By “epistemological imperialism” I mean demanding that a particular subject matter be knowable by means unsuited to it. We don’t expect the same precision from ethics that we expect from mathematics, and to insist upon that would be an instance of epistemological imperialism.

Likewise, the “brights” like Richard Dawkins demand that theology conform to the methods of the empirical sciences in order to be considered intellectually respectable. But what if the subject matter of theology is not amenable to those methods? Why should a single method be allowed to determine our entire ontology (what we think is real)?

There are good reasons, I think, for maintaining that God is not knowable by the methods of science. Science deals with what is observable, measurable and predictable (follows law-like patterns). God is not traditionally thought to be any of those things.

But this might sound like special pleading or begging the question. Alright, consider an analogy: in order to get to know another person, there are limits to what external observation can tell us. To really know someone they must reveal themselves to us. They can hide from us if they choose.

How much more would this be true of God, who exceeds us immeasurably in wisdom, power, knowledge and goodness? God’s utter transcendence virtually guarantees that he won’t be encompassable in our mundane categories of thought, or susceptible to our tools of inquiry. To demand that all that is must be knowable by the scientific method seems to exclude the divine a priori.

Moreover, can this epistemic principle – only science delivers truth – itself be demonstrated by the canons of science? It would seem not; how could such a sweeping principle be justified empirically? (This is really just a form of the traditional refutation of postivism.)

If God reveals himself as a person, then it may be that the disciplines of the self required to know God are different from the disciplines required to measure the distance between two stars. “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God” may be an epistemic principle. The saints and mystics report that their sense of God’s presence was heightened – a kind of special training analogous to that of the scientist. And maybe most of us occupy a similar position with respect to the saints as we do to the scientists – we take what they report as testimony.

Pascal advocated that we “wager” on God’s existence. I don’t think he meant this as a stopping point, but as a starting point. He suggests that, in the face of uncertainty, we start along the path, trusting that as we proceed things will become clearer. If we put ourselves in the right position, gain the right dispositions and virtues (through prayer, meditation, study, the sacraments, works of charity, etc.) we will come to know God. Is this so different from the disciplines that any honest inquirer has to undertake?