A Thinking Reed

Month: July 2004

  • Voting and Universalizability

    Occasionally I will suggest to friends and acquaintances (from somewhat puckish motives I have to admit) that they shouldn’t vote, or at the very least that it doesn’t matter whether they vote or not, or who they vote for, especially in large (national or state-wide) elections.

    My reasoning is fairly simple: whether you vote or not will make no difference to the outcome of the election. Suppose you vote for candidate X and she receives 5,497,385 votes while candidate Y receives 5,326,792 votes. Now suppose you hadn’t voted at all. Candidate X would’ve won by 170,592 votes instead of 170,593 votes. Wow! Your vote really counts! (For simplicity’s sake, I’ll ignore the fact that in the U.S. there are no truly national elections. In the case of presidential races we all vote in statewide elections, which then determine which candidate the state’s electors vote for. But the point stands.)

    Even in those (extremely rare) cases such as in the presidential election in 2000 where the margin is relatively small, it still never comes within spitting distance of a single vote. And, as we saw, as the margin of victory approaches a small number of votes, the chance that the election will be decided in a courtroom rather than the voting booth increases significantly.

    But wait, some will say (if there was anyone reading this), what if everyone acted like that? Then no one would vote and where would we be??

    The intuition underlying this protest is that we ought to act in such a way (at least, in so far as our moral duties are concerned) that we would want anyone (or everyone) to act in circumstances that were relevantly similar. Philosophers call this the “universalizability principle” (hereafter, UP). As Kant put it, we should act in such a way that the maxim guiding our action can consistently be willed as a universal law.

    If this is right, then I should refrain from voting only if I am willing to say that everyone else should do the same. Since I’m not willing to say this (because it would spell the end of democratic governance, which I regard as a good thing), I should not refrain from voting, nor should I advocate that others refrain from voting. Q.E.D., right?

    Well, I’m hesitant to embrace this conclusion, because it seems to me that we can use similar reasoning to proscribe other kinds of voting behavior – kinds of behavior that most people would, intuitively, regard as perfectly acceptable, even commendable.

    Take, for instance, third-party voting. Many people vote for third-party candidates, not because they actually want their candidate to win, but because they want to “send a message” of dissatisfaction with one or both of the major parties. Maybe it’s because the major parties are not addressing some issue they deem important, or because they want one of the major parties to move further to the right or left, or whatever. I imagine there are people who voted for Ralph Nader or Harry Browne in 2000, not because they wanted either of those esteemed gentlemen to actually become president, but because they wanted to send a message of protest to the Democrats and/or Republicans (this is not to deny that there were people who voted for Nader or Browne who did want them to become president; I’m just stipulating that there was some sub-set of third party voters who were voting primarily to send a message, not because they wanted their guy to win).

    But, if we apply UP, it looks like these third-party voters are behaving irrationally or immorally, just like someone who refrains from voting altogether. After all, by hypothesis, these folks didn’t want the candidate they voted for to win. But, according to UP, one should always act in such a way that one would will everyone to act. So, in voting for a candidate they didn’t actually want to win, they are running afoul of this principle, since if everyone voted as they did, their candidate would have, in fact, won.

    Now, that might not seem so bad, since you can always say that, yeah, you should only vote for the guy you really want to win. But it gets worse. It looks like we can get an even more counterintuitive result when we apply UP to voting for someone whom we actually want to win. Suppose I really and truly in my heart of hearts want John Kerry to win the upcoming election and so I vote accordingly. Now, according to UP, I should be willing to say that everyone should vote for John Kerry, since that’s what I think is best all things considered.

    But I’m not so sure I’m willing to say this. Even if I want John Kerry to win, would I want everyone to vote for him? Wouldn’t that create a situation in which the winner had an overwhelming (unanimous!) mandate, and couldn’t that lead to him running roughshod over all opposition? The problem with this is that I think a vigorous opposition is essential to a healthy democracy, so I want there to be a significant amount of support for the opposition party in any given election. But this means that I can’t will that everyone act as I do in voting for John Kerry, even if I want Kerry to win. So that means that I shouldn’t vote for Kerry, even if I want him to win!*

    The upshot of this is that it looks like the consistent application of UP rules out not only abstaining from voting, but also voting for any candidate unless you want him or her to win with 100% of the vote. This suggests, to me anyway, that UP may not be the self-evident principle it has often been taken to be, since it seems to lead to some extremely counter-intuitive conclusions. But, if we reject UP, then at least one argument against non-voting appears to be without foundation.

    ———————-

    *Now, there may be fanatical party loyalists who think that a 100% vote tally for their guy would be just dandy, but I take it as nearly self-evident that, other things being equal, a one-party state is a bad thing.

  • Thought for the Day

    “There is no good trying to be more spiritual than God. God never meant man to be a purely spiritual creature. That is why He uses material things like bread and wine to put the new life into us. We may think this rather crude and unspiritual. God does not: He invented eating. He likes matter. He invented it.” – C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity

  • Thinking Outside the Box

    I like people who defy easy stereotypes and flout established categories. For instance, here’s the website of John McColgan, a Democrat running for a congressional seat in Oregon. Here’s his platform:

    1. Defend the Constitution, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the rules of the Geneva Convention;

    2. Restore American credibility abroad by respecting international law and cooperating with the United Nations;

    3. Promote long-term national security by converting some military spending into aid to underdeveloped countries, and by reducing our dependence on foreign oil;

    4. Challenge any threat to the sanctity of human life, including war, euthanasia, cloning, abortion, and capital punishment;

    5. Stimulate the economy by reducing tax rates and health care costs for the self-employed, by promoting fair trade and unionization, and by demanding stiff penalties for corporate fraud;

    6. Promote a balanced budget through progressive tax reform;

    7. Develop a national health care program supported by employers, employees, and investors;

    8. Stabilize social security by removing the current ceiling on taxes for the wealthy and by taxing investment income;

    9. Support public education by opposing mandatory federal testing and promoting local control;

    10. Defend the environment by protecting national parks and wilderness areas, and by employing selective harvesting in federal forests.

    Notice that Mr. McColgan seems to be to the “left” of someone like John Kerry on, for instance, health care and taxes, but to the “right” of most liberals on abortion, euthanasia and cloning. He’s also opposed to capital punishment – something almost no major party candidate is willing to do, lest they appear “soft on crime.” (Remember Bill Clinton’s trip home to Arkansas while on the campaign trail in ’92 to preside over the execution of a mentally retarded man?)

    Anyway, I have no idea what his chances are, but I hope the good people of Oregon’s second district give this guy a look.

  • Tom Regan on Contractarianism

    In this essay, Tom Regan, the philosopher best known for his writings on animal rights, argues against “contractarianism” in a fashion similar to that of my argument below. Here’s Regan:

    Here, very crudely, is the root idea [of contractarianism]: morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract (hence the name contractarianism). Those who understand and accept the terms of the contract are covered directly; they have rights created and recognized by, and protected in, the contract. And these contractors can also have protection spelled out for others who, though they lack the ability to understand morality and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved or cherished by those who can. Thus young children, for example, are unable to sign contracts and lack rights. But they are protected by the contract nonetheless because of the sentimental interests of others, most notably their parents. So we have, then, duties involving these children, duties regarding them, but no duties to them. Our duties in their case are indirect duties to other human beings, usually their parents.

    Regan points out that the status of animals under contractarian theories is analogous to that of children since they, obviously cannot be parties to a contract – implied or otherwise. But he doesn’t think this is a problem for his theory of animal rights since, according to him, contractarianism is far from being an adequate theory of moral duties with respect to humans, and so doesn’t even make it out of the gate. He says:

    When it comes to the moral status of animals, contractarianism could be a hard view to refute if it were an adequate theoretical approach to the moral status of human beings. It is not adequate in this latter respect, however, which makes the question of its adequacy in the former case, regarding animals, utterly moot. For consider: morality, according to the (crude) contractarian position before us, consists of rules that people agree to abide by. What people? Well, enough to make a difference – enough, that is, collectively to have the power to enforce the rules that are drawn up in the contract. That is very well and good for the signatories but not so good for anyone who is not asked to sign. And there is nothing in the contractarianism of the sort we are discussing that guarantees or requires that everyone will have a chance to participate equally in framing rules of morality. The result is that this approach to ethics could sanction the most blatant forms of social, economic, moral, and political injustice, ranging from a repressive caste system to systematic racial or sexual discrimination. Might, according to this theory, does make right. Let those who are the victims of injustice suffer as they will. It matters not so long as no one else – no contractor, or too few of them – cares about it. Such a theory takes one’s moral breath away…. A theory with so little to recommend it at the level of the ethics of our treatment of our fellow humans cannot have anything more to recommend it when it comes to the ethics of how we treat our fellow animals.

    Regan goes on to consider more sophisticated versions of contractarianism, such as the version propounded by John Rawls. Nevertheless, it suffers, according to Regan, from the same fundamental defect – by excluding certain individuals from the original bargaining position, it denies that we have direct duties to those individuals who lack a sense of justice.

    I think Regan here puts his finger on a central defect of contractarianism. Its circle of moral concern – who it considers agents worthy of moral consideration and obligation – will have to be determined in advance of determining the rules of morality (which is what the contract is supposed to do). But specifying to whom we have moral duties is itself a crucial and central aspect of morality. By excluding entire classes of beings in advance, contractarianism appears to beg a central question of morality, despite the fact that the contract is supposed to determine morality’s content.

  • Part IV: The Road to Serfdom?

    (for earlier posts in this series see here, here, and here)

    I realize that the foregoing will have put me well beyond the pale in the eyes of most libertarians, but for what it’s worth, I remain convinced that the present day State is far larger and more intrusive than is necessary. Libertarian critics are right to point out that an expansive state tends to undermine private initiative, crowd out the voluntary sector, and drain the vitality from communities, families and civil society. Not to mention the important fact that the State often makes claims of loyalty for itself and demands sacrifice in a way that can only be called demonic.

    But, it will be objected, what principled reason do I have for saying “this far and no further” to Leviathan? Haven’t I placed myself on a slippery slope to totalitarianism, on the proverbial road to serfdom?

    I don’t think so, mainly because what might look like a slippery slope in logical terms is often nothing of the sort in the real world. In the real world, we draw lines, even if they seem arbitrary from certain theoretical perspectives. What prevents government over-extending itself is usually not our political theory, but people’s common sense and their commitment to a particular way of life. We don’t need a theory about “limited government” so much as we need people with the virtues and practices that enable them to resist the blandishments of ever-expanding government. How much government intervention is appropriate is a judgment that can only be made by citizens employing the virtues of prudence and justice. What kind of political regime we have, I think, ultimately depends on what kind of people we are.

  • Part III: Beyond the Minimal State

    (see here for Part I and here for Part II)

    Suppose that the foregoing argument is right, and that anyone committed to the minimal protection of basic libertarian rights should prefer a minimal state to an anarcho-capitalist world of competing defense agencies. Are there further considerations that drive us beyond affirming the minimalist night-watchman state of classical liberalism?

    There might be if, as I argued below, there is no clear line to be drawn between the protection of “negative” and “positive” rights. The protection of any “right” requires that economic resources be dedicated to the task. But, I’ve already conceded that the costs of protecting “negative” rights should be socialized in order to prevent the basic rights of those I referred to as the “weak, the helpless, and the infirm” from going undefended. So, are there reasons to support the further socialization of other “rights” such as the “right to welfare” or the “right to education”?

    It seems to me this may be the case. There are those people who are, for example, truly unable to provide the means of subsistence for themselves. Is having access to such means less crucial than having access to the protection of one’s life from aggressive assault? It’s hard to see how. So, how do we justify “socialized” provision of the latter and not the former?

    Once we’ve conceded that the costs of providing some goods (i.e. rights-protection) may be socialized, what, logically, prevents us from extending the principle to other crucial goods? This is not to say that all, or even most, goods should be socialized. Obviously, both history and economic theory have shown that socialism is untenable. But, by the same token, history has shown that the so-called mixed economy appears to be more or less stable.

    I conclude, therefore, that government is justified to provide at least a) basic protection of so-called negative rights and b) collective provision of essential goods to those unable to provide them for themselves. This justifies going beyond the classical liberal night-watchman state, though whether it would justify the far-flung apparatus of the modern-day welfare state is an open question.*

    —————————-

    *I won’t even attempt to deal here with the numerous critiques of welfare state policies based on models of economic efficiency. Needless to say, these must be taken into account by anyone who proposes some new government intervention. Though, I suspect many of them are not as decisive as their proponents often assume.

  • Part II: Do We Even Need Government?

    (see here for Part I)

    Radical libertarians, so-called anarcho-capitalists, argue that government, defined as an agency or institution with a coercive monopoly on deciding when force is legitimate in a given territorial area, is not necessary to protect human rights. As a subset of libertarians, an-caps consider human rights to include life, liberty, and the right to acquire and transfer property.

    Most libertarian anarchists favor the establishment of private competing rights-protection agencies (hereinafter RPAs) to replace the current coercive government monopoly on such services. No RPA would have a coercive monopoly in a given geographic area, thus distinguishing it from a government. The idea is that individuals would subscribe to their preferred RPA, with market mechanisms providing checks and balances on concentrations of power.

    Thus envisioned, an anarcho-capitalist society would be a contractarian one. By this I mean that, since rights protection services are to be provided by private competing agencies, you will only get as much rights protection as you contract for. There would be no government to ensure that every person gets a certain amount of rights protection.

    In fact, this seems to show that the much-touted (by libertarians) distinction between so-called negative and positive rights is not as clear-cut as it first appears. This is because if we think of “rights-protection” as an economic good (which it surely is), there are costs to providing protection of “negative” rights, just as much as “positive” ones. Someone has to provide the protection of these rights. The protection of a “negative” right to liberty has a cost just as much as the enforcement of a “positive” right to education. In other words, asserting a right doesn’t mean much if you can’t protect that right, either by defending it yourself, or contracting with someone else to protect it.

    But if this is the case, then we face an urgent question. How, in an anarcho-capitalist world, are the rights of those who are unable to enter into contractual relationships to be protected? I have in mind here not only children, but also other “marginal cases” such as the severely retarded, the mentally ill, the comatose and others who are utterly dependent on others for their care (I won’t even mention even more controversial marginal cases such as animals or the unborn, except to say that the same principle would apply to them as well). In short, the weak, the helpless, and the infirm would lack moral standing.

    The problem, it seems to me, is that with no agency to assert unilateral rights-protecting authority (i.e. a State) over anyone unable to contract for such a service themselves, there is no way of ensuring that their purported rights will be protected in an anarcho-capitalist social order. While the State is, at least officially, committed to protecting basic rights, what incentive would a private RPA have for intervening to protect the rights of someone with whom it had no contractual relationship?

    If this is right, then for all our talk of rights, we are left with the situation of the weak and helpless essentially unchanged. Since they can’t contract for rights-protection on their own behalf, they would remain, for all intents and purposes, under the control, and at the mercy of, other people. They would be, in essence, “owned” by those who were able to exercise power over them.

    I see no way to avoid the conclusion that crucial rights will go unprotected – as a matter of policy – in an anarcho-capitalist social order. Because individuals who can’t contract for rights-protection would not be guaranteed to receive rights-protection in an anarchist society (by definition). So, a monopoly agency that provides a minimum amount of rights-protection to everyone in the moral community, even if they cannot contract for such rights-protection themselves, would be necessary. That is, we should be, at the very least, libertarian minarchists (i.e. proponents of a minimal state committed to the protection of basic rights of life, liberty and property).

  • Why I Am Not a Libertarian (Anymore) Part I

    As hinted in earlier posts, for quite a while I thought of myself as a libertarian as far as political philosophy went. Libertarianism, I think, often appeals to people who value abstract, systematic theorizing and like the idea that you can deduce a blueprint for an ideal political arrangement from a few simple axioms. Over time, though, I’ve come to believe that libertarianism fails at crucial points (this will hardly come as a shock to most people!), and that it might be worthwhile to put some of those second (and third, and fourth) thoughts into words.

  • Maybe "Humane Slaughter" Is an Oxymoron

    Keith Burgess-Jackson directs our attention to this article in the Washington Post on the conditions in modern slaughterhouses. Despite the passage of the (somewhat Orwellian-sounding) Humane Slaughter Act, the level of enforcement appears to vary greatly:

    For example, the government took no action against a Texas beef company that was cited 22 times in 1998 for violations that included chopping hooves off live cattle. In another case, agency supervisorsfailed to take action on multiple complaints of animal cruelty at a Florida beef plant and fired an animal health technician for reporting the problems to the Humane Society. The dismissal letter sent to the technician, Tim Walker, said his dislosure had “irreparably damaged” the agency’s relations with the packing plant.

    “I complained to everyone — I said, ‘Lookit, they’re skinning live cows in there,’ ” Walker said. “Always it was the same answer: ‘We know it’s true. But there’s nothing we can do about it.’”

    Some blame the lack of enforcement on the “privatization” of inspection processes:

    In the past three years, a new meat inspection system that shifted responsibility to industry has made it harder to catch and report cruelty problems, some federal inspectors say. Under the new system, implemented in 1998, the agency no longer tracks the number of humane-slaughter violations its inspectors find each year.

    We are also offered this interesting paradox:

    Industry officials say they also recognize an ethical imperative to treat animals with compassion. Science is blurring the distinction between the mental processes of humans and lower animals — discovering, for example, that even the lowly rat may dream. Americans thus are becoming more sensitive to the suffering of food animals, even as they consume increasing numbers of them.

    The article goes on to detail some of the mishaps that have resulted in gruesome suffering in animals such as cattle being skinned alive and botched stunning techniques that allow conscious pigs to be dunked in tanks of hot water where they are scalded and drowned.

    If these were cats and dogs instead of cows and pigs, would we be more outraged by this kind of thing? But pigs and cows are just as intelligent and sociable as cats and dogs and are just as sensitive to pain. What is the morally significant difference?

  • Thought For the Day

    “There are many things wrong with the internationalist idea to Make the World Safe for Democracy, one of them being that it is not that different from the nationalist idea that What Is Good for America Is Good for the World.” – John Lukacs, Confessions of an Original Sinner