A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

Singer and Cowen on poverty

Interesting “diavlog” between Peter Singer and libertarian economist Tyler Cowen, focusing mostly on Singer’s new book The Life You Can Save. (I mentioned the book here; I still haven’t read it, though I do have a request in at the library.)

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I think at one point Cowen gets into some fairly outlandish thought experiments that aren’t particularly relevant to evaluating a moral theory. I generally think that moral rules exist to equip us to deal with the world as it is, not with a highly hypothetical, if possible, world. For instance, he seems to suggest that Singer’s consequentialism has counterintuitive results because it implies that one ought to want one’s granddaughter to be genetically programmed to be more altruistic, even to the point of selling her baby to benefit 30 people living in dire poverty. And this seems to conflict with moral sentiments most of us currently have. But, of course, as Singer points out, to truly result in the best consequences, this engineering would have to have been perfected, the daughter would have to experience no sense of loss or separation from her child, etc., etc. Once you’ve changed so many of the features of the real world in your thought experiment, its relevance as a counterexample becomes less clear. Similar things happen with other objections to utilitarianism. The classic case is the secret murder of an innocent person to provide some great social benefit; once all the details of such a situation has been tweaked to make it realistic, much of the initial sense of counterintuitiveness tends to dissipate (e.g., if no one would find out, if it wouldn’t undermine the rule of law, if no one else would be adversely affected, etc., etc.). I’m not a utilitarian per se, but I do think there are good responses to many of the most common objections. And other moral views do seem to have a consequentialist “tipping point” where rights or duties or whatever yield to some kind of utilitarian calculus. (I’m not sure if Cowen really objects to utilitarianism on these grounds or if he’s more playing devil’s advocate.)

More importantly though, am I the only one who thinks Peter Singer sounds eerily like Jermaine from Flight of the Conchords?

3 responses to “Singer and Cowen on poverty”

  1. The scenario sounds a bit Kantian. That is, it is testing whether or not acting according to the theory is something we could wish for everyone. Singer’s response does bring out something important. Singer would feel like he had won if he could change human nature beyond recognition to achieve the good consequences. This clearly sets him apart from ethical theories that focus on what it means to live a good human life.

    If there always were such a thing, the consequentialist tipping point could be framed in more than one way. It would be one thing to say that at a certain point, the consequences are so dire that people stop acting according to their own ethic and start acting according to consequentialism. But you might also frame the move from within the other system. At a certain point the virtuous person exercises the virtue of prudence. Prudence is a virtue that, among other things, deals with dire consequences.

  2. That’s a good point you make in the first paragraph–does ethics tell us how to live as good humans, or does it license changing human nature if we can? C.S. Lewis wrestled with this in The Abolition of Man; I’m not really sure what I want to say about it at the end of the day: how much tampering with our genetic make-up, for instance, would be required for it to count as a fundamental alteration in human nature (as opposed to piecemeal improvements like removing a predisposition for a certain disease)?

    You second point is well-taken too. In fact, I’m inclined to think that no ethical framework (virtues, consequences, duties, etc.) provides a single best way to think about ethics. I tend to think they all get at certain aspects of our ordinary ethical thought and practice. And I think I’m getting more comfortable with the idea that we don’t need a systematic theory of ethics, that it’s more of a practical than a theoretical enterprise (as Aristotle suggested of course!).

  3. […] waiting for my copy of Singer’s book from the library. (See here and here for relevant […]

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