Part III: Beyond the Minimal State

(see here for Part I and here for Part II)

Suppose that the foregoing argument is right, and that anyone committed to the minimal protection of basic libertarian rights should prefer a minimal state to an anarcho-capitalist world of competing defense agencies. Are there further considerations that drive us beyond affirming the minimalist night-watchman state of classical liberalism?

There might be if, as I argued below, there is no clear line to be drawn between the protection of “negative” and “positive” rights. The protection of any “right” requires that economic resources be dedicated to the task. But, I’ve already conceded that the costs of protecting “negative” rights should be socialized in order to prevent the basic rights of those I referred to as the “weak, the helpless, and the infirm” from going undefended. So, are there reasons to support the further socialization of other “rights” such as the “right to welfare” or the “right to education”?

It seems to me this may be the case. There are those people who are, for example, truly unable to provide the means of subsistence for themselves. Is having access to such means less crucial than having access to the protection of one’s life from aggressive assault? It’s hard to see how. So, how do we justify “socialized” provision of the latter and not the former?

Once we’ve conceded that the costs of providing some goods (i.e. rights-protection) may be socialized, what, logically, prevents us from extending the principle to other crucial goods? This is not to say that all, or even most, goods should be socialized. Obviously, both history and economic theory have shown that socialism is untenable. But, by the same token, history has shown that the so-called mixed economy appears to be more or less stable.

I conclude, therefore, that government is justified to provide at least a) basic protection of so-called negative rights and b) collective provision of essential goods to those unable to provide them for themselves. This justifies going beyond the classical liberal night-watchman state, though whether it would justify the far-flung apparatus of the modern-day welfare state is an open question.*

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*I won’t even attempt to deal here with the numerous critiques of welfare state policies based on models of economic efficiency. Needless to say, these must be taken into account by anyone who proposes some new government intervention. Though, I suspect many of them are not as decisive as their proponents often assume.