Andrew Bacevich, reviewing several new books on the presidency, contends that the Imperial Presidency is a symptom, not the cause of our current troubles. The underlying problem is the state of permanent semi-mobilization that the country entered into after World War II and the attendant national security apparatus that it gave rise to. In matters of foreign policy and warmaking the president, Bacevich argues, has become more beholden to the various institutions within the national security state that act as quasi-independent centers of power and less beholden to the people.
In short, as the atmosphere of semiwar took hold in the later 1940s, the formulation of national security policy became less democratic, but it did not become less political. It’s just that politics became an insider’s game, shielded from public scrutiny; henceforth, the politicking that counted occurred within the presidency behind closed doors. Keeping the Joint Chiefs on board became more important than gaining the assent of Congress. Maintaining a consensus among the various entities represented on the National Security Council took precedence over attending to what was once called the common good.
If that’s right, then simply changing the current occupant of the Oval Office (however desirable that might be) will do little to restore democratic accountability to the conduct of foreign policy. Some kind of structural or constitutional change would be necessary, maybe along the lines of the Ludlow Amendment proposed in the late 30s to require a national referendum on any declaration of war except in cases where the U.S. had been attacked. Of course, the Ludlow Amendment applied to Congress, whereas nowadays presidents regard congressional authorization for war as a formality at best. But something in the same spirit might be one way of restoring some kind of check on the autonomy of executive branch, however unlikely such a thing is.

Leave a comment