Author: Lee M.

  • With friends like these…

    Maybe this is splitting hairs, but I confess to be a little annoyed when some of the most visible opponents of the war in Iraq are people who seem, well, a little off their rockers.

    A widely publicized debate (at least on the Internet) pitted Trotskyite-turned-neoconservative fellow-traveller Christopher Hitchens against far-left British MP and mollycoddler of terrorists George Galloway. Galloway drew boos from the crowd (at an event sponsored by a socialist organization!), when he suggested that Americans had it coming on 9/11 (the event was held in New York). That, and the debate was apparently couched largely in terms of which position was more authentically left-wing and “internationalist” (see this account). What normal American thinks in those terms?!

    Meanwhile, Cindy Sheehan, instead of trying to build any kind of big-tent anti-war movement appears content to preach to the hard-left choir, recently declaiming that the victims of Katrina were “collateral damage of George Bush’s insane and moronic policies in Iraq.”

    Americans who opposed the Iraq war or have come to think it was a mistake, but still think the U.S. has a right and a duty to respond to terrorism, using military force if necessary, and don’t necessarily hate the President (though they may be steadily losing confidence in him), don’t have anyone speaking for them. And I suspect that the rhetoric of people like Galloway and Sheehan will only turn them off.

  • Foster and Willard on spiritual formation

    Christianity Today interviews Richard Foster and Dallas Willard, two major authors affiliated with the Renovaré spiritual renewal movement. They talk about “spiritual formation” as something that’s missing from many churches, and by this they mean taking on the character of Christ.

    What do you mean when you use the phrase spiritual formation?

    Willard: Spiritual formation is character formation. Everyone gets a spiritual formation. It’s like education. Everyone gets an education; it’s just a matter of which one you get.

    Spiritual formation in a Christian tradition answers a specific human question: What kind of person am I going to be? It is the process of establishing the character of Christ in the person. That’s all it is. You are taking on the character of Christ in a process of discipleship to him under the direction of the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. It isn’t anything new, because Christians have been in this business forever. They haven’t always called it spiritual formation, but the term itself goes way back.

    Is spiritual formation the same as discipleship?

    Willard: Discipleship as a term has lost its content, and this is one reason why it has been moved aside. I’ve tried to redeem the idea of discipleship, and I think it can be done; you have to get it out of the contemporary mode.

    There are really three gospels that are heard in our society. One is forgiveness of sins. Another is being faithful to your church: If you take care of your church, it will take care of you. Sometimes it’s called discipleship, but it’s really churchmanship. And another gospel is the social one—Jesus is in favor of liberation, and we should be devoted to that. All of those contain important elements of truth. You can’t dismiss any of them. But to make them central and say that’s what discipleship is just robs discipleship of its connection with transformation of character.

    […]

    At this conference, I heard some panelists criticize megachurches. I wonder what your take is on seeker-oriented congregations.

    Willard: What they do well is establish a public presence that draws many people under the sound of the gospel. They are led by wonderful people who are under the call of God to do the work they’re doing.

    In many seeker-sensitive churches, the focus is on getting people to confess Christ as a basis for going to heaven when they die. I don’t want to diminish the importance of that, because you’re going to be dead a lot longer than you’re alive, so you ought to be ready for that.

    But it is possible to lose sight of character transformation as a serious element for the people you’re bringing in. We need to do both of those things.

    I think when they talk about character transformation, they’re talking about what we traditionally call sanctification. But I wouldn’t want to oppose that or separate it from “going to heaven” as though they were unrelated.

    In traditional Christian theology, “going to heaven” and the transformation of character are two sides of the same coin. When we are adopted as members of the Body of Christ we’re given the gift of the Spirit. And the goal of that indwelling spirit is ultimately to transform us into the kind of people who will be fitted for eternal life in the presence of God.

    In The Great Divorce one of the themes that C.S. Lewis develops is that people end up not going to heaven because they don’t want to. They simply haven’t become the kind of people who would be happy in God’s presence. For Lewis, “going to heaven” is intrinsically bound up with the kind of people we are. Not that I think Willard and Foster would deny that, but it’s good to be reminded that “character formation” in the Christian understanding has a goal: that “when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.”

  • Can Christians separate "personal" and "social" morality?

    Melinda Henneberger accuses Christian conservatives of “overturning the Gospels” by focusing on sexual morality rather than economic justice:

    We as a nation—a proudly, increasingly loudly Christian nation—have somehow convinced ourselves that the selfish choice is usually the moral one, too. (What a deal!) You know how this works: It’s wrong to help poor people because “handouts” reward dependency and thus hurt more than they help. So, do the right thing—that is, walk right on by—and by all means hang on to your hard-earned cash.

    Thus do we deny the working poor a living wage, resent welfare recipients expected to live on a few hundred dollars a month, object to the whopping .16 percent of our GNP that goes to foreign aid—and still manage to feel virtuous about all of the above.

    Which is how “Christian” morality got to be all about other people’s sex lives—and incredibly easy lifting compared to what Jesus actually asks of us. Defending traditional marriage? A breeze. Living in one? Less so. Telling gay people what they can’t do? Piece o’ cake. But responding to the wretched? Loving the unlovable? Forgiving the ever-so-occasionally annoying people you actually know? Hard work, as our president would say, and rather more of a stretch.

    While I’m sympathetic to a lot of what she says here, it’s too simplistic to say that Christians shouldn’t be worried about sexual ethics. Ms. Henneberger seems to buy into the idea that sexual behavior is essentially “private” and nobody else’s business. But why couldn’t conservatives say the same thing about economic behavior – as the libertarian philospher Robert Nozick put it, what is morally objectionable about “capitalist acts between consenting adults”?

    The thing is, Jesus, Paul, and the Christian tradition generally don’t really go out of their way to separate “private” sexual morality from “public” matters of economics. Jesus comes down pretty hard on divorce, and Paul’s admonitions regarding sex are well-known. In Acts the church is notably economically egalitarian, but the Apostles also require Gentile converts to refrain from “sexual impurity” as one of the parts of the law that still apples to them.

    Of course, this raises the question of who is being addressed by Christian ethics – the church or society at large? Is there a “minimal” morality that applies to everyone, while Christian morality only applies to Christians? But if that’s so, how can we apply Christian teachings on economics to society as a whole but not its sexual ethics (as liberals sometimes seem to want) or vice versa (as conservatives would like)?

  • A consistent ethic of killing

    W. James Antle III has an article in the American Conservative on the attempts, from adherents of a “consistent life” ethic to Joseph Bottum’s “new fusionism,” to extend pro-life principles to other issues. He cautions against drawing facile policy implications from a general principle of “reverence for life”:

    Opposition to the shedding of innocent blood is a moral question, but attempts to order society and international relations justly often turn on prudential questions. One can agree that if human life is too sacred to be snuffed out by the abortionist that there is also an obligation to care for the children who thus enter the world. But it doesn’t necessarily follow that the welfare state, especially as constituted before the mid-1990s welfare reform in this country, is the best means to this end.

    Similarly, the dignity of human life that is violated by abortion and euthanasia is also affronted by tyranny and oppression. But it does not follow that the proper corrective is U.S. war on a massive scale to effect regime change in oppressive countries.

    In recent years, pro-lifers have awakened to the fact that opposing abortion requires more than lobbying for legal restrictions. It also requires compassionate treatment of women and children and efforts to make the horrible option of abortion seem unnecessary. This is a weighing of means and ends.

    But as pro-lifers have tried to broaden their focus to issues far removed from abortion, they have often sidestepped questions about means in pursuit of noble ends. Food, health care, and employment for all are each worthwhile goals. But serious thought is required about the means, especially given decades of evidence regarding the failures of welfare statism and socialism.

    I think he makes a fair point. Which policies are actually conducive to the protection and flourishing of human life is a matter of empirical investigation and can’t, by and large, be deduced from moral principles alone. However, that doesn’t mean that issue like abortion, war, capital punishment, and euthanasia are unconnected. For instance, in his essay “Toward a consistent natural-law ethic of killing,” Catholic philosopher Germain Grisez argues for a ethic of killing that unites opposition to capital punishment, most abortions, and strict limits on warfare. The logical connection is that these are all forms of killing and are naturally governed by the same set of moral principles.

    Grisez argues that it is never permissible to intend the death of another human being. Killing can be justified only as a forseeable side-effect of another morally licit action aimed at preserving one’s life or the life of another innocent person (or persons). In the case of self-defense, for instance, the morally licit act is the use of necessary and sufficient force to repulse an attack on one’s person; the death of the attacker is not what is intended, only putting a stop to their aggression (Grisez is here following Thomas Aquinas’ account of justifiable self-defense). This line of reasoning, he thinks, rules out capital punishment altogether since the community almost always has alternatives for self-protection that don’t involve killing the offender (e.g. imprisonment, banishment).

    He extends the same logic to warfare. Force is justified only as a form of communal self-defense*, and only the amount necessary to stop the aggression of the enemy force. Gratuitous slaughter of enemy soldiers is never justified, and the intentional targeting of civilians is, of course, prohibited. He argues, compellingly, that the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence is morally unjustifiable insofar as it involves the targeting of civilian populations.

    The point of Grisez’s article is simply that the same principles should govern the taking of human life in all cases. The state has no more authority to take human life than individuals would under the same circumstances. Thus no appeal to “realism” can justify loosening restraints on killing even during warfare.

    So, devotees of a “consistent life” ethic are not necessarily wrong to see a tight connection between abortion, war, capital punishment, and euthanasia. However, I agree with Antle that things like anti-poverty policy, trade policy, or what have you require a great deal more empirical evidence to determine what will work best. It may be a mistake to make a certain position on those issues part of a whole “pro-life” package.**
    ———————————————————————————-
    *Grisez doesn’t discuss the case of a nation coming to the aid of a third party, either another nation threatened by aggression or people being threatened by their own government. It’s hard to see how his argument could categorically rule these out as possible instances of justified military action, though.
    **Though it is interesting to note that some of the more independent pro-life groups like the NRLC looked askance on welfare reform in the 90s on the grounds that cutting aid to single mothers and “family caps” would result in more abortions, while the more traditionally Republican-alingned groups like the Christian Coaltion supported it.

  • Religious hatred and religious relativism

    Call me a free speech absolutist, but this seems like a bad idea to me. I’ve long been troubled by the tendency to make religion into one more marker for the purposes of identity politics. In this country, it tends to, ironically, be religious conservatives who increasingly cry “religious discrimination” when criticized. This is not to say that there’s no such thing as religious discrimination, but positions motivated by or rooted in religion are still fair game for criticism.

    Moreover, religion itself has to be fair game for criticism, and even mockery and derision. Religion is not like race or ethnicity for at least two reasons. First, you can change your religion. But secondly, and more importantly, religions make truth and value claims, and in a free society those claims have to be open to public inspection and criticism.

    The idea that religion is like race or ethnicity and therefore should be off limits from criticism actually buys into a kind of relativism, because it treats religion as nothing more than a part of one’s identity, rather than something that actually makes a public claim on others. For Christians in particular, the proclamation of the Gospel is a public event, calling its hearers to faith. Anything making those kinds of claims can’t be ruled immune from criticism by legislative fiat.

  • Warning: pious posturing ahead

    That wacky atheist Michael Newdow is at it again, this time getting a federal judge to declare the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional again, possibly setting the stage for another go round at the Supreme Court. (The court, you’ll recall, dodged a bullet last time around by ruling that Newdow didn’t have standing to bring the suit since he doesn’t have custody of his daughter. This time, though, he’s brought the suit on behalf of other parents (Newdow is a lawyer and an M.D.).)

    I predict much voluble outrage from bloggers, cable news pundits, radio talk-show hosts, etc. etc. at this godless attack on our great country. Despite this, the Supreme Court has pretty consistently ruled that the reference to God is nothing more than “ceremonial deism” intended to recall our history and/or shore up respect for the state.

    It’s funny that those same conservatives who so strenuously object to removing “God” from the Pledge hardly ever point out that the Pledge itself was written by socialist Baptist minister Francis Bellamy, in part to express the ideas of his brother Edward, author of the (in)famous socialist utopian novel Looking Backward, whose bright, shining future is an authoritarian collectivist nightmare that ought to make any true conservative’s skin crawl.

  • The prelapsarian humor of P.G. Wodehouse

    Philosopher C. Stephen Evans reviews a biography of Wodehouse for Books & Culture (via Thunderstruck), offering some reflections on why Wodehouse is so beloved and seems to be more than a “mere” humorist:

    According to Kierkegaard, the fundamental contradiction that is human existence can be experienced as either tragic or humorous, depending on our perspective. To smile at life (or anything), we must be able to occupy a “higher perspective,” which makes the “contradiction” painless. This is surely why so many situations that are painful at the time can be funny in retrospect; the person remembering the incident is beyond or above the contradiction, and this distance is a necessary condition for humor. Thus, to view life itself as humorous, to vary the metaphor, we must have a way of escape, “know the way out.”

    But which do we do? The Christian, for example, knows the tragedy of the fall, but also knows the good news of God’s grace and forgiveness. According to Kierkegaard, the character he calls the “humorist” lies on the boundary of the religious life because the humorist has somehow acquired a “knowledge” of these religious insights. The humorist fails to be genuinely religious because this knowledge is a kind of merely intellectual appropriation of those insights; the humorist does not really take these religious convictions into the core of his or her own existence. If we shift focus from religion in general to Christianity in particular, perhaps humorists can be viewed as people who help themselves to the solution Christianity offers to the problem of human life without fully plumbing the depth of the problem itself.

    I think that Kierkegaard’s description of the humorist fits the case of Wodehouse precisely. We love the world of Wodehouse because it is paradise, a world without sin. Of course Wodehouse has villains and intimidating aunts, but they are amusing rather than genuinely evil. We love the world of Wodehouse because it is the world we were born to live in, and it is a world in which we would love to dwell. Yet, as [Evelyn] Waugh himself clearly said, Wodehouse’s world is a world to escape to, not a world we aspire to find or create. It is not paradise regained but paradise never lost. Sin has here not been defeated; it has never really appeared.

  • Garrison Keillor on Lutherans and Episcopalians

    (Via A Conservative Blog for Peace.)

    Post to the host for May 2001:

    Mr. Keillor,I’ve been wondering if you picture the Lake Wobegon Lutherans as ELCA Lutherans. If so what do you think of the new communion between the Lutheran and Episcopal churches, and thus what would the good reserved Scandinavian folks there in Minnesota think of their more liberal Anglican brethren?

    Aidan

    Dear Aidan, The ELCA Lutherans of Lake Wobegon were dead set against the new communion, although some of them (I name no names) have, while visiting their fallen-away children in distant cities, attended Episcopal churches (with the children) and partaken of communion. But they don’t want there to be an official link that might, over the years, grow tighter and, before you know it, you’ll find Pastor Ingqvist processing in a dress and a rhinestone-encrusted cape preceded by two guys twirling incense pots on chains like they were yo-yos and go through a lot of bowing and turning and genuflecting. And suddenly the Bible-based sermon of 25 minutes turns into a 6-minute homily about the beauty of flowers. And the Sunday School takes up the infrastructure needs of the inner cities. And soon you realize that your young people are a little shaky on their Bible stories and parables and can’t find Jeremiah or Deuteronomy or even Ephesians without looking up the page number in the index. No, the Lutherans of Lake Wobegon don’t care to go in that direction. Anglicanism is for when you take a vacation to England. It’s like nightclubbing that way. It’s for special occasions. You don’t want to make a practice of it.

  • Thought for the day II

    This one’s from Anglican theologian Oliver O’donovan, from an interview he did with the Calvin Collge Chimes a few years ago:

    I think [Stanley Hauerwas’] criticisms of the Christendom idea are partly wrong, first because he dismisses the church as always being a minority. I don’t know on what theological authority one could make that assertion. The church has very often been a minority. But whether the church is a majority or a minority at any time or place, the church is not given yet to be wholly visible to itself. There is a real temptation in wanting to be a visible minority, a gathered church in which you can say, “We are few, but we know exactly who we are, and we know who is on our side. The line is drawn clearly and unambiguously between us and the world.” That kind of visibility and definition is not granted to the church in our age. We know where the church is because we know where the sacraments are and where the word is preached. We see people gathering to the sacraments, we see the church taking form. I’m with Augustine and again a gathered church Protestantism. The edges are always indistinct. Is this person moving into the church, giving light to those who dwell within the house, or is he just standing on the edge and about to turn his back? We don’t know. … Even if it’s true that the church is going to be a minority, the church is going to be embattled and contested to a certain extent, but it can be so as a majority sometimes. Evil has its ways of challenging the church when it’s in an apparently confident position just as much. Even if the church is a minority, it can’t be a self-conscious minority which says to itself, “We’re perfectly safe because we’re a minority.” That I have to say I find troubling in the kind of catacomb consciousness I find in Stan and John Howard Yoder. I don’t think it was at all typical of the Christians that actually inhabited the catacombs. They didn’t huddle down there and say, “How nice. We at least know who we are while we’re down here.”

  • Thought for the day

    An oldie but a goodie from the Bruderhof site:

    The line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either, but right through every human heart, and through all human hearts. This line shifts. Inside us, it oscillates with the years. Even within hearts overwhelmed by evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained; and even in the best of all hearts, there remains a small corner of evil. It is impossible to expel evil from the world in its entirety, but it is possible to constrict it within each person. — Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn