Category: Theology & Faith

  • Edwards on providence

    If God acts in a non-interventionist way as Denis Edwards suggests–acting through “secondary causes” and allowing natural processes and created beings their own proper autonomy–then what about events that theology has traditionally viewed as special divine actions that bypass the normal order of things? Let’s look at two cases: God’s providential ordering of all things (as traditional faith would have it) and unique, miraculous events. In this post I’ll talk about providence and save miracles for a later post.

    Traditionally, “providence” refers to God’s guiding of nature and history toward divinely chosen ends. Some theologians have gone so far as to say that God directly wills every event that occurs. But if, as Edwards maintains, God allows created being a level of autonomy and doesn’t act in an interventionist way to change the course of nature or history, then what becomes of providence?

    Edwards takes as an example of providence the development of life on Earth, including the emergence of human beings:

    In the approach I am advocating, this can be seen as a special act of God in the sense that God chooses, eternally, that the universe would bring forth biological life on our Earth by means of emergence and increasing complexity. What makes this act special is that (1) this action of God has a specific effect in creaturely history, the emergence of life in the universe, and (2) this specific effect is intended by God. (pp. 64-5)

    He goes on to say that this “act of God takes effect in and through all the regularities and constraints of nature, including chance events occurring within the structure provided by the laws of nature” and there are “no gaps in the causal explanation at the empirical level that theology should fill” (p. 65). God’s one act of choosing this world entails (or is identical with?) the act of choosing a world that would bring about the emergence of life.

    But does this mean that every event that happens must be viewed as a direct expression of God’s will? No, because while God wills to give his creatures good things, he also respects the processes by which they come into being, which can in turn have unpleasant side-effects:

    [T]he God who provides for me through secondary causes may also respect the proper autonomy of the created order. This means that while God can be seen as acting in secondary causes for my well-being, God may not be free to intervene in the functioning of secondary causes in a way that overturns the laws of nature in order to preserve me from suffering. (pp. 69-70)

    This may seem to be an arbitrary distinction, but we have to remember that, for Edwards, God’s nature is revealed in the self-giving love of Jesus. That’s why it makes sense to affirm that God sends us good things, regardless of merit, but also that God chooses to create through secondary causes and to respect their “freedom.”

  • Denis Edwards’ theology of divine action

    In his new book How God Acts, Australian Catholic theologian Denis Edwards offers an account of divine action that is conscious of the picture of the world offered by modern science, but takes its lead both from the Christian revelation of God in Christ, the insights of Karl Rahner, and a modified Thomist metaphysics. The result is what Edwards calls a “noninterventionist” view of God’s action in the world that, he maintains, can make allowances for God’s special or particular actions, such as providence, miracles, and the resurrection of Jesus.

    Science, Edwards says, reveals to us a universe that is multi-leveled and evolving, contains processes with their own integrity, and at least appears to move in a direction toward greater complexity. While this process results in the development of a marvelous diversity of life, sophisticated consciousness, and intelligent personhood, it also has costs in terms of the suffering and extinction of countless billions of living creatures. While the world may give hints of a divine intelligence, it is ambiguous enough to cause us to question whether a benevolent God is running the show.

    However, if we attend to the God revealed in the ministry, teachings, passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus, we may be led to a different picture of divine action–one that is actually more harmonious with the scientific world-view. The God of Jesus, Edwards observes, is a God of vulnerable love, a God who “waits upon creation.” Jesus’ parables picture the reign of God coming in small, often unnoticed ways. His eschatology, on one interpretation, is a “participatory” one where God’s work requires the cooperation of creatures. The picture Jesus paints is of a providential God who cares deeply for his creatures, but not a manipulative puppet-master.

    This understanding is reinforced when seen in light of the entire “Christ event.” In the resurrection of Jesus, God acts to “bring healing and hope to the world in a new creation” (pp. 25-6). But this comes only after the crucifixion. We needn’t see God as directly willing the death of Jesus, Edwards contends. Instead, we should understand that God in Jesus was wooing his creation back into a relationship of love. He was so willing to wait for humanity’s free response that he allows us to have our way, even to the extent of killing Jesus. However, God’s love refuses to give death and hatred the last word:

    Reflection on the Christ-event suggests a theology of divine action in which God actively waits upon creation, upon the unfolding of natural processes and upon the freedom of human responses, yet acts powerfully, faithfully, and lovingly to fulfill the divine promises. (pp. 29-30)

    To fill out this insight, Edwards draws upon Karl Rahner’s theology of creation and St. Thomas’s theology of divine action. Rahner sees the act of creation as a single act of divine “self-bestowal”: God seeks to give himself to something other than himself. This single act, Edwards proposes, has particular effects at various points throughout the created order. Thus every event can be seen as a manifestation of this single act of divine creativity without supposing that there are causal or explanatory “gaps” within the empirical world.

    Following St. Thomas, Edwards distinguishes between God as the “primary” cause of everything that is and created beings as genuine “secondary” causes with their own proper autonomy. There is no causal competition between God and creatures; God’s causality can only be spoken of analogically and operates at a different level than that of creatures. This is the metaphysical counterpart to the more ethical picture derived from the Christ-event: God allows creatures their own proper autonomy, enabling them to flourish. He is the cause or root of their freedom, not the limit of it.

    The way is then opened for Edwards to develop a genuinely “noninterventionist” account of divine action. If God is the power that enables creatures and created processes to exist and to exercise their own proper causality, then we can see God at work in the world without positing occasional divine “interventions” that break or override the “laws” of nature. God creates and exercises providential guidance of the world in and through created processes. “Divine action…works in and through the laws of nature rather than by violating, superseding, or bypassing them” (p. 55).

    This has implications the problem of evil, among other things. If God creates through natural processes and respects the relative autonomy of created reality, then it may be that God cannot (in some sense) prevent the evil that mortal flesh is prey to. Suffering, pain, predation, disease, and death may be necessary (again, in some sense) attendants to the process by which God brings about new life. If the picture of the evolution of the universe offered by science is even remotely accurate, we are compelled to think of God as being very patient in waiting on natural processes to bring sentient and personal life into being. But unlike, say, the God of process theology, who seems to be one being among others within a shared ontological framework, Edwards’ God is genuinely transcendent and the unqualified source of all that is. God respects the relative autonomy of creation, but will take action to bring the divine purposes to completion.

    (More to come in a later post…)

  • Teleology beyond biologism

    One addendum to the previous post. I noted that old-style “biological” teleology had largely fallen out of favor as a foundation for ethics. However, this doesn’t mean that Christian ethics can or should dispense with teleology altogether. I grazed this point when I said that “ultimate happiness consists in greater knowledge of and union with God or the Good…and this fulfillment only comes to complete fruition in the life to come.” Our telos, in Christian terms, is an eschatological one and is not given “immanently” in the created order. The same could be said of other creatures: if they are to share in the life of the world to come, then their proper end is a transcendent one too.

    This doesn’t mean that biology is irrelevant to understanding the goods proper to the lives of individual creatures. However, from a Christian perspective, the “natural order” doesn’t fully reflect God’s intention for his creatures. This is expressed in the traditional language of creation being “fallen,” which still has some salience, even if we reject the notion of a historical fall. Creation is, Christians believe, on the way to being transformed. The Risen Christ as the “first fruits” of the new creation provides us with a picture of our genuine end. This can and should inform Christian ethical thinking.

  • Creaturely goods and theistic ethics

    In comments to this post, Gaius asked some incisive questions about how a theist who accepts the general evolutionary picture of the world can avoid falling back on some form of divine command theory (also known as theological voluntarism).

    The problem arises because, post-Darwin, it’s difficult to attribute inherent purposive-ness to natural processes. But the old natural law ethics, which has probably been the chief alternative to divine command ethics in Christian history, rested on a teleological view of nature that no longer seems tenable: the good life consisted in realizing one’s essential nature.

    Maybe it’s my Platonistic inclinations, but I’ve never been particularly happy with this choice. I think a full understanding of value will inevitably make reference to the divine, but I don’t think moral rules are simply the arbitrary dictates of God. They are, I believe, rooted in the nature of things, but not properly accounted for by the “biologism” of some versions of natural law.

    My general view is that each individual creature is an expression of (or resembles, or participates in) the divine. The Catholic theologian Denis Edwards, following St. Bonaventure, puts it like this:

    In the life of the Trinity, everything flows from the fecundity of the Source of All, whom Bonaventure calls the Fountain Fullness (fontalis plenitude). He sees the eternal Word of Wisdom of God as the Exemplar, the image of Fountain Fullness. When God freely chooses to create, the fruitfulness of Trinitarian life finds wonderful expression in the diversity of creatures. Each different kind of creature is a reflection and image of the eternal Word. (Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith, p. 71)

    Creation, we can say, is a form of God’s self-expression. Thus, each creature, because it reflects the divine, has inherent value. Further, at least some of these creatures—human beings and many other animals—have an experiential welfare, or, to put it another way, their lives can go better or worse for them. And because these creatures have inherent value (being a reflection of the divine), their well-being matters, not just from their own point of view, but from a universal, or impartial, point of view.

    It’s clearly a matter of controversy what constitutes a good human life—that is, what it means for a human life to go better or worse for the one living it. But there do seem to be some universals. Pleasure, happiness, knowledge, freedom, and companionship seem to be among the goods universally prized by human beings. Likewise, all humans seek, other things being equal, to avoid pain, suffering, frustration, ignorance, bondage, and enmity. (A modified, though not wholly dissimilar, list could be provided for other animals.)

    So, it’s not merely a matter of God’s preference or whim that, say, happiness is preferable to misery. This is a fact rooted in the constitution of the world (which, of course, theists believe is ultimately traceable back to God). And for Christians at least, ultimate happiness consists in greater knowledge of and union with God or the Good. Nothing less will truly satisfy us (and this fulfillment only comes to complete fruition in the life to come).

    While this general picture makes reference to the nature of things, note that we’re not talking about “reading value off of biological processes” here. Clearly the kinds of goods that contribute to a human animal’s well-being are rooted in our biology, but biological processes as such don’t have the same status in this account as they do in some versions of natural law ethics. To take an obvious example, most of us no longer regard it as wrong per se to interfere with the process by which intercourse (sometimes) leads to conception. We need an independent moral criterion to decide when that may or may not be a good idea. And this will involve reference to the kinds of goods that make for a well-lived human life.

  • What are they saying about sex?

    Following up on the Countryman series, I have to wonder: Where is the serious Christian teaching on premarital sex? Or the purpose of sexuality more generally? He sketches out some principles, but I don’t know that our churches (i.e., mainline Protestant one) are really teaching much in the way of a substantive sexual ethic.

    It seems to me that it’s unrealistic to expect people to remain virgins until they’re married, particularly when people are frequently delaying marriage till their late 20s or early 30s (or beyond). Nor is it altogether clear how you’d justify such an expectation. Moreover, Christians do more harm than good when they insist that losing your virginity means losing your “purity” or that people who have sex before they’re married are somehow damaged goods.

    Mainliners typically don’t adopt the more zealous pro-chastity rhetoric and tactics favored by some evangelicals, but what have they replaced it with, if anything? What are teenagers and young adults in our churches learning about how they should carry out their sexual lives? Since I was not a churchgoer during that particular period of my life, I really have no idea what our churches are saying about this stuff. But it seems to me that we need to say something.

    I do get the impression that mainliners almost expect there to be a period during young adulthood when people leave the church and “sow their oats,” only to return once they’re settled down (married, having kids). So we can leave any teaching about pre-marital sex to a kind of benign neglect. Leaving aside whether this pattern will continue to hold (more likely, it seems to me, that fewer and fewer people will bother coming back to church), this hardly strikes me as a responsible approach since the vacuum left by the church will be filled with who-knows-what from the surrounding culture. But what is the alternative?

  • Countryman: Principles for a Christian sexual ethic

    We saw earlier that Countryman argues that we can’t, because of the vast gulf that separates our social world from those of the Bible, simply apply “the Biblical ethic” to contemporary concerns. But does that mean that the Bible has nothing to say to us regarding sexual ethics? By no means!

    First, as already mentioned, Countryman thinks that one of the chief functions of the Bible is to “relativize” our own social world by bringing us into contact with the very different ones of the biblical world. Second, and more importantly, the Bible records the transformation of the social world of first-century Christians as they encountered the gospel of God’s grace.

    If Scripture is important partly because it is alien to and therefore relativizes our own historical-cultural situation, it is even more important in that it can show, by reference to the way the grace of God broke into the self-sufficiency of another culture, how it breaks into our own as well. The New Testament writers did not try to construct a new sexual ethic from the ground up. They took over the existing cultural patterns and refocused them, pushing some elements from the center to the periphery, altering the balance of powers allotted to various members of society and, most important, relativizing the familiar life of this world by subordinating it to the reign of God. (p. 219)

    To provide a framework for doing the same in our own historical-cultural situation, Countryman offers six “generative principles” derived from the NT which, in turn, can offer guidance for navigating current ethical dilemmas in the realm of sex:

    1. “Membership in the Christian community is in no way limited by purity codes.” This means that nothing is “unclean” in itself, but only as it violates one of the other substantive principles. “To be specific, the gospel allows no rule against the following, in and of themselves: masturbation, nonvaginal heterosexual intercourse, bestiality[!*], polygamy, homosexual acts, or erotic art and literature” (p. 223). This doesn’t mean that there aren’t circumstances under which any of these might be wrong, but that wrongness doesn’t have to do with the “unclean” nature of any of these acts.

    2. “Christians must respect the sexual property of others and practice detachment from their own.” Countryman makes the interesting observation that “the New Testament interests itself in property not so much in order to defend me against my neighbor as to defend my neighbor against me” (p. 221). In other words, property–including the “property” each person has in his or her self–refers to a kind of zone of inviolability around each person. The corresponding point is that Christians ought to be ready to give up their own prerogatives in service to the neighbor’s well-being.

    3. “Where, in late antiquity, sexual property belonged to the family through the agency of the male householder, in our own era it belongs to the individual.” This principle is derived from the changed cultural situation rather than from the NT itself, and necessarily qualifies the previous principle. In our world “the individual is the primary arbiter of his or her sexual acts” (p. 222). Among other things, this implies that the goods one seeks in entering into a lasting sexual relationship no longer have to do primarily with political alliances between families, ensuring legitimate heirs, etc. Rather they are more likely to be intangible goods like “friendship, encouragement, counsel, solace, and a new sense of family to supplement and eventually replace the natal family” (p. 233)–in addition, of course, to the satisfaction of sexual desire.

    4. “The gospel can discern no inequality between men and women as they stand before God’s grace.” While the NT authors made certain accommodations to the social realities of their day, the trajectory of Christian ethics is toward one of egalitarianism between men and women. This qualifies, for example, any assessment of polygamy which, if not proscribed because of “impurity,” does not have the greatest track record when it comes to securing the dignity and well-being of women. In addition to “the revision of household rules and the alteration of household roles,” Christian egalitarianism calls for nothing less than “new understandings of manliness and womanliness” (p. 239). Countryman suggests that heterosexual couples could have much to learn from homosexual ones, who lack socially-prescribed roles and division of labor.

    5. “Marriage creates a union of flesh, normally indissoluble except by death.”
    In the ancient world, ensuring the virginity and fidelity of the bride was essentially to shoring up the familial property regime. But how does this principle apply to marriages based on the intangible “internal” goods mentioned above? Countryman flatly denies that we should expect young people getting married always, or even typically, to be virgins since “the goods sought in connection with marriage in an individual society are goods which can best be offered only by a mature person and such a person will more often than not have acquired some sexual experience” (p. 241). He goes on to suggest that the church might defer blessing marriages until a mature relationship has had time to develop and does not rule out, in principle, pre-marital sexual activity.

    6. “The Christian’s sexual life and property are always subordinate to the reign of God.”
    This is the most fundamental principle. Christians “belong” to Christ, and seeking first his kingdom and righteousness will not uncommonly require “sacrifice of lesser to greater good” (p. 222). While sex is “an integral part of the human person, particularly as joining us to one another, and therefore has a right to be included in the spiritual transformation which follows upon our hearing of the gospel,” (p. 245) it is not central, any more than other finite goods. To the extent we make it central to our lives, we are fashioning an idol.

    I don’t necessarily agree with all of Countryman’s specific applications of these principles (though his discussions of, among other things, birth control, abortion, and prostitution are well worth attending to). But I do think that his general position is on more or less the right track. It’s unrealistic to expect to have timeless commandments that apply equally well to the tight-knit pastoral society of ancient Israel, the urbanized Mediterranean world of the first century, and our contemporary globalized, individualist world. More to the point, many of the traditional rules only made sense in the context of a purity system or a familial-property ethic that we wouldn’t want to resurrect even if we could! This isn’t relativism, but an attempt to uphold the gospel as that in light of which we can criticize and question those partial and relative truths that often masquerade as absolutes.
    ————————————————————
    *Regarding bestiality, Countryman says “where it is the casual recourse of the young or of people isolated over long periods of time from other humans, [it] should occasion little concern. It is probably too isolated a phenomenon to justify strong feelings” (p. 224). That may be true, but he neglects to mention that such acts may also wrong the animals involved!

  • Countryman on modern individualism

    One of the main reasons we can’t simply apply the “Biblical” sexual ethic (or ethics!) to our contemporary world, argues Countryman in Dirt, Greed & Sex (see the previous post), is that we have gone from a family-centered society to an individual-centered one. The property ethic that governed sexual relations in the ancient world existed to uphold the importance of the patriarchal family; given that this state of affairs no longer exists (at least in much of the world), we can’t assume the applicability of that ethic to our world.

    A refreshing thing about Countryman is that he’s willing to look at both the pros and cons of modern Western individualism, instead of embracing it or rejecting it wholesale. Here’s a representative passage:

    The individualization of modern American society is a social fact, an aspect of the environment in which we make ethical decisions, not an ethical principle itself. As such, it is neither good nor bad. It represents some losses as against earlier, family-structured eras and also some gains. If the human being now lacks the kind of inevitable links with a social continuum that the earlier society afforded, that loss must be balanced against the fact that individualization has gone hand in hand with–and is probably the condition for–what progress this century has made toward genuine equality of races, nationalities, and the sexes. The ability of modern people to choose for themselves with regard to education, work, living place, life-partner, religion, or politics became conceivable only as the family ceased to be the basic unit of society and was replaced by the individual. (p. 231)

    And yet, we need to distinguish between relatively benign and more objectionable forms of ethical individualism:

    Individuality can become an ethical principle in two ways. Philosophically speaking, it may become so by a recognition that my individuality is intelligible only as an expression of the principle which renders every other human being an individual, too. This principle was already being expressed in late antiquity in the Golden Rule; respect for my individuality implies respect for that of others. As such, it enters into Christian ethics, but it is by no means the crowning element in them. It could not, for example, have generated the sacrifice of Jesus on the cross or the witness of the martyrs, which require the further principles of love, faith, and hope for their understanding. On the other hand, individuality can also become an ethical principle in the form of individualism–an idolatry of the self, which treats the self as its own source and end. Such individualism has been a pervasive ethical influence in the modern West, enshrined in certain forms of capitalist ideology as the image of the “self-made” person–that is, the person who has chosen to forget the role others played in his fashioning and rise and who regards with interest only those people and things that contribute to his own aggrandizement. This individualism, like any other idolatry is utterly inconsistent with the gospel. (p. 231)

    It’s common to hear denunciations of “individualism” from theological quarters, but some critics aren’t as careful as Countryman in making these distinctions. The individualism that has been the precondition of much social progress is different than the idolatry of the self that Countryman (rightly, I should think) says is incompatible with the gospel. This new individualistic context will play a significant role in assessing the sexual property ethic and its relevance for our time.

  • Dirt, Greed & Sex

    Having been stuck at home for the better part of a week, I’ve had ample time to catch up on my reading. One book I finally got around to was L. William Countryman’s Dirt, Greed & Sex, a study of the sexual ethics of the New Testament.

    Countryman–a professor of New Testament and an Episcopalian–focuses on the ways in which the NT modified or discarded the existing rules surrounding sexual conduct that it inherited from Judaism and the broader Greco-Roman culture. The two organizing concepts he uses are related to the Torah’s purity code (“dirt”) and the property ethic rooted in the patriarchal family of the ancient world (“greed”).

    In his telling, the NT is consistent, indeed almost unanimous, in rejecting sexual norms based on physical purity/impurity. As enunciated in the Torah, purity has to do with maintaining the “wholeness” of individuals and boundaries between kinds of things. The resulting ethic is based on avoiding or removing ritual impurity, whether intentionally incurred or not. (This covers everything from contract with menstruating women to homosexual relations.) By contrast, he says, when “purity” is used in the NT, it refers to purity of heart, or the intention underlying our actions.

    Obviously, the question of the law and its ongoing role in the Christian community was an important topic for the NT writers. Countryman shows, however, that the NT takes a fairly consistent line that allowed Jewish Christians to continue observing the purity requirements of the law, while definitively rejecting that observation as a requirement for Gentiles to become full-fledged Christians. Purity is not a condition for receiving God’s grace. And purity and ethics are two different kinds of discourse. (Relevant here is his particularly fascinating exegesis of the much-discussed Romans 1 as it relates to homosexuality.) “With the possible exception of Jude and Revelation, all the documents that dealt with physical purity at all agreed in rejecting it as an authoritative ethic for Christians as such” (p. 123).

    The sexual ethic of the NT, to the extent we can discern one, is a modified form of the property ethic common both to ancient Israelite culture and the broader ancient world. This family-centered culture rested squarely on the patriarchal family unit in which women, children, and slaves were essentially the property of the male head of the household. For example, adultery was condemned on the grounds that the man who committed it was stealing property from another man (because depriving him of the possibility of legitimate heirs), not because it represented the violation of a relationship of trust between the adulterer and his wife.

    The NT introduces some major changes to this ethic. First, Jesus’ ministry disrupts the centrality of the patriarchal family. By calling disciples to “leave everything” and follow him, Jesus rejects the priority of the family to all other loyalties. And by telling his disciples they must become “like children,” he introduces an egalitarianism into the Christian community that contrasts starkly with the hierarchy of the “traditional family.” Second, both Jesus and Paul affirm–at least in principle–the equality of men and women. One critical example is Jesus’ teaching that both men and women can be guilty of adultery, and the corresponding implication that both partners have sexual “property rights” in the other. This represents a major elevation of women’s status compared to the traditional patriarchal family.

    Both Jesus and Paul, Countryman insists, see sexuality as good, but not something to be put at the center of one’s life. Loyalty to God’s reign is the overarching value of the Christian life, and all other goods find their proper place only in relation to this. This accounts for the NT’s–at times radical–disregard for traditional family structures.

    Countryman recognizes that there are some outliers in the NT, such as the Pastoral Epistles, which seem to be trying to put a more socially respectable face on Christianity, and Revelation, which seems perhaps to uphold virginity as the ideal for all Christians. But the mainstream tendency of New Testament Christianity is neither strictly ascetical nor hedonistic (two dissenting tendencies Paul had to fight in his Corinthian community), but subordinates sexual fulfillment to the calling each one of us receives from God.

    Paul in particular is fairly pragmatic: he may prefer that people remain celibate, but recognizes that celibacy is a gift not given to everyone. Sexual desire is a sufficient reason for getting married, though Paul is careful to note that, in light of God’s inbreaking reign, the distinctions between married, single, betrothed, etc. aren’t all that important.

    One of the key points Countryman wants to make is that there is no “Biblical” sexual ethic that we can simply adopt wholesale and apply to our current situation. Both the purity ethic and the property ethic presuppose social structures that are almost completely foreign to us. This doesn’t mean, however, that the NT has no value for our ethics. For one thing, the very “alien-ness” of the biblical world can provide a critical perspective on our own: the way things are isn’t the way they have to be.

    Secondly, Countryman thinks we can extract some “generative principles” that provide guidance for contemporary Christian ethics. But since this has already gone on long enough, I’ll save that discussion for a future post.

  • Whither amateur theo-blogging?

    Readers may have noticed something of a drop-off in theology blogging in these parts recently. Partly, this is just because my interest in things waxes and wanes, and I’ve found that my attention has alighted on other subjects lately.

    I’ve also been considering the question of what niche the “amateur” theology blog is trying to fill. In the past several years, blogs by pastors, theologians, theology grad students, and other “religious professionals” have proliferated. It’s increasingly difficult for the layperson to engage on a substantive level in the increasingly sophisitcated blogospheric debates about, say, the finer points of Karl Barth’s views on election.

    Since starting this blog I’ve always had in the back of my mind the idea from C.S. Lewis that there’s some value in the equivalent of “schoolboys comparing notes” on theology, as distinguished from the authoritative dissemination of specialized scholarly knowledge. Theology, almost by definition, is something that all lay Christians should take some interest in because, at its broadest, it’s simply the attempt to understand one’s faith and relate it both to our knowledge about the world and how we live our lives. No thoughtful person of faith can avoid doing that to some extent.

    The lay person who lacks the time, inclination, training, or ability to delve into the thickets of scholarly argumentation will always be at something of a disadvantage compared to the professionals. Perhaps, though, the amateur theo-blogger has the advantage that he or she is attempting to apply theology to life outside the academic cloister–to kick the tires and see if theological concepts can do some work in the “real” world. Hopefully there’s some value in that.