A Thinking Reed

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed" – Blaise Pascal

One of these things is not like the others

Rod Dreher writes:

I think the most common, and superficially common-sensical, questions that comes up in discussions of this issue is, “How does Jill and Jane’s marriage hurt Jack and Diane’s?” The idea is that unless you can demonstrate that a gay marriage directly harms traditional marriage, there is no rational objection to gay marriage.

But this is a shallow way to look at it. We all share the same moral ecology. You may as well ask why it should have mattered to the people of Amherst, Mass., if some rich white people in Charleston, SC, owned slaves. Don’t believe in slavery? Don’t buy one. Similarly, why should it matter to the people of Manhattan if the people of Topeka wish to forbid a woman there to have an abortion? Or, conversely, why do the people of Topeka care if women in New York City choose to abort their unborn children? Don’t believe in abortion? Don’t have one.

Gee, what could possibly be the morally relevant difference between 1. owning another human being as a chattel slave, 2. disposing of an unborn human life and, 3. entering into a lifelong loving partnership with another consenting, adult human being?

“Moral ecology” arguments, while not something I’d dismiss out of hand, depend on there being something intrinsically wrong with whatever act or phenomenon it is that’s under consideration. If it’s not bad in itself, what reason is there to believe it will “pollute” (i.e. affect in a harmful way) the moral ecology?

In the case of slavery, and arguably abortion, it’s not at all difficult to see what makes them bad–they harm other human beings, or violate their liberty, etc. However, in the case of gay marriage, its goodness or badness is precisely what’s at issue. For those of us who see same-sex marriages as just as capable, in principle, of manifesting virtue and contributing to human flourishing as opposite sex ones, there’s no particular reason to worry about damaging the moral environment (and, by implication, straight people’s marriages). The moral ecology argument depends on a prior demonstration of the inherent wrongness of gay marriage itself, which hasn’t been forthcoming.

12 responses to “One of these things is not like the others”

  1. Obviously Dreher wasn’t saying, or even trying to insinuate, that homosexual relationships are in the same moral category as slavery and abortion. And while I am entirely in agreement with you that not nearly enough has been done to demonstrate the wrongness of gay marriage, that seems to me to be beside the point here. The reason for the appeal to “moral ecology” was that the standard – or at least a standard – pro-gay marriage line in this debate has been that even if gay marriage is inherently wrong or somehow a degenerate form of marriage, that’s nobody’s business but that of the people involved; it doesn’t affect anyone other than them. And Dreher was saying – reasonably, I think – that that needn’t be so. Again, I think a lot more needs to be said here, and I actually see a lot of plausibility in the idea that even if it’s wrong, allowing gay marriage might still be better for society “as a whole” than prohibiting it, at least under the current circumstances. But it seems important to recognize that many people think that even if it is “wrong in itself”, there is still no reason to think it will “‘pollute’ the moral ecology”. It’s this conditional that Dreher was arguing for in this particular post, not its antecedent.

  2. That’s fair enough – yet I think the initial plausibility of the “moral ecology” argument rests on recognizing the odious nature of those two particular practices, doesn’t it?

    The point you make is sound enough – that a wrong act which superficially seems to have no moral “externalities” might turn out to upon closer inspection. But I guess I’m not sure who’s making that particular argument (i.e. it’s wrong, but it doesn’t matter because it doesn’t affect anyone else). Is that really a widespread position? But if that’s the case, then Dreher does seem to be making a different argument from the one I’m targeting.

  3. “don’t believe in abortion , don’t have one” is that like, don’t believe in shooting babykilling abortionists don’t shoot one?
    SAY THIS PRAYER: Dear Jesus, I am a sinner and am headed to eternal hell because of my sins. I believe you died on the cross to take away my sins and to take me to heaven. Jesus, I ask you now to come into my heart and take away my sins and give me eternal life.

  4. Lee, I do think that position may be more widespread than you think. But I also agree that the intuitive force of the “moral ecology” conditionals that Dreher employs – regarding abortion and slavery – are rooted almost entirely in the obviously (well, obvious to almost everyone in the latter case, sadly not so in the former) horrible nature of the acts involved. And it’s open to a defender of gay marriage to argue that the conditional – things that are wrong in themselves pollute the moral ecology – works only when the things in question are extremely wrong, and then to claim – reasonably, I think – that while abortion and slavery fall into this latter category, gay marriage does not. I think, though, that the better argument to make – the one I’d be inclined to make if I were willing to take a side – is that allowing gay marriage is actually better for society as a whole. The “just leave us alone” refrain, which I really do think was Dreher’s target even if it wasn’t yours, doesn’t really work, especially when what’s being asked for is a specific sort of societal and governmental recognition of the acceptability of a certain way of life. It seems much wiser to explain, in value-laden rather than merely libertarian terms, why homosexual relationships should be recognized (in the thick sense, of course) than just to demand that their opponents give reasons why they shouldn’t.

  5. […] of Law and the Aims of Christianity Lee over at A Thinking Reed has a quick and concise post responding to a long bit by Rod Dreher, which argues against the, “How does Jill and […]

  6. What Dreher is doing is a fairly common social conservative response to the whole libertarian non-aggression paradigm: blurring the distinction between coercive and non-coercive relationships. I see it all the time: the argument that there are no victimless crimes because of the damage to the “social fabric,” etc. Once you get on that slipperly slope of bluenose-ism, there’s no principled way of drawing a line that says some things other people do are none of my business, whether I approve or not.

  7. Until the harms actually done to gay and lesbian persons by the attitudes and structures currently erected often in Jesus’ Name are factored into this whole ecology thing, I’m suspicious. As the CA Supreme Court Chief Justice noticed we can be blind to the harm we do to others. Indeed, as white people were to enslaved black people. There seems to always be a lot of questioning of the other (meaning gay people–we live in a state of ambiguity and limbo) in these arguments but little self-questioning on the part of folks like Dreher that they might be doing others harm.

  8. In other words, Dreher’s ecology, from my perspective is deeply polluted by his heterosexism.

  9. And moreover, we have plenty of tangible proof of the harm his attitudes and positions actually do.

  10. John, I think I see better now where you’re coming from, and I also think we agree quite a bit. For one thing, I definitely agree that an argument for why same-sex marriage is a positive good is superior to a strictly libertarian/leave-us-alone-type argument, especially when the goal is not simply tolerance, but a measure of social acceptance/approval. I also happen to think it’s true!

    Still, I’m wary of holding people’s rights hostage to their success in making the case for the social benefits of their relationships, especially when I’m not the one whose relationship is going to be affected.

    I wonder if there might be a line of argument that goes something like this: people have a right, other things being equal, to participate on equal terms in institutions ordered around important personal and social goods that are key to human flourishing. I.e. the goods being served are the familiar goods associated with marriage in its personal, social, and political dimensions. But it shifts the burden of proof off of gay and lesbian people to “prove” to the rest of society that their relationships are “good enough” to merit social sanction, but also recognizes that marriage isn’t simply a private contractual relationship, but one that has an important social dimension.

    I think your point, Christopher, is apposite here in that creating a zone of protectino around gay people’s relationships is a worthy enough goal in itself, especially considering the treatment they’ve received.

    Again – I have no moral standing to say what the “proper” approach is here since I’m a fellow-traveler at best. So everyone should take what I say with a grain of salt (as if you don’t already!).

  11. […] 21, 2008 · No Comments A Thinking Reed teaches Rod Dreher a bit on proper equivalencies. Gay marriage laws do no equate to slavery […]

  12. One could make the arguement, contra Dreher, that it is promiscuity, whether hetero or home, unbound by the covenant of marraige that is the real threat to our moral ecology. If there is a moral ecology arguement for marriage, it is that it makes people (men especially) more normal and, well, boring, and it should be looked at from that perspective. More happily married gay people and fewer leather-clad S&M fetishists on parade is a net plus for everyone’s moral ecology.

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