Here is an interesting post on veganism that distinguishes what I would call “conditional” vegans from “unconditional” vegans. The former group opposes the current system of factory farming, but would, hypothetically at least, eat animals raised “humanely” and sustainably. They don’t think, in other words, that it’s inherently wrong for humans to use animals, just that, under current conditions, one should boycott the animal industry. Unconditional vegans, by contrast, think that it is inherently wrong to use animals for food (or clothing, medical experiments, etc.), even if they’re humanely raised, painlessly killed, and so on.

That’s a useful distinction, it seems to me. But this, regarding conditional vegans, isn’t quite right:

If you think that producing and consuming animal products is morally acceptable, then for you veganism is a boycott. Perhaps you’ve decided that veganism is a socially and environmentally responsible choice, but you don’t feel that animals have rights beyond “humane” treatment. To you, veganism is a choice, not a moral obligation.

That last sentence just doesn’t follow. If I conclude that, all things considered (environmental impact, treatment of animals, etc.), veganism is the right choice, even if under some very different set of conditions I might conclude differently, then I do consider veganism a moral obligation. It’s no less of a moral obligation simply because, were things different, I might not be obliged to do it. Similarly, I may believe that I am morally obliged to boycott non-fair-trade coffee, but not the fair trade stuff, because I think there’s nothing inherently morally problematic about consuming coffee. Or: I may be morally obligated to reduce my carbon emissions, but if I lived a thousand years ago or in sub-Saharan Africa or if the laws of chemistry or physics were radically different, I wouldn’t be.

It could be that the unconditional vegans are right and there really is a moral obligation not to consume animals tout court (or at least under normal, non-“lifeboat” conditions). I’m not a vegan and don’t really have, um, a dog in this fight, but the difference here is between two different moral positions, not a moral position and a non-moral one.

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