A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

Notes on an animal theodicy and soteriology

Early in my blogging career (on Verbum Ipsum, my Blogspot predecessor to ATR) I, perhaps with delusions of grandeur, wrote a five-part series called “The Atonement and the Problem of Evil” (the series is archived here: Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V). My reason for writing it was a hunch that the problem of evil is best addressed not just by trying to answer the question “Why is there so much evil in the world?” but also by talking about what God is doing about the evil in the world. Theodicy should not be separated from soteriology, in other words.

I think it holds up fairly well, but in retrospect I see that I neglected an important topic, the problem of animal suffering. Many thinkers including C.S. Lewis and one of my old teachers, philosopher (and atheist) William Rowe see the problem of animal suffering as one of the most difficult problems for any theodicy. This is because none of the standard responses to human suffering seem available for dealing with non-human suffering. Animals can’t be morally improved by suffering, nor can they be said to deserve their suffering as punishment for sin. It can’t even be chalked up to a necessary consequence of free will, since we don’t think animals have free will, at least not in sense used by traditional “free will” theodicies. In short, much animal suffering seems to be severe, gratuitous, and without redeeming features of any sort. The question, then is whether we have reason to believe that God is a) concerned about animal suffering and b) is going to do something about it.

I think we do have reasons to believe that God is concerned about animal suffering and will do something about it based on the kind of God that we believe he has revealed himself as. All Christians agree that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus reveal the character of God. This character is one of self-giving love that enters into solidarity with us by sharing our human condition. And this love is exemplified on the Cross as nowhere else: Jesus “loved his own to the end” (Jn. 13.1). But does this have any relevance for animal suffering? In his Animal Theology Andrew Linzey suggests that the Cross shows us not only God’s solidarity with human suffering, but God’s solidarity with the suffering of all sentient creatures. “If it is true that God is the Creator and sustainer of the whole world of life, then it is inconceivable that God is not also a co-sufferer in the world of non-human creatures as well” (p. 50).

If God has entered into solidarity and made a new covenant not only with all human beings, but with “all flesh,” then it might not be too much of a stretch to think that God will raise all flesh, all sentient creatures, to newness of life. If Jesus is the firstfruits of a new creation, why shouldn’t we follow the Bible in anticipating that this will include more than human beings? This seems a more promising approach to theodicy than one that tries to write off animal suffering as necessary to the greater good of the whole. If “not even a sparrow falls” without our Heavenly Father’s knowledge, can we consign billions of sentient creatures to exclusion from his Kingdom?

Obviously any kind of post-mortem existence for animals raises some difficult questions since we don’t really know what kind of “selves” animals have, especially the lower ones. Then again, there are some difficult questions about post-mortem human existence and I don’t know that we can draw a bright line between human beings and other animls such that only the former are capable of surviving death. Whatever else we know it seems virtually certain that animals have some degree of “subjectivity” which could, in principle, be resurrected or re-embodied in some way.

If Christians are right that God created the world and called it good and that he entered into that creation in a unique and miraculous way, then I think we can reasonably suppose that God has purposes for his creation that extend beyond his purposes for human beings. Clearly we occupy a pivotal position in those purposes if Christian teaching is to be believed, but we don’t exhaust them. Did God create the natural world and billions of living creatures merely to discard them? Just as we believe that our bodies will, in some way that we can’t really imagine, be raised, I think we can hopefully affirm that our animal kin will be raised to share, in a way appropriate to their natures, in the life of the Blessed Trinity.

5 responses to “Notes on an animal theodicy and soteriology”

  1. “it seems virtually certain that animals have some degree of “subjectivity” which could, in principle, be resurrected or re-embodied in some way.”

    I’d qualify this that SOME animals have some degree of subjectivity.

    Certain sea slugs have, I think I remember, thirty or so neurons. Hard to see what kind of subjectivity they could have. Ditto for a jellyfish, with no neurons.

  2. Yeah, that was sloppy of me. Certainly higher mammals, and probably birds. And I’d want to give the benefit of the doubt at least to reptiles and fish. 😉

  3. Likewise, at the end of his life, John Wesley wrote some about this as well, believing that God also has a place for all of creation, including animals. I don’t exactly remember the specific places in Wesley, but Michael Lodahl references this in his God of Nature and of Grace, put out by Kingswood Books.

    Peace,

    Eric

  4. I can’t tell you how pleased I am to have found your blog, Lee! I got here by way of Hugo.

    I’ve only read two of your posts so far, this one and “Brownback vs. Darwin?”. Both were light bulb experiences for me.

    Particularly in this post, I was struck by the realization that my own revulsion to accounts of animal cruelty have some grounded religious reasoning. I’ve always felt that animal suffering was somehow worse a thing, more vile an affront to God, than human suffering. However poor a humanist that may make me, there it is.

    And reading about its impact on theodicy, my gut feeling seems vindicated. It’s precisely because there’s no warrant for such a thing to be.

    A couple final thoughts, regarding your two-part rhetorical:

    Do we have reason to believe that God is
    a) concerned about animal suffering and
    b) is going to do something about it.

    I would answer that with “yes and no, respectively”. Not to sidetrack too severely on personal views of God’s nature, but I feel that if one were to look at God as the watchmaker here, He is absolved from much responsibility, other than initially setting the great machine. It’s now winding along on its own with free willed agents (us), doing what we tend to do (evil, toward each other and animals).

    And your last question:

    Did God create the natural world and billions of living creatures merely to discard them?

    This is really an anthropocentric question. Why would it be out of the question for an omniscient Being to do such a thing?

    Thanks again for the great read!

  5. Hi Rob, thanks for stopping by – I’m glad you’ve liked what you’ve read so far.

    Regarding your first point, I think there’s an issue not only with the abuse we inflict on animals as a result of our free will, but the very structure of a universe that seems to inevitably entail a lot of animal suffering even without human intervention. Starvation, predation, natural disaster, etc. are facts of nature even leaving aside human evil.

    On the second point, you’re right of course if we regard God’s sense of justice as so disanalogous to our own that we can’t confidently say what it would be right or wrong for God to do. I’m not convinced we’re totally adrift here, though.

    Cheers,

    Lee

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