Justifying God’s Ways to Man

Marcus critiques a Calvinist theodicy and theory of predestination here. Generally, I’m suspicious of theodicy – it seems like a problem that’s above our pay grade, and I’d be surprised to find out that most theodicies have provided any actual comfort to those in need of it.

Still, it’s a topic that inevitably comes up. I tried to deal with it in relation to the Atonement (see here, here, here, here and here – whew!) as a way of putting it in a more concretely Christian context.

Regarding predestination, I’m right in the middle of Paul Althaus’s book on Luther’s theology and he says that Luther makes a distinction between God’s “revealed will” and his “hidden will.” God’s revealed will comes to us in the Gospel proclamation – God seeks to be merciful to sinners. But God’s hidden will is that he predestines some to salvation and some to perdition.

To reconcile this with God’s justice, Luther takes what philosophers would call a “compatibilist” view of free will. That is, I am responsible for my rejection of God’s grace because it is my will to remain obstinate in my sin. This is true even though my will is determined by causes outside of my control.

I happen to think compatibilism has serious problems, but in fairness, so do virtually all other accounts of free will. The deeper issue here, though, is the theology that underwrites the notion of predestination.

What Luther (and Augustine and Calvin among others) were interested in safeguarding was God’s sovereignty and the efficacy of his grace. For Luther in particular, God’s grace is manifested in the fact that he has mercy on whom he wills to have mercy, and that mercy is effective in bringing to salvation. If a human response is necessary for God’s grace to be effective, then Luther thinks we are right back to works righteousness. My being saved is dependent on something I do.

The trick is reconciling God’s efficacious grace with a) the claim that God wants to save us all and b) the claim that at least some people, and possibly a majority of people, are going to be damned. If God’s grace is completely efficacious (i.e. it doesn’t depend on anything we do) and God wants to save everyone, then it seems to follow that everyone will in fact be saved.

Both a and b seem to have scriptural support. Thus the resort to the “hidden will” of God. God wants to save us all in the sense that the Gospel is proclamed to all as an unconditional promise of forgiveness and new life, but in fact some people will not respond to the proclamation and will not be saved. And this failure to respond is itself predestined by God from all eternity.

The problem with the theory of the hidden will, as Althaus points out, is that it seems to contradict Luther’s firm belief that Jesus reveals the Father to us. In fact, this belief, Althaus says, was the lynchpin of Luther’s Christology. It was the answer he found to the burning existential question of how we can know what God’s attitude toward us is. Jesus reveals to us a God who loves us so much that he comes to us to offer forgiveness, take away our sins and give us new life.

But if the “real” will of God is the “hidden will” that predestines to salvation and damnation, how can we say that Christ truly reveals the Father? The merciful Father that Jesus reveals to us seems to be trumped by the inscrutable deity of predestination.

It seems safer to stick with this bedrock theological principle – that Jesus reveals a God who really wants to save all of us, and let the other chips fall where they may (either in the direction of universalism or some form of Arminianism). After all, it was Luther himself who said “I know of no other God except the one called Jesus Christ.”

Comments

5 responses to “Justifying God’s Ways to Man”

  1. Eric Lee

    “Generally, I’m suspicious of theodicy – it seems like a problem that’s above our pay grade, and I’d be surprised to find out that most theodicies have provided any actual comfort to those in need of it.”I read a book called Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy that was in discussion format between 5 different theologians/philosphers. I found that while David Griffin’s process theodicy made the most sense, it also seemed to be the most complex and had almost no emotive value as far as giving comfort to others, which is basically my biggest problem with process: I don’t necessarily disagree with it insomuch as it’s just hard to explain to anybody; you need a flippin’ glossary of terms to share it with anybody.

  2. Bill

    Having read the Luther-Erasmus debates on Free Will and determinism a few years ago, I decided that Luther backed himself into a corner because he was so adamantly opposed to the Roman Catholic indulgences and other ways of buying ones or ones loved ones way into heaven.

    As for theodicy, it will always be problem as long as God considered all-powerful and all-knowing. The minute one considers Him to only be able to use the laws of nature as we do, but with superior knowledge, the theodycic question becomes moot.

  3. David Fiore

    have you ever read Jonathan Edwards’ treatise on the freedom of the will Lee?

    happy new year!

    Dave

  4. Marcus

    I have sent for that “Live Options” book thru Amazon. Interesting that some thinkers willingly depart from tradition by denying God knowledge of future contingent actions of free beings.

    I wonder if they have considered Plantinga’s strategy of allowing God knowledge but denying him control (Middle knowledge, trans-world depravity, and counterfactuals of creaturely freedom?).

    Did any of them – Hick aside – say anything about how reincarnation and retribution via something like Karma might help account for otherwise unaccountable evil, I wonder. Well, I’ll see soon enough.

  5. Lee

    I guess I’m reluctant to look for a solution to the problem of evil by limiting our concept of God. In the classic tradition God is conceived not as a being among other beings, but as being itself – the source and end of all existence. Open theism, process theology, etc. seem to me to make God just one piece of ontological furniture in the universe rather than the ground of being itself.

    I think the question is better posed not as why can’t God deal with evil in the way we think he should, by why won’t he. And the answer to the latter lies, I suspect, in the revealed character of God. If Jesus truly reveals the Father, then doesn’t that seem to imply that God’s method of dealing with evil (i.e. via patient suffering love) isn’t what we would expect?

    I also found this article on Arminianism vs. Calvinism helpful:

    http://www.goodnewsmag.org/magazine/SeptemberOctober/so04calvinism.htm

    p.s. Dave – haven’t read Edwards, but I probably should. Most of what I know about him is mediated through Christopher Lasch. Lasch held up Edwards as someone who advocated loving being for its own sake (i.e. independently of whether it makes us happy) which seems to fit with a Calvinist conception of God (e.g. we should praise God even if he damns us!)

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