A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

The bar of reason

Marvin reproduced an interesting quote from Gary Dorrien, who Google tells me is the Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics at Union Theological Seminary and Professor of Religion at Columbia University. Dorrien offers this definition of a “liberal approach” to theology:

theology should be based on reason and critically interpreted religious experience, not external authority.

Depending on how key terms are defined, I’d have to say that I substantially agree with this.

A lot of 20th-century philosophy has taught us to mistrust appeals to “reason” and “experience;” we’re told that they are context-dependent, tradition-bound, and embedded in language.

While these are all valid points, the core of what Dorrien seems to be saying here seems unaffected.

“Reason” doesn’t need to be thought of as a kind of infallible algorithm for arriving at truth, or a means of shedding all our existing cultural, social, and linguistic baggage to adopt a “God’s-eye” view of the world (or, a “view from nowhere” as Thomas Nagel puts it).

And “experience” is not an unmediated apprehension of the world as it is independent of any subjective elements we may bring to bear.

I doubt Dorrien, or any critical thinker in the 21st century, would be making such claims.

But there are understandings of reason and experience that are relevant to testing theological (or any other) truth claims.

When some claim is presented for my belief, one thing I might do is consider whether it is reasonable and whether it comports with my experience. “Reasonable” here needn’t refer to some a priori faculty for arriving at truth; it can simply mean that it is consistent with the laws of logic and with widely-known and accepted truths about the world.

And experience is just that: my experience and other people’s experience of the world, including their moral, aesthetic, and religious experience.

None of this implies that reason and experience are “context independent” or “universal” in allowing an unbiased view of the world. That’s precisely why we, if we’re smart, try to widen our base of knowledge and experience by learning from other people, other cultures, traditions, religions, etc. This is a very piecemeal, fallibilist view of knowledge, but I don’t know what the alternative is.

In deciding whether to accept a certain truth claim, then, what other procedure can we follow but to see how it fits with what we know about the world and what we’ve experienced of it?

Thus any theological truth claim presented for our belief that 1. conflicts with the laws of logic (e.g., is self-contradictory); 2. contradicts well-established truths about the world (e.g., well-established findings of science); or 3. can’t make sense of widespread moral, aesthetic, or religious experience is, I submit and other things being equal, likely to be false.

On the positive side, if such a claim supports or is entailed by other knowledge, or provides a more satisfying interpretation of our experience than the alternatives, or sheds new light on previously accepted truths we have good reason (again, other things being equal) to adopt it.

Of course, as Dorrien mentions, many religions have been uncomfortable with this piecemeal sifting and testing of truth and have looked for refuge in an appeal to authority, such as the authority of an infallible church, pope, Bible, tradition or whatever.

But as we well know, this just pushes the question back a step: How am I decide which authority is infallible? The only way I can do it is by appealing to my (fallible!) knowledge (or reason) and experience. What other way is there? Again, not an abstract, universal knowledge and experience, but the knowledge and experience I actually have, supplemented by that of others.

I don’t know if this makes me a “liberal” or not by Dorrien’s standards; I consider the actual content of my theological beliefs to be fairly traditional. Food for thought.

More from Dorrien on liberal theology here.

13 responses to “The bar of reason”

  1. So what does someone who takes a liberal approach to theology do with the idea of revelation, which could contradict both reason and experience? In fact, it would seem that any supernatural event would by definition contradict reason and experience.

  2. Good question. I guess the first thing I’d want to get clear on is how we distinguish between “revelation” and religious experience more broadly. We want to say (we being Christians) that God reveals himself in special ways – preeminently in the life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Jesus. So how does, say, Paul’s experience of the risen Christ differ from, say, Julian of Norwich’s? Is there a difference in kind or a difference in degree?

    It seems to me that all revelation has to be received according to human capacities. So maybe “revelation” refers to the objective side of this relationship – God’s self-initiated communication to us – and “experience” refers to our subjective receipt of it? But if that’s so, then is all religious experience (or at least all true or genuine religious experience) initiated by God? And is the distinction between “general” and “special” revelation helpful here? Much to ponder…

  3. How about we talk about reason as a verb rather than as a noun? We use reason as a tool for evaluating truth claims, but it is not an independent source of knowledge? Reason as a tool, but not as a source? Does that distinction make sense? Because nothing in my sense of reason or even experience would lead me to believe in the Resurrection. But if i take Resurrection as a starting point, I can use reason to help me understand some things about the world in light of the resurrection.

  4. Yeah, I think that’s helpful. Unless you’re a Platonist (not that I think there’s anything necessarily wrong with that!), reason isn’t really a source of truths.

    But, at the same time, can’t I also ask why I believe in the Resurrection, or even what it means to say that I believe in the Resurrection? And doesn’t that ultimately involve some kind of appeal to reasons and experience, etc.? I realize explanation/justification has to stop at some point, but are theological claims just brute facts that we take or leave?

  5. I agree with Leslie Newbigin, who said, “The resurrection cannot possibly be accomodated within any plausibility structure, except one of which it is the cornerstone.” (Proper Confidence: Faith, Doubt, and Uncertainty in Christian Discipleship, 1995, p. 93). And the only analogy for the resurrection is the creation of the universe itself. If there were a principle out there by which we could evaluate Jesus, then we could just worship that principle and forget about Jesus.

    N. T. Wright has said that faith in the resurrection cannot be proven, but unfaith can be challenged. Everyone has a starting point, and for the church throughout the ages, it has been “Jesus Christ is Lord.” This is like the lense through which we see the world, and it helps us bring the world into focus. but we don’t usually take off the glasses and look at the glasses themselves. I don’t think that’s possible. As soon as we take off one pair of glasses, we immediately put on another pair. At no time do we look at the glasses with the naked eye.

    John Wesley allowed for ‘experience’ but this was not a general universal human experience, but rather the particular experience of Christian discipleship in the Christian community- God’s Spirit bears witness with our Spirit that we are children of God.

  6. Okay, I haven’t read Newbigin, so I’ll have to check him out. But the quote you offer sounds suspiciously like saying “You can’t decide whether the resurrection happened without first being a Christian.”

    And it seems clear that there are principles by which we evaluate Jesus (depending on what we mean by “evaluate”); if we recognize Jesus as exhibiting a particularl kind of goodness (even if to an unparalleled degree), doesn’t that imply we have some idea of goodness by which we recognize him?

    I’m also not sure I agree with N.T. Wright: it seems to me that throughout Christian history there have been various “prolegomena” to faith. It’s not like you start with the resurrection without any background beliefs about God, the universe, etc. is it? Or am I misunderstanding?

    I will definitely try to check out Newbigin, though.

  7. More of the Newbigin quote:

    There is a long tradition of Christian theology that goes under the name “apologetics” and that seeks to
    respond to this question [How can we know that Christianity is true?] and to demonstrate the “reasonableness” of Christianity. The assumption often
    underlying titles of this kind is that the Gospel can be made acceptable by showing that it does not contravene the requirements of reason as we understand them within the
    contemporary plausibility structure. The heart of my argument is that this is a mistaken policy. The story the
    church is commissioned to tell, if it is true, is bound to call into question any plausibility structure, which is
    founded on other assumptions. The affirmation that the One by whom and through whom all creation exists is to be identified with a man who was crucified and rose bodily from the dead cannot possibly be accommodated within any plausibility structure except one of which it is the
    cornerstone.

    The N. T. Wright comment I made above is taken from Simply Christian. But in his long book on the Resurrection, he makes a pretty ‘reasonable’ case for why the resurrection really happened. He actually comes closer to ‘proving’ the resurrection than many Yale/Duke theologians would be comfortable with. N. T. Wright looks at the meaning of the concept of resurrection in the context of first century Judaism. He thus eliminates the Borg interpretation of symbolic resurrection, because if that’s what the earliest followers of Jesus believed in, they would not have used the word, resurrection. He also notes that of all the messianic movements in Judaism, only the one surrounding Jesus of Nazareth contined after its leader’s death. He then asks what could possibly explain the phenomenon of early Christianity, and the most ‘reasonable’ explanation would be the resurrection of Jesus. But again, he doesn’t think he’s proving the resurrection, he’s just saying that the other explanations are not as satisfying. Not an air-tight case, but better than the other explanations.

  8. I agree with Jonathan, and think Newbigin is right (along with Wright) that ‘knowledge’ of the Resurrection is not really possible according to some apparently ‘objective’ reason. I think recent philosophy is right to see the very possibility of this kind of objective reason as a myth, and a pretty damaging one. Isn’t the choice here between the Anselmian notion that ‘unless I first believe, I shall not understand’ (‘faith seeking understanding’, a la Newbigin), and the more modern notion of ‘unless I first understand, I will not believe’ (or at the extremity, I believe only what I can verify scientifically or rationally)?

    The issue I have with Dorrien’s statement at the top, is that it is so internalising; it tends towards a kind of intellectual autonomy and self-determination, which I think is problematic for faith in God. I think it automatically places faith (which is necessarily faith in something *external*) in opposition to reason – but I don’t think that dichotomy stands. Rather (as the phrase ‘faith seeking understanding’ expresses), faith and reason need to be working together, infused, even if faith can sometimes take us places where reason cannot (like belief in the Resurrection, which is scientifically absurd … [even if we then seek to understand more about the Resurrection after choosing to believe it, as Wright said above]).

    But I think, ultimately, this union of faith and reason together is what your post is getting at, and I agree completely on that. I guess we might (?) agree that most Christians would do well to *think* a little more about what they believe!

  9. […] 2, 2009 by Lee Jeremy and Jonathan both provided some good comments and helpful pushback on this post. Here are some follow-up […]

  10. Hi Simon,

    Thanks for your comment. I don’t think our positions are very far apart, best as I can tell. (See my latest post for some clarifications and a bit of backpedaling.)

    I agree that there’s not a sharp dichotomy between faith and reason. At the same time, though, I think there may be a false dichotomy lurking under the opposition of “unless I first believe, I shall not understand’ (’faith seeking understanding’, a la Newbigin), and the more modern notion of ‘unless I first understand, I will not believe’ ” as you put it. Surely some degree of understanding has to precede belief, otherwise we seem to be saying that Christianity can never be understood (at all?) from the outside. (Let’s not forget that Anselm also attempted to provide a rationalistic proof of God’s existence and the incarnation!) Though I certainly agree that there’s a certain kind of understanding that comes only with “existential” commitment.

  11. Re. the false dichotomy- yeah, we can’t hold these distinctions too rigidly. And you’re right about Anselm- recognising that we cannot fully ‘prove’ Christianity rationally, doesn’t mean we completely evacuate apologetics, or abandon any kind of rational defence of the faith (some common sense has to come into it). It’s just that we know those things have limitations, and that there are other things going on too (e.g. your ‘existential commitment’).

  12. I’ve got further thoughts up at Avdat.

    I think it’s worth noting that the jury is still out on Anselm’s relationship between faith and reason. Herrera argues that the quote “unless I first believe, I shall not understand” needs to be understood in the context of what Anselm says about faith in Cur Deus Homo. For Anselm, because “faith comes by hearing,” he sees some usefulness for reason prior to faith. Grace gives the will, rendered defective by the Fall, the power to order reason toward faith. Faith then orders reason to understanding and finally a beatific vision.

    By Herrera’s reading, Barth is wrong, and Theology is not strictly faith seeking understanding.

  13. I never found Barth’s to be a particularly persuasive interpretation of Anselm (or at least what Anselm thought he was doing). I mean, he just plain says in Cur Deus Homo that he’s going to argue for the incarnation “as though nothing concerning Christ were known”!

    Also: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/#FaiSeeUndChaPurAnsThePro

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