A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

The cosmic prodigal son

I’ve been reading a book called Created from Animals: the Moral Implications of Darwinism by the late philosopher James Rachels. The thesis is that Darwinism does have far-reaching implications for morality, even if not the ones commonly thought. This is in contrast to those, like Stephen Jay Gould, who tried to erect an insuperable wall between the realm of “values” and scientific fact.

Rachels’ long opening chapter, in which he reviews Darwin’s life and the basic argument of the Origin of Species, is extremely clear and compelling, and worth the price of the book alone (well, at least in my case—I picked it up used for around five bucks). Subsequent chapters delve into the more properly philosophical argument about how Darwin’s findings might be related to ethics.

What Rachels is trying to show is that Darwinism pulls the lynchpin of “human dignity” out of our existing moral framework by undermining crucial beliefs that support it. He agrees with many other philosophers that you can’t get an “ought” from an “is”—that is, statements of fact do not logically entail statements of value. But, he argues, our belief in human dignity—by which he means the view that human life is uniquely sacred or valuable—derives its support from certain beliefs about the world and our place in it. Chief among these are one religious belief and one secular philosophical belief: that human beings were specially created (in some sense) in God’s image and that human beings are uniquely rational.

If, as Rachels believes is the case, Darwinism undermines the grounds for these beliefs, then the corresponding normative belief in human dignity will be undermined, even if it is still logically independent of those beliefs. In other words, we could still retain the belief in human dignity as a sheer judgment of value, but without the supporting beliefs (or some substitute), it’s not clear why we should.

So why does Rachels think that Darwinism does in fact undermine these beliefs? For the purposes of this post, let’s focus on the imago dei doctrine. According to Rachels, the traditional view that human beings are created in the divine image means that “the world [was] intended to be [humanity’s] habitation, and everything else in it given for [our] enjoyment and use” (p. 86). The evolutionary picture of the world, Rachels contends, undermines this for several reasons. First, there have existed long stretches of time–billions of years, far and away the vast majority of time–where human beings did not exist and the universe got along just fine without us. Second, Darwinian evolution undermines the view that all things in nature have the form they do in order to serve some human purpose; instead, it sees the forms of creatures as an adaptation to their environment. Finally, the path of evolution doesn’t require us to posit a god to explain the emergence of human life; on strictly scientific grounds, we aren’t required to believe that the existence of human beings is anything other than a fortuitious (for us) outcome of a blind process.

It’s possible, Rachels says, to say that God is the “first cause,” the one who sets up the basic laws of the universe, but whose further intervention isn’t required to explain the emergence and development of life. But even if this is accepted (and he’s not sure that it should be–why not just say that the universe is uncaused?), we’re a long way from the God of the Bible or Judeo-Christian tradition. Such a deistic god doesn’t possess nearly the same religious significance as a more traditional one. At that point, it’s not clear why we’d insist on hanging on the word “god” at all.

Regular readers are probably not terribly surprised to learn that I have some sympathy with Rachels’ argument. Like much of the best atheist and agnostic thought, Rachels’ argument provides the opportuntiy for a purification of religious thought and for smashing a few idols. And surely one of the great idols of the Christian tradition has been precisely the view that creation was made just for us and all other creatures were given for our enjoyment and use. While there are certainly parts of the Bible that support such a view, modern biblical scholars have pointed out that a “humano-centric” interpretation of the Bible (as distinguished from a theo-centric one) is profoundly distorting.

The Bible is clear in many passages that creation exists not for our sake, but for the creator’s sake. God creates all that is and calls it “good” (not “good for us”). After the flood in Genesis, God makes a covenant with all flesh, not just with humanity. The Psalms tell us repeatedly that creatures of land, air, and sea praise their creator in their own language, without the mediation of human beings. God’s admonition to Job is that the creator’s purposes encompass far more than parochial human interests. The apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon praises the mercy and love of the Lord: “you love all things that are and loathe nothing that you have made; for what you hated, you would not have fashioned.” Jesus insists that our heavenly Father cares for the lillies of the field and the sparrows of the air. St. Paul contends that “all things” are reconciled in Christ and that the entire creation is groaning for liberation from bondage.

Rachels isn’t wrong to see the anthropocentric interpretation as the dominant one in Christian history. This may have been encouraged by a secular philosophy that defined the imago primarily as reason and free will, thus emphasizing the distinction between human beings and other creatures. A more “functionalist” understanding of humanity’s role as caretakers or gardeners of the earth, by contrast, emphasizes our embededness in and responsibility to the rest of creation.

If this alternate narrative is right, then the evolutionary story can be seen in a different perspective. Human beings are one among millions of species in whom God takes delight. The story of creation is more of an open-ended process than a static, once-and-for-all act, one that gives rise to a multiplicity of beings that reflect some facet of the divine goodness.

And the creator has many purposes, or many stories to tell. The overarching story is that of God’s overflowing goodness in creating other beings, beings with whom God wishes to share God’s self. Within that story are sub-plots, like that of humanity. Instead of seeing humanity as the jewel of creation, maybe a truer story would be that we are the prodigal son of creation, the ones who go off and squander the riches left to us by our Father. But the Father is constantly calling us back, willing to mend the broken relationship between us so that we can be restored to our proper place in the household. This isn’t a measure of how great we are, but of how great God’s love is.

I’m not claiming to have solved all the problems evolutionary thought poses for religion (far from it!), but in this case I think a better understanding of the natural world can actually point us to a deeper understanding of our faith. (I’ll likely have more to say about Rachels’ moral project in a later post.)

16 responses to “The cosmic prodigal son”

  1. Have your read anything by Steven Charleston or George Tinker? It really requires that we relinquish a particular view about creation, that we dwell in creation rather than possess creation, that we are a part of creation rather than creation’s owner. They both make the point apropos to this week that the struggle between First Nations and Europeans was in fact a religious struggle on precisely the ground of creation and God’s presence therein.

    1. I had the distinct pleasure of meeting Bp. Charleston and hearing him give a talk on the BVM at the Episcopal parish I attended for a year in Boston. Seemed like a wonderful, gracious man! Just browsed some of Tinker’s work on Amazon–looks very interesting. Thanks!

  2. A few points on the imago dei.

    First, when I took Old Testament Hermeneutics from Meredith Kline, he emphasized that the imago dei was not to be identified with humanness. He inductively came up with a list of attributes common to restored humanity and angels and God. (Sitting in council and luminosity stuck in my mind. Don’t put too literal an emphasis on the sitting part!)

    Second, C.S. Lewis in his Space Trilogy, while emphasizing rationality, saw possibilities of this going beyond the human. His three rational Martian races, or hnau, bore the image.

    Lastly, I have found interesting discussion in Dean Koontz where the possibility of the divine image existing in a laboratory-produced super intelligent dog was discussed.

    The term “image” is itself somewhat poetic, so I think there can be some slippage and mystery to it. What can be an image of something else can be a more or less matter. In any case, I think the idea that this was confined to “humanness” left my mind long ago. I think you make some good suggestions as to how some of what is considered “orthodox” has been considered too narrowly by Rachels. Further speculation might show that there are many ways different elements of orthodox teaching could still be compatible with a Darwinian world picture. Knowing just what constitutes a contradiction is difficult, as we may not see all the possibilities of how a synthesis might be framed.

  3. Caelius Spinator

    Re: Rick Ritchie

    “Second, C.S. Lewis in his Space Trilogy, while emphasizing rationality, saw possibilities of this going beyond the human. His three rational Martian races, or hnau, bore the image.”

    Indeed, but as I read this post, I recalled that the Venusians were human(oid), because of the Incarnation made it fitting that all future hnau be in that form.

    If there is any strong Biblical argument for human “exceptionalism”, it lies in the Incarnation. But Christopher rightly has been pointing out, that’s an extremely serious responsibility. As we grow into some of the knowledge and power of the creator (see the Job passage), we bear more and more of the responsibility for creation, to paraphrase the Apostle, being like God is not something to be snatched at…

    From the secular perspective, humans have become ecologically unique. We don’t have a specialized niche. We can occupy the greatest diversity of habitats. We now create our own food chains. We’ve manipulated natural selection in ourselves in countless ways: from antibiotics to glasses to Caesarean sections that don’t result in death. We’ve manipulated natural selection in plants and animals. If there is no rational creator, we are the most powerful rational beings. A more well-considered Christian perspective could be a badly needed corrective to a consistent secular view, many important elements of which Rachels apparently ignores.

    1. I think this is a good point. There is a certain de facto “dominion” that we have whether we like it or not. And, as Spider-Man’s Uncle Ben put it, “With great power comes great responsibility.”

  4. I’m new to the whole process of questioning anthropocentric theology but as I’ve thought about it a bit it doesn’t seem like much of a stretch to say that the God became man in the Incarnation not because everything is about humanity but because humanity has some capacity to understand and declare the event that animals do not have. It’s not at all difficult to see how people would think that because Jesus came as a man then the Incarnation was a declaration of the superiority (or whatever) of humanity. But if the creation story tells us that we are stewards of creation then perhaps the Incarnation tells us we are stewards of redemption. That it is a message entrusted to us, though not centered in us.

    Of course, that’s not a new idea. It just struck me in a particular way when thinking about these issues.

  5. Jeremy makes vital points imho. We must remember that that most poetic of Prologues declares the Word became flesh, yes particularly as human, but this is Good News for all creatures, not just us. And we have not generally been Good News for our fellow creatures, though Jesus Christ is. It isn’t simply rationality that makes us imago Dei, but how it is we are toward others, its sociality. I would remind that Aquinas went so far as to say the entire creation was imago Dei. Nowhere does Genesis tell us that other creatures are not in the image of God, and an iconic view of the world in the end, premised as it is on the Incarnation, decides rather to greet all as Christ. Rather than think of this in terms of exceptionalism, perhaps thinking of this in the same terms as the Law given to the Hebrews, as responsibility and burden would be safer. In either case, Jesus is unique, as fully God, fully human, something we are not, and that should be warning to us that we are not God. The more we are like God, the more we find ourselves not just declaring Good News, but being Good News, and that resides in seeing ourselves as servants and stewards not dominators and lords. There is one Lord, and Creation and fellow creatures can claim Him against us as well.

  6. Great comments all around.

  7. I have a question which may or may not be germane to the discussion. Since angels are higher in the chain of being than humans, and and since the classical Christian tradition posits an angelic fall as prior to the human fall, do any theologians bother answering the question, Why did the Incarnation happen in a human being and not in an angel?

    I’m getting ready to read Cur Deus Homo? so maybe I will be able to answer this question myself shortly, but why wait?

    1. One interesting thing Anselm says is that the number of human beings restored to blessedness is necessary in part to replace the fallen angels. But I can’t remember offhand if he explains why the bad angels can’t be redeemed.

      Of course, if angels are immaterial beings, as tradition holds, there couldn’t exactly be an “enfleshment” in angelic form. Maybe a “finitization”?

  8. This is more speculative, but I know that some of the fathers and classic philosophers said that humanity, being a mixture of soul and body, was the link between the material and immaterial worlds, or occupied the central link on the Great Chain of Being. So maybe it makes a certain sense that the Incarnation would occur in a human, since we, so to speak, tie creation together.

  9. I think there are at least two alternatives here. One is, I think there was an idea of our materiality adding more contingency to our beings. Perhaps our characters are less set in stone than those of angels. We are not yet in our final state. When the corruptible has put on immortality, we shall be. Had Adam and Eve taken from the Tree of Life right after the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, they might have been immortal, but without remedy. Immortality, once conferred, might preclude certain kinds of change. The second alternative is to take the rescue of humanity and not angels to show that God’s grace really is something lavish. God does not have to rescue a race that falls. Perhaps He was accused (by the Accuser) of being stingy with grace. So He created another race and then embarked on a costly rescue. In these forms, the alternatives seem to be exclusive of each other, in a way I had not realized until now. The first would seem to argue for a necessity of not rescuing angels. The second would argue the possibility of a rescue.

  10. Finally got to the end of Cur Deus Homo, and Anselm, responding to a question on whether the Devil himself will be saved, says No, because apparently each angel is a unique creation. There’s no common angelic nature that all angels take part in, so not only is the devil not saved because he doesn’t share the human nature that the Son assumed, as far as I can tell, for the Son to save the fallen angels would have had to do multiple incarnations, one for each angel who fell, and I’m guessing that the conclusion to draw is that that’s a bit too much incarnating!

  11. Ah, right–St. Thomas says the same thing: each angel is a species unto itself.

  12. I wonder where they got that information. It isn’t that I find the idea implausible. But I would think it would be speculative at best. On the other hand, I sometimes find that something that at first sounded like wild speculation is very grounded in the text. Anyway, it’s probably no more speculative than the contingency ideas I’ve heard.

    1. For St. Thomas it’s based, at least partly, on his aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotle says, roughly, that there are two components, or aspects, to any individual being: form and matter. Form is what gives the thing its essential properties or characteristics, while matter is the “stuff” that makes it a distinct individual. So, for instance, in the case of a human being, the form is the universal human nature, and the matter is what makes him an individual distinct from other individuals.

      But since angels are immaterial, there is no matter to individuate them. Thus they are pure form, and since forms=species, each angel is a species unto itself.

      At least that’s how I remember it. I’m a bit rusty on my medieval philosophy.

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