Religion, Politics, and Casuistry

Bill Keezer has a couple of good posts, both touching on matters that have been much on my mind recently. First, Bill addresses the difficulty of applying moral absolutes in particular instances. Secondly, he has some harsh words for the presiding bishop of his (and my) church, Bp. Mark Hanson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, for making some ill-advised remarks of a political nature. I don’t know specifically what comments of Bp. Hanson’s Bill has in mind, but knowing the ELCA I could probably make an educated guess.

Bill’s comments (so to speak!) raise some interesting questions. How do we apply our moral maxims to concrete cases? How should moral principles be expressed in the political sphere? How should religious belief influence the principles we bring to bear on making political judgments?

A typical moral argument will have two premises followed by a conclusion. The major premise will usually be a general moral principle. The minor premise will be a claim that a particular instance falls under (or fails to fall under) the general principle. And the conclusion will be a judgment about the moral rightness or wrongness of the particular instance. For example:

1. For war to be justified, the threat must be lasting, grave and certain.

2. The threat from Iraq was not lasting, grave and certain.

3. Therefore, the war in Iraq was not justified.

or:

1. The taking of innocent human life is wrong.

2. Abortion is the taking of innocent human life.

3. Therefore, abortion is wrong.

or:

1. We are obliged to help the poor.

2. Welfare programs help the poor.

3. Therefore, we should support welfare programs.

What religion usually provides us with are general moral principles like those used as major premises in the above arguments. Take, for example, Jesus’ command in Luke 6: “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who mistreat you.” This commandment doesn’t tell us who our enemies are, or what it means to do good to them. These are judgments we have to make in particular cases.

In each of the arguments above, the minor premise is a judgment about some state of affairs in the world. And in each case different people can and have come to different conclusions about the truth of these premises. The judgments we make will depend on, among other things, the evidence available to us, how we weigh various pieces of evidence, which authorities we find trustworthy, and so on. Religious beliefs are of little direct help here, except insofar as they form our conscience so that we are inclined to make honest, informed judgments about the cases before us.

So, if Bp. Hanson, say, were to judge that the threat from Iraq was not lasting, grave, and certain, he would not be making that judgment qua religious leader, but rather in his capacity as a private citizen. Religious belief gives no special insight into such matters of fact. However, he may, qua religious figure, say that Christians should love their enemies and do good to those who hate them. And, as such, he may ask his flock to judge if their leaders are living up to these standards, especially those who profess to be Christians.