his presence in their terrifying situation. (p. 192)

    However, O’Collins goes on to emphasize that it is the divine love, not suffering as such, revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, that has value and the power to redeem us. The love poured out through these events has the power to heal us and unite us to the divine life. The divine self-manifestation is itself redemptive, even though in a fallen world it necessarily has a cruciform shape.

    One way of understanding this is suggested by Paul’s dictum that “neither death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.” In Jesus God has entered into the human experience so thoroughly with his forgiving, healing love that there is no “place” we can occupy where God’s love is absent. Not the place of suffering, of guilt, or of death. Hans ur von Balthasar, as is well known, daringly suggested that this extended to the depths of Hell itself. God’s love in Jesus permeates everything such that we can’t separate ourselves from it by anything we do or suffer.

  • Sex, marriage, and false dichotomies

    Marvin has a terrific post on same-sex marriage in the church, pointing out the silliness of some of the slippery slope arguments (Next it’ll be group marriages! Marriage to animals!) made against churches blessing these relationships. Far from being part of some hedonistic collapse in moral standards, the movement for recognition of gay relationships is in many ways a conservative one, with same sex couples seeking to reap the benefits of stable, committed, monogomous relationships.

    I don’t post on this much, because it’s amply covered elsewhere, but one of the reasons I support same-sex marriage (as well as civil marriage or unions or whatever they end up being called) is because I’m conservative about sex. Eros is a powerful and dangerous force, one that is best channeled into a stable, faithful relationship that is enabled to contribute to the well-being of the surrounding community. Both Paul and Luther seem admirably pragmatic about marriage, seeing it as a way of taming our sinful impulses. And Jesus says that it is a penultimate institution, intended for this world, but not the world to come. To me this suggests a certain flexibility in approaching marriage: it’s intended to contribute to human flourishing here and now, not necessarily to mirror some eternal archetype. I’d add, of course, that it can be a kind of school of virtue where we learn to love by committing ourselves to loving one particular other person (a bit more on that here).

    Maybe I’m unusual, but I had no objections same-sex relationships before I became a practicing, adult Christian, so I didn’t really go through some process of “overcoming” ingrained objections to them. I was raised in a conservative small town, but pretty much as soon as I came into contact with gay people I couldn’t discern any reason to object to two people of the same sex being in a romantic relationship. Maybe it was partly due to the fact that I was routinely accused of being a “fag” by other kids in school (it seemed to be a generalized term of abuse for bookish, awkward, or otherwise anomolous kids, which is not to trivialize the torment that actual gay kids often undergo, mind you), but I found myself rather instinctively sympathizing with gay classmates.

    As someone who leans to the traditional side in matters theological I’ve tried to understand and sympathize with the traditionalist position here, but, in my judgment, the biblical evidence is too ambiguous (a useful overview here) and the arguments from natural law, etc. too unconvincing to sustain that position in the face of my experience of gay folks (and I would now add gay Christians). And I’d add that the fact that this has become a “debate” over an “issue” that often takes place at a very abstract level far removed from people’s actual lives and relationships seems to me to be quite wrongheaded.

    So, in the church I find myself in the awkward position of agreeing with the “liberals” about this but not about certain theological matters, while being out of sync with a the “conservatives” on what for many has become the sin qua non of faithfulness. However, I do think that a lot of people “on the ground,” especially younger ones, are less likely to line up in quite the way that the most vocal people on both sides would have it. So I’m hopeful that there’s a possibility of a “third way” that isn’t just in the mushy middle but rejects what I think are the false choices being presented to us.