A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

Doubting Dawkins

An excerpt from Keith Ward’s Why There Almost Certainly Is a God, a response to Richard Dawkins. (In Ward’s defense, he’s been debating Dawkins for years, so this isn’t cheap bandwagon jumping.)

The world of philosophy, of resolute thought about the ultimate nature of things, is a very varied one, and there is no one philosophical view that has the agreement of all competent philosophers. But in this world there are very few materialists, who think we can know that mind is reducible to electrochemical activity in the brain, or is a surprising and unexpected product of purely material processes.

In the world of modern philosophy, there are idealists, theists, phenomenalists, common sense pragmatists, scientific realists, sceptics and materialists. These are all going concerns, living philosophical theories of what is ultimately real. This observation does not settle any arguments. But it puts Dawkins’ ‘alternative hypothesis’ in perspective. He is setting out to defend a very recent, highly contentious, minority philosophical world-view. Good. That is the sort of thing we like to see in philosophy! But it will take a lot of sophisticated argument to make it convincing. It is not at all obvious.

Though this is only an excerpt, I think the objection an atheist would naturally raise is that, even if most of history’s great philosophers have been idealists (in the sense of believing that reality has something mind-like as at least one of its most fundamental constituents), we now think that many things can be explained without appealing to consciousness or purpose. Not that I think that’s a knock-down argument by any means, but it’s a challenge that needs to be addressed (and I assume Ward addresses it in the book).

3 responses to “Doubting Dawkins”

  1. It seems that Ward’s main thrust, in what you quoted, is that Dawkins’s arguments, or kinds of arguments, are not about “obvious” or manifest things, and shouldn’t immediately be taken as authoritative. Maybe he is trying to weaken the strength of Dawkins’s claims by saying that he is merely another philosopher in a long development, thereby excluding Dawkins from any claims to self-evident arguments. (?)

    “But it will take a lot of sophisticated argument to make it convincing.”

    This seems to be a bit of a jab at Dawkins, who might claim that his arguments only need to be plain and straightforward. (?)

  2. Ward seems to be taking advantage of the narrowness of vision of the recent handful of public advocates for atheism, several of whom have scientific training and none of whom seem to be primarily philosophers – much less philosophers of religion.

    Too many contemporary atheists at least seem to want to make atheism at least appear to entail physicalism, which of course it does not.

    Also, many people seem unaware that philosophers do not ordinarily argue against theism by arguing for physicalism or any other grand metaphysical view.

    Generally, atheists try to make their point by undermining the arguments for the existence of God, attacking the coherence of the concept of God, and attacking the credibility of revelation or, as we say in connection with the heathen religions, the credibility of the myths.

    In addition, most of them take the existence of evil to afford a usable premise for an argument against the existence of God just as the ancients thought it a point against the existence of providence.

    A great many of the most influential and best known 20th Century atheists were phenomenalists or neutral monists, and many atheists in all ages have not been materialists.

    Hume, always quoted in attacks on theism, was himself the grand-daddy of phenomenalists and Kant, sometimes cited as having established that all theist arguments are necessarily invalid, was far from materialism.

    Perhaps the most famous of atheists of the mid to late 20th Century, Jean-Paul Sartre was a unique kind of phenomenologist (many even called him a Cartesian) and Camus’s views on the relevant points are unclear.

    Atheism commits no one to anything but disbelief in any personal God or gods.

    It never did.

    You cannot disprove it by disproving materialism.

  3. All true. Though, to be fair, in a book critiquing Dawkins, he’s not really obliged to answer arguments Dawkins doesn’t make. 😉

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