Previously we saw that a major difference between a strictly scientific or naturalistic worldview and a supernaturalistic or theistic one is whether or not personal existence is taken to be a derivative and ultimately reducible facet of non-personal existence. Another way of putting it might be to ask which is a more fundamental form of explanation: teleological or mechanistic? Are some events only explanable in terms of purposive goal-directed action, or are these only apparent and essentially the result of blind, efficient causation?

The same question can be posed at another frontier of scientific explanation, namely, the very existence of the universe itself. Or, as Leibniz asked, “why there should be any world rather than none,” or why the particular world we’ve got rather than some other? Is the ultimate explanation for the world to be sought in a personal or non-personal cause?

Ward thinks that a personal explanation, though beyond what science can tell us, is more satisfying for several reasons. First, even if there is only one consistent set of natural laws, such that only one world is physically possible, we still can ask why that set of laws was realized in an actual physical world. Without some kind of personal agency “there seems to be no way of ‘breathing fire into the equations,’ of accounting for the physical existence of a contingent cosmos from purely mathematical facts” (p. 130).

Second, it seems strange to think of the laws of nature, expressed in mathematical form, as just existing on their own. Better, he says, to think of them as existing in some fully actualized mind or consciousness:

We can then say that mathematical truths can exist even before the existence of the physical universe, if they exist as products of a supreme mind. So we can frame the idea of a consciousness in which all mathematical structures exist. That consciousness could select one axiomatic system and construct a physical universe that was patterned on that system. The hypothesis of such a consciousness exactly fits the bill for something that might be an ultimate explanation of the universe. (p. 131)

I’m not sure that Ward has given us sufficient reason here to think that the mathematical truths that make up or describe the deep structure of the universe must exist prior to the actual physical universe. Perhaps they simply describe the structure of the universe without existing independently in their own right. Of course, the question would remain why the universe exists at all and why it exhibits the particular structure that it does. So I’m not sure the business about mathematics is even a necessary step in the argument.

Ward goes on to hypothesize, a la Leibniz, that “this ultimate consciousness might be able to conceive of every possible state of affairs — every possible world — that could ever exist”:

We can posit that there necessarily exists a complete array of every possibility of any kind, something like the Platonic world of Forms. This array is necessary, for every possibility is exhaustively expressed within it. No other possibilities exist, and the possibilities that do exist are necessarily what they are. No question arises of why this consciousness is as it is, since it includes all possible worlds and states exhaustively. No reason needs to be given why one state exists rather than another, since all these states exist, though only as possibilities. But it is plausible to think that possibles can only exist if there is some actuality that sustains them in being. That actuality is mind, which conceives them, and is necessarily what it is, the actual being that is necessary to give these possible worlds real existence as unactualized possibilities. (p. 131)

The crucial premise here seems to be that “possibles can only exist if there is some actuality that sustains them in being,” but I’m not sure how to evaluate that claim. Couldn’t it be that possible states of affairs are simply logical extrapolations from what does exist? Why must they have a kind of shadowy existence in their own right? Or to be more precise, I’m perfectly happy to admit that all possible states of affairs are contained in the mind of God, but that’s because I already believe in God. I’m less sure that the need for them to exist somewhere can be used as a premise in an argument for God’s existence. At the very least, the ontology of possible worlds is sufficiently murky that I’d be hesitant to put too much weight on this premise.

But, leaving this aside, let’s suppose that there are many ways in which the world could’ve existed, regardless of the ontological status we might ascribe to these possible worlds. This seems a plausible supposition in light of what we think we know about the world. Ward is still right, then, to ask “why some possible states should be selected for actuality” (p. 133) or why does the world have the particular order it does.

Here he reintroduces the concept of value as the key to providing an explanation. Clearly we think some states of affairs are preferable to others:

Imagine God trying to decide between creating a universe in which all conscious beings suffer terrible pain and frustration for ever, and another universe in which all conscious beings are happy, wise and loving. It is obvious that the second universe is better, more desirable, than the first. (p. 134)

Obviously neither of those descriptions fits our universe. But it’s not unreasonable to suppose that a purposive intelligent agent might choose to create a world in which great goods were capable of realization, even if accompanied by certain evils. “Then we could say that the reason a universe exists is because it is a possible universe that God makes actual for the distinctive sorts of goodness it contains” (p. 134).

In short, Ward thinks that a personalistic explanation for the existence of this particular universe, rather than some other or none at all, is more satisfying on the whole than an alternative non-personal explanation. It seems to account for the beauty and intelligibility of the cosmos as well as why the universe appears fine-tuned to bring into being conscious agents capable of realizing great goods. This is not, I think, intended to be a demonstrative argument, but one that appeals to the desire for an explanation, even one that goes beyond what is strictly observable or verifiable. “[T]he existence of brute matter, which just happens to be the way it is for no reason and yet gives rise to such a fine-tuned, utterly improbable and beautiful universe, terminates the quest for understanding in a way that is repugnant to any scientist” (p. 130).

I would say that the existence and order of the universe at least should open the question of God to someone who might’ve previously dismissed it without necessarily compelling an answer in one direction or another. And these kinds of considerations may well contribute to a cumulative case for God’s existence, even if not dispositive in themselves.