One of the many puzzling things about this post from Brian Leiter on veganism is that it seems to take place in a world unrecognizable as our own. To wit:

Let’s suppose, plausibly enough, that sentience (the ability to experience pleasure and pain) is a morally relevant characteristic. Since animals are sentient, it seems there ought to be a moral obligation not to inflict gratuitous pain and suffering on them. […] That by itself simply wouldn’t demand veganism as a response, since there are lots of ways to utilize animals and animal products that do not involve infliction of pain and suffering on them. […] To be sure, many kinds of uses of animals and animal products require them to be dead, but as long as they are killed painlessly, we have discharged our duties in virtue of their sentience.

Just out of curiosity, does Leiter actually think that the way we typically raise and slaughter animals for food is carried out painlessly? ‘Cause that’s actually a pretty high bar to meet, and if you think that our minimal duty to animals is not to inflict unnecessary suffering on them, you’ve all but given up the game, practically speaking.

I realize that many, perhaps most, vegans would make the stronger claim that it’s wrong to kill animals for our use even if done painlessly. But, even on utilitarian grounds, Leiter doesn’t seem to recognize how strong the case is. (Though I certainly disagree with Leiter’s reasoning to show that animals are not harmed in being killed, incidentally.)

Link via Theoria.