I recently read an article by philosopher Andrew Fiala called “Citizenship, Epistemology, and the Just War Theory”* which attempts to flesh out an argument for what he calls “pacifism in practice.” Fiala says that those who are committed to the just war tradition should, for all intents and purposes, be “antiwar pacifists”** due to the nature of modern political life. He notes that some have tried to show that just war principles entail a commitment to pacifism due to the uniquely horrific nature of modern war, but Fiala is more interested in the limitations on what the average citizen can know in a modern democracy, and how those limits constrain whether or not she can give her support to a war undertaken by her government.

Fiala argues that, in practice, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a citizen to know whether the ad bellum and in bello criteria of just war theory are met by any particular war. Therefore, the prudent thing to do is to “err on the side of peace” and oppose all (or nearly all) wars. Regarding ad bellum, he says that apart from the issue of just cause there are the questions of proportionality and prospects of success (meaning not just victory, but the attainment of a stable peace), as well as whether the war is being waged by legitimate authority and whether that authority possesses right intention. Fiala points out that right intention must extend to the means by which the authority intends to carry out the conlfict. To support a given war, he says, a citizen would have to be reasonably certain of the purity of his leaders’ motives, with respect to ends and means.

Turning to the in bello criteria, of which discrimination, or non-combatant immunity, is arguably the most important, Fiala says that to justifiably support a war, a citizen has to have adequate knowledge of military strategy in order to be confident that the limits of jus in bello will be adhered to. But this is something that she hardly ever has:

I am skeptical about the ability of ordinary citizens to evaluate claims made about the intention of the military to constrain its operations in light of the principle of discrimination. Ordinary citizens are excluded (for good strategic reasons) from having access both to battle plans and to a concrete analysis of the “facts on the ground” that could inform a decision about whether this principle were respected.

[…]

[T]he history of warfare shows us the amount of force used often exceeds the means that could be justified, especially when military objectives (such as absolute victory) overshadow moral concerns. One could discuss the use of atomic bombs in Japan or the firebombing of Dresden to make this point. Thus, unless we blindly trust our leaders, healthy skepticism about the use of war is rational. We should resist the drive to war until our leaders have demonstrated their good intentions and their ability to make the morla judgments required by the just war theory.

One could strengthen this argument, it seems to me, by noting that not only is it difficult to know whether our leaders will act within the parameters of just war theory, but they, in fact, seem institutionally committed to violating them by the adoption of certain strategies. For instance, the policy of nuclear deterrence rests on the (at least hypothetical) willingness of our government to launch a massive counterstrike against anyone who attacks us with nuclear weapons. Such a strike would almost certainly involve the targeting of civilian population centers.*** A less extreme example might be the somtimes stated policy that “we don’t do body counts” of civilian casualties, thus making it impossible in practice to know if the criteria of discrimination and proportionality are being respected.

In general, while it is possible for ordinary citizens to judge that there are good causes for war, we do not have access to the kind of information we would need in order to know whether the means of war–even a war proposed for a just cause–were justifiable.

It’s important to note that Fiala isn’t saying that no war is justified. A given war is either just or not, and it may well be, he says, that our leaders, who are privy to information that the average citizen isn’t, know that a particular war is justified. The problem, he thinks, is that the average citizen can’t under normal circumstances know if the war is justified, and therefore should refrain from supporting it.

The strength of Fiala’s argument derives from the belief that the burden of proof for going to war – which, after all, typically results in maiming and killing a large number of people – should be extraordinarily high. Certainly the burden of proof falls on those advocating war rather than those opposing it. War is at least prima facie wrong and especially in a democracy the leaders proposing to go to war in the people’s name and on their behalf should make the case.

In a liberal democracy, it is not a citizen’s immediate duty to support a war. Rather, it is the government’s duty to convince the citizens they should support the war by offering proof about the justice of the cause and the intention to utilize just means.

Fiala considers the objection that we should trust our leaders and support the government even if we can’t know that the course of action it’s pursuing is right. His (in my view correct) response is that liberal governance rests on reasons, not on blind obedience. In a liberal society the government is obliged to provide reasons for the policies it undertakes, not simply demand that we trust it. As Fiala says:

I admit that my position hinges on a certain amount of distrust of those in power. This distrust is rational, however, in light of a long history that shows a tendency toward manipulation and abuse of power by those in power. In liberal states–which, since Locke, have been understood as fiduciary institutions–citizens have a right and a duty to raise skeptical objections to ensure their trust is not abused. This is especially true with regard to actions as momentous as war.

[…]

The relation between the practical pacifist and the state is like Socrates’ relation to Athens: a relation of questioning aimed at justice. Like Socrates, practical pacifists admit that their knowledge is far from perfect. They believe their duty is to serve society by questioning and clarifying evidence and arguments. … Because of strategic necessities, our leaders cannot provide us with full access to all of the evidence that would support their claims about the prudence of their proposed response to a supposed just cause, nor can they provide us with access to battle plans that would help to support the claim that war will be conducted in a just manner.

Certainly, I think, Fiala’s argument is persuasive in commending a higher degree of skepticism toward any proposed war than many of us typically display. Since war is a “capital case,” shouldn’t we be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before throwing our support behind it?
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*Logos, vol. 7, issue 2, Spring 2004; for a similar argument see Paul Griffiths, “Just War: An Exchange”

**By “antiwar pacifist” I mean someone who opposes war, but not necessarily all lethal violence. One might think war is never justified, but that the use of lethal violence by the police or in the immediate defense of self or others is sometimes justified.

***See Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism by John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.