Do animals have rights?
I used to resist this conclusion because I thought it implied that animals were on a moral par with human beings, and that was something I just couldn’t accept. I’m an unrepentant speciesist, I guess.
But it now occurs to me that one can sensibly talk about “animal rights” without implying some kind of fundamental moral equality between animals and humans.
One way of understanding the notion of “rights” is to see a right as a moral claim. For instance, if it’s wrong to kill an innocent person, then any innocent person has a claim upon the rest of us not to be killed unjustly. Or, you could say that person has a right not to be killed unjustly.
Now, some people seem to think that rights must be rooted in some ethereal metaphysical property inherent in the rights-possessor (which is why philosophers have been tempted to locate the source of rights in some property possessed only by people, such as rationality or free will, and why they have generally denied that animals have any rights). I think this is what Jeremy Bentham had in mind when he said that rights were “nonsense on stilts.” But on the understanding sketched above, a “right” is just a correlate of a moral principle or duty. It isn’t wrong to kill an innocent person because they possess some quality “the-right-not-to-be-killed-unjustly.” Rather, the right not to be killed is constituted by the moral principle.
So, by analogous reasoning, if there are moral principles that govern our relations with animals, then it seems reasonable to suppose that those principles could imply that animals have certain rights.
For instance, nearly everyone with a modicum of decency would agree, I think, that it’s wrong to torture an animal simply for pleasure. But if this is right, then it seems to follow – if one accepts the (admittedly sketchy) account of rights given above – that animals have a right not to be tortured for pleasure. And this in no way implies that animals have the same rights as human beings, since the moral principles that govern our relations with animals may well differ from those that govern our relations to other humans.