Author: Lee M.

  • Pascal’s Fire 7: The end (of the universe and this series)

    Up until this point, Keith Ward has been arguing that the findings of modern science can point to, even if not demonstrably prove, the existince of an infinite mind that underlies and upholds the physical world in existence. But this is a far cry from what most of us mean when we talk about God. At least, the heart of many religious believers’ understanding of God has more to do with God’s relation to and purposes for people than with the kind of metaphysical and cosmological speculations Ward has been examining thus far.

    In part three Ward seeks to bridge the gap somewhat between what he calls, echoing Pascal, the “God of the scientists” and the “God of religion.” He discusses what a scientifically-informed theistic worldview might say about such topics as God’s action in the universe, interactions between finite minds and God, and whether miracles are possible. This last one has never seemed to me a very vexing question. I’ve always thought it obvious that whatever we say about the “laws of nature,” surely the creator of the universe could override them if he wished. Or that the laws of nature hold other things being equal. “Miracles as not totally inexplicable; they are just not eplicable by known scientific laws. They are not irreproducible, but since only God can reproduce them, they are beyond the powers of science to reproduce” (p. 224). Ward also has a helpful discussion of David Hume’s argument against the rationality of ever believing the report of a miraculous event (see pp. 228-230).

    In chapter 16 Ward surveys some recent speculations from physicists on a kind of immortal life that might be possible in this physical universe. These range from a subjective eternity experienced by finite minds as the universe grinds to a slow halt, to the existence of vast information-processing “clouds” of photons and gravitons. None of these speculations, Ward admits, come close to reflecting what many religious believers mean by eternal life. But, he says, if sciece has enabled us to imagine multiple universes existing parallel to one another, it may not be such a stretch to imagine that God could, if he wished, translate the consciousnesses and personalities of humans into to some other universe at death. Or perhaps “resurrect” us by creating new beings who share our memories, personality traits, etc. I have my doubts about whether such duplication would actually be the resurrection of the very same people, though.

    In any event, if the Newtonian cosmology demolished the old “three storey” universe with heaven above us and hell below, more recent cosmology at least allows us to imagine how a “new heaven and a new earth” might be brought into existence. But, as Ward points out, endless personal existence does not exhaust, nor is it even the most important feature, of what many faiths mean by “eteral life.” Rather, it has always meant living in the presence of God himself, or the “beatific vision” as Catholic theology has traditionally referred to it.

    Ward offers the speculation that, instead of trying to find immortality within this cosmos (or the “nearest convenient parallel dimension” to quote Dr. Ray Stantz) we might see the purpose of the cosmos to be giving rise to finite minds who are able to reflect and ultimately share in the divine life. This would entail transcending the physical cosmos and being translated to an entirely different kind of existence.

    It seems quite possible that, just as some scientists think that a future intelligence could replicate human persons to live again within the far future cosmos, so the eternal intelligence of God could bring persons to live again in other realms beyond the physical confines of this cosmos. We might expect that a perfect eternal intelligence would be as concerned for every sentient being throughout the history of the cosmos as for any life-form that exists at its end. It may then seem fitting that all such sentient beings that have a sense of their own continuous existence can share in the mind of God, and find there an appropriate sort of fulfillment for what remained incomplete, and a transformation of experience of all that caused pain and suffering, in their cosmic lives. (p. 257)

    I suspect some readers may have grown impatient with Ward at this point. Why resort to such far-flung speculations rather than drawing on religious revelaton? It’s common in these postmodern days to see each tradition as having its own internal logic and rationale and to cast aspersions on those who would seek to employ a deracinated reason to search the mysteries of God.

    First of all, Ward does have positive things to say about revelation. He acknowledges that science and philosophy can only take us so far, and that if we are to enter into some kind of personal relationship with God, or if God is to reveal his purposes to us, it will be through the medium of some kind of revelation or religious tradition. He also notes that our decision to commit ourselves to a religious tradition will not be definitively determined by publicly observable evidence, but will also draw on personal experience, value judgments, and other more “subjective” factors. That is to say, different people with different life experiences may be justified in adhereing to different religious traditions, even if they both can’t be right.

    Secondly, even though I don’t agree with everything Ward says, I think the task of examining our faith in the light of science is an important one. It’s ture that theology shouldn’t hitch its wagon to the latest scientific finding, which may be overturned tomorrow. But it’s also important to show how the tenets of faith are consistent with what modern science, at least in broad outlines, has told us about the universe. Augustine made a similar point in his Literal Commentary on Genesis:

    Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he holds to as being certain from reason and experience. Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household of the faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men…. Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when they are caught in one of their mischievous false opinions and are taken to task by these who are not bound by the authority of our sacred books. For then, to defend their utterly foolish and obviously untrue statements, they will try to call upon Holy Scripture for proof and even recite from memory many passages which they think support their position, although they understand neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertion. (Source)

    Theologians often seem hesitant to engage directly with science, partly, no doubt, because of the daunting task of familiarizing theselves with the latest findings in biology, cosmology, and physics and trying to speak intelligently about it. But it seems to me an indispensible task for the church, certainly as important as grappling with the latest trendy philosopher or social theorist. In that spirit, I think Ward has made a valuable contribution.

    (I should also note that Ward has interesting things to say on a variety of subjects that I haven’t covered, including the mind-body problem, God’s relation to time, and whether human culture can be given a purely naturalistic explanation. I’d recommend the book to anyone looking for an accessible introduction to these issues.)

  • Is peace a winning issue?

    There’s been no shortage of people willing and eager to argue that any move by the Democrats toward an anti-war position will be an electoral kiss of death in 2006 and beyond. The victory of Ned Lamont in the Connecticut primary over incumbent Sen. Joe Lieberman has been hysterically denounced by friend and foe alike as evidence that the Dems are being taken over by fanatically anti-war hippies. Inevitably McGovern’s 1972 campaign is dredged up as indisputable proof of the folly of taking an anti-war stance.

    But historian Lawrence S. Wittner argues here that running as a “peace candidate” has in fact frequently been successful in American politics. Unfortunately, perhaps, some of the candidates he mentions were in fact crypto-“war candidates” (Wilson, Johnson), but the point stands. Naturally historical analogies are of limited usefulness, but I know I would be more likely to vote for someone who was running on some kind of anti-war platform. Then again I may well be an outlier.

  • The Christian Coaltion – "drifting to the Left"?

    Chip Frontz tipped me off to the news that the Alabama chapter of the Christian Coalition is disassociating itself from the national body on account of the latter’s “leftward drift.” The Alabama chapter is the third to do so.

    [Alabama chapter president John] Giles said the relationship between the state affiliate and national organization began to deteriorate in 2003 when Combs appeared in Alabama, without Giles’ knowledge, to endorse Gov. Bob Riley’s $1.2 billion tax plan after the Christian Coalition of Alabama had come out against it.

    Giles said the relationship worsened as the national organization drifted from its original tenets to address environmental and economic issues, like raising the minimum wage.

    I remember when Gov. Riley’s tax plan was being touted as an application of biblical principles to tax policy. It was designed in part by Susan Pace Hamill, a Law professor at the University of Alabama who published a law review article, “An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics” [PDF]. While the national Christian Coalition supported the tax plan, the Alabama chapter strongly opposed it, and their efforts are credited with helping to send it down to defeat.

    The national Christian Coalition seems to be following the recent trend of conservative evangelicals straying from the traditional conservative party line. Global warming, poverty and other issues traditionally associated with liberalism have been taken up by groups like the National Association of Evangelicals. It’ll be interesting to see how this affects the electoral prospects of the GOP in the next two elections.

  • "Don’t kid yourself, Jimmy! If a cow ever got the chance, he’d eat you and everyone you care about!"

    Here are some very bad, yet strangely common, arguments against vegetarianism:

    1. “But other animals eat each other!”

    2. “We’re at the top of the food chain!”

    3. “How do you know plants don’t feel pain?”

    I’m not saying there aren’t good arguments against it, but you have to wonder why the really bad ones come up so often.

  • Links of note

    Steven Riddle at Flos Carmeli is discussing Rod Dreher’s Crunchy Cons, here, here, and here.

    Camassia on Christians and political protest, here and here.

    In the American Conservative symposium on “right and left” that I mentioned recently, onservative writer Heather Mac Donald took issue with the allegedly widespread assumption that one has to be religious to be a political conservative. Her original piece generated a lot of discussion on National Review’s blog and elsewhere, as well as follow-up pieces from Michael Novak and Mac Donald herself.

    At Siris, Brandon dissects one of Mac Donald’s anti-theistic arguments.

    Of course, I’d want to dispute the assumption seemingly shared by Mac Donald and most of her interlocutors that Christians (not to mention adherents of other religions) ought logically to be political conservatives in the current American sense.

  • Pascal’s Fire 6: The contingent cosmos

    Previously we saw that a major difference between a strictly scientific or naturalistic worldview and a supernaturalistic or theistic one is whether or not personal existence is taken to be a derivative and ultimately reducible facet of non-personal existence. Another way of putting it might be to ask which is a more fundamental form of explanation: teleological or mechanistic? Are some events only explanable in terms of purposive goal-directed action, or are these only apparent and essentially the result of blind, efficient causation?

    The same question can be posed at another frontier of scientific explanation, namely, the very existence of the universe itself. Or, as Leibniz asked, “why there should be any world rather than none,” or why the particular world we’ve got rather than some other? Is the ultimate explanation for the world to be sought in a personal or non-personal cause?

    Ward thinks that a personal explanation, though beyond what science can tell us, is more satisfying for several reasons. First, even if there is only one consistent set of natural laws, such that only one world is physically possible, we still can ask why that set of laws was realized in an actual physical world. Without some kind of personal agency “there seems to be no way of ‘breathing fire into the equations,’ of accounting for the physical existence of a contingent cosmos from purely mathematical facts” (p. 130).

    Second, it seems strange to think of the laws of nature, expressed in mathematical form, as just existing on their own. Better, he says, to think of them as existing in some fully actualized mind or consciousness:

    We can then say that mathematical truths can exist even before the existence of the physical universe, if they exist as products of a supreme mind. So we can frame the idea of a consciousness in which all mathematical structures exist. That consciousness could select one axiomatic system and construct a physical universe that was patterned on that system. The hypothesis of such a consciousness exactly fits the bill for something that might be an ultimate explanation of the universe. (p. 131)

    I’m not sure that Ward has given us sufficient reason here to think that the mathematical truths that make up or describe the deep structure of the universe must exist prior to the actual physical universe. Perhaps they simply describe the structure of the universe without existing independently in their own right. Of course, the question would remain why the universe exists at all and why it exhibits the particular structure that it does. So I’m not sure the business about mathematics is even a necessary step in the argument.

    Ward goes on to hypothesize, a la Leibniz, that “this ultimate consciousness might be able to conceive of every possible state of affairs — every possible world — that could ever exist”:

    We can posit that there necessarily exists a complete array of every possibility of any kind, something like the Platonic world of Forms. This array is necessary, for every possibility is exhaustively expressed within it. No other possibilities exist, and the possibilities that do exist are necessarily what they are. No question arises of why this consciousness is as it is, since it includes all possible worlds and states exhaustively. No reason needs to be given why one state exists rather than another, since all these states exist, though only as possibilities. But it is plausible to think that possibles can only exist if there is some actuality that sustains them in being. That actuality is mind, which conceives them, and is necessarily what it is, the actual being that is necessary to give these possible worlds real existence as unactualized possibilities. (p. 131)

    The crucial premise here seems to be that “possibles can only exist if there is some actuality that sustains them in being,” but I’m not sure how to evaluate that claim. Couldn’t it be that possible states of affairs are simply logical extrapolations from what does exist? Why must they have a kind of shadowy existence in their own right? Or to be more precise, I’m perfectly happy to admit that all possible states of affairs are contained in the mind of God, but that’s because I already believe in God. I’m less sure that the need for them to exist somewhere can be used as a premise in an argument for God’s existence. At the very least, the ontology of possible worlds is sufficiently murky that I’d be hesitant to put too much weight on this premise.

    But, leaving this aside, let’s suppose that there are many ways in which the world could’ve existed, regardless of the ontological status we might ascribe to these possible worlds. This seems a plausible supposition in light of what we think we know about the world. Ward is still right, then, to ask “why some possible states should be selected for actuality” (p. 133) or why does the world have the particular order it does.

    Here he reintroduces the concept of value as the key to providing an explanation. Clearly we think some states of affairs are preferable to others:

    Imagine God trying to decide between creating a universe in which all conscious beings suffer terrible pain and frustration for ever, and another universe in which all conscious beings are happy, wise and loving. It is obvious that the second universe is better, more desirable, than the first. (p. 134)

    Obviously neither of those descriptions fits our universe. But it’s not unreasonable to suppose that a purposive intelligent agent might choose to create a world in which great goods were capable of realization, even if accompanied by certain evils. “Then we could say that the reason a universe exists is because it is a possible universe that God makes actual for the distinctive sorts of goodness it contains” (p. 134).

    In short, Ward thinks that a personalistic explanation for the existence of this particular universe, rather than some other or none at all, is more satisfying on the whole than an alternative non-personal explanation. It seems to account for the beauty and intelligibility of the cosmos as well as why the universe appears fine-tuned to bring into being conscious agents capable of realizing great goods. This is not, I think, intended to be a demonstrative argument, but one that appeals to the desire for an explanation, even one that goes beyond what is strictly observable or verifiable. “[T]he existence of brute matter, which just happens to be the way it is for no reason and yet gives rise to such a fine-tuned, utterly improbable and beautiful universe, terminates the quest for understanding in a way that is repugnant to any scientist” (p. 130).

    I would say that the existence and order of the universe at least should open the question of God to someone who might’ve previously dismissed it without necessarily compelling an answer in one direction or another. And these kinds of considerations may well contribute to a cumulative case for God’s existence, even if not dispositive in themselves.

  • Follow-up on creation, natural evil, etc.

    Just wanted to call your attention to some of the excellent comments on these two posts. I haven’t had time to respond to all of them, but I’m really glad to get comments of such caliber here. (Of course, the post on booze has generated more comments than either of them.)

    Also, see this discussion in two parts at Three Hierarchies.

    Plus, here’s an interesting article by Robert John Russell I discovered at the Center for Theological Inquiry website that deals with some of these issues, but with an emphasis on eschatology.

  • Pascal’s Fire 5: The priority of the personal

    In part one of Pascal’s Fire Keith Ward emphasized the ways in which the best contemporary science is consistent with, and maybe even suggestive of, belief in God. In part two he goes one step further to look at the ways in which science falls short of offering an exhaustive description and explanation of reality.

    The success of science in providing precise and law-like explanations of phenomena, Ward says, owes a lot to the fact that it abstracts away aspects of reality that don’t fit its model of explanation. Things like subjective conscious experience, values, purposes, and meaning are all part of our everyday experience of the world, but they aren’t publicly observable, quantifiable, and measurable like the physical aspects of reality are. “Modern science begins with the ejection of purpose, value and significance from the universe. This is one main reason why the ‘scientific worldview’ fails to deal with all aspects of reality” (p. 116). To say that consciousness, value, purpose, and meaning elude scientific explanation is not to show that they aren’t real. At best science seems to offer us reductionistic accounts of these phenomena: consciousness is just brain function, values are subjective, purpose is an illusion, etc.

    It’s possible to argue that we should take experimental science as the sole avenue to truth. This might seem to be the most economical approach to forming beliefs. But, Ward says, part “of a reasonable account is that it should cover all the different sorts of data there are in as coherent a way as possible” (p. 118). Our experience of consciousness, purpose, value, and meaning is in many ways more certain than any theory that would purport to explain them away, as reductionist accounts do. And by excluding that which isn’t publicly observable or able to be established by experimental methods, science doesn’t show that such things don’t exist, only that it’s incapable of accounting for them. If such things are real, they would of necessity not be reducible to more basic constituents that can be explained in a thoroughly physicalistic way.

    There are personal experiences, known to all of us in a direct and natural way, that do not fall within the domain of the natural sciences. The scientific domain is that of publicly observable objects in shared public space. Since science does not deal with personal experiences, it cannot itself give an account of what they are or how they relate to objects in physical space. Science itself cannot provide a comprehensive worldview, because there are aspects of reality with which it does not deal. The most obvious aspects of this sort are personal experiences. It is precisely in such experiences that such notions as value and purpose have their home. (p. 123)

    What’s going on here, it seems to me, is that we have a fundamental difference in worldviews. One takes personal reality and all that it encompasses to be in some way fundamental to the constitution of the universe. The other takes personal reality to be ultimately reducible to some non-personal reality. Since personal existence seems to involve features which elude quantification, measurement, prediction, and public observability, any worldview that takes science to provide the key to an exhaustive account of reality will have to offer a reductionistic account of personality. But this will only be as plausible as the initial decision to treat quantifiable, etc. aspects of reality as the really real aspects of the world. Science as such can’t show us that those things it is methodologically incapable of dealing with aren’t real.

    But, if personal existence is a non-reducible aspect of reality, and given that humanity is a latecomer on the cosmic scene, this rasies the question of whether there is a personal reality that underlies the entire phenomenal world. Which is the subject of the next post…