A Qualified Retraction

Thanks to some comments from Marcus and a conversation with the wife, I’m now convinced that the argument in this post doesn’t show the impermissibility of “collateral damage.”

For if C (the innocent bystander) doesn’t have a duty to sacrifice himself to save A, it doesn’t seem like we can say that A has an obligation to sacrifice himself to save C. In other words, what we get is a kind of “lifeboat” situation where two people’s rights come into irreconcilable conflict and one person has to be sacrificed.

However, this would only seem to be the case in instances where the use of lethal force is the only way for A to save himself. If A can defend himself in some other way, he has the obligation to take that route (even perhaps at considerable risk to himself).

Comments

2 responses to “A Qualified Retraction”

  1. Marcus

    Ah. Good man. And good wife.

    😉

    As for me, I do not agree A has the right to unintentionally but foreseeably kill really innocent C to save his own life, though I cannot claim I would myself have the courage to avoid wrongdoing in this situation.

    Much less, I think, may A kill innocent C intentionally to save his own life, either when he knows he will be killed by B if he does not, or when C is a merely innocent threat (the famous fat guy blocking the exit from the cave), or when C is an innocent human shield between A and the one, B, who will actually kill him (A, that is).

    Nor do I agree, as your remarks seem to suggest, that persons in the much abused lifeboat situation are in a moral free-for-all where anyone who can may licitly kill any or all of the others in order to survive.

    I wonder if our differences arise from some difference in our approaches to this question?

    You seem to pose the question first in terms of rights, then ask whether and how these may generate correlative duties.

    But I approach the question first of all in terms of what is wrong, or right, or a duty. I don’t even need to ask any questions about rights.

    Or is it that you ask from the point of view of the patient of the action? And I ask from the point of view of the agent?

  2. Lee

    Well, let me make one clarification: I’m not saying it’s okay to unintentionally but foreseeably kill an innocent. I’m saying that the argument I posted below doesn’t show that it’s wrong. It may be wrong for other reasons.

    I agree that it is never okay to intentionally take an innocent life. The question raised by DDE is whether there is a morally significant distinction between intentionally killing and unintentionally but forseeably killing. Not sure about that.

    Regarding the “lifeboat” situation – maybe such a situation shows the limits of the “rights” model? I agree that “rights-talk” isn’t the best way to think about morality, though it does have its uses as an alternative to consequentialism.

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