The New York Review of Books is going to become the first major American media outlet to (finally!) publish the “smoking gun” memo of Tony Blair’s government. The memo indicates that the decision by the Bush administration to go to war with Iraq had been made as early as July 2002, and that the justifications (WMD, ties to terrorism) came afterwards.
From the memo:
C [a British intelligence agent] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
The accompanying story suggest that the confrontation with the UN was engineered largely in order to provide a legal pretext for the war, not to avoid it:
Thus, the idea of UN inspectors was introduced not as a means to avoid war, as President Bush repeatedly assured Americans, but as a means to make war possible. War had been decided on; the problem under discussion here was how to make, in the prime minister’s words, “the political context …right.” The “political strategy” — at the center of which, as with the Americans, was weapons of mass destruction, for “it was the regime that was producing the WMD” — must be strong enough to give “the military plan the space to work.” Which is to say, once the allies were victorious the war would justify itself. The demand that Iraq accept UN inspectors, especially if refused, could form the political bridge by which the allies could reach their goal: “regime change” through “military action.”
Tom Dispatch has been permitted to make the NYRB story available early here.
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