How firm a foundation

It’s interesting that in some theological circles epistemology has become such a hot topic, especially considering I’ve always found epistemology to be one of the least exciting branches of philosophy. Much of the controversy seems to revolve around attacking or defending “foundationalism.” Foundationalism is the view, often associated with Descartes, that all our knowledge rests ultimately on certain “foundational” beliefs.

The Cartesian version takes those foundational beliefs to be certain in the sense of not being open to doubt, but it’s important to note that not all versions of foundationalism are committed to that. It’s perfectly possible to think that some of our beliefs are more fundamental than others (in fact, I’d say it’s probably impossible not to think that to some degree) but that even the more basic beliefs are fallible. For instance, many of my beliefs rest, at least in part, on my sense-perception of the world, but it’s quite possible for me to coherently doubt whether my sense-perceptions accurately represent the world. It’s just that perhaps I don’t have anything more basic to go on.

So the common dichotomy you see between people who supposedly believe in “absolute certainty” and those who don’t isn’t necessarily a matter of foundationalism vs. non-foundationalism. Once that’s clear I’m not sure how much of a stake theology has in that particular debate (though I do think theology has a stake in realist vs. non-realist epistemologies).