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For the idea that the voter himself is making the decision to have any real validity, it would be necessary for the options presented to the electorate to include all possible choices. In a two-party system this is never the case. The voter chooses not a position of principle but the less objectionable of two competing oligarchies. — John H. Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State

At this rate VI threatens to become all Kerry-bashing all the time, but some things just cry out for comment (perhaps I’ll make a point to bash President Bush some more just to keep things fair and balanced).

Anyway, this past weekend Senator Kerry gave a radio address wherein he promised, if elected, to lift the restrictions on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research that President Bush has put into place. As CNN reports:

“This is not the way we do things in America,” Kerry said in the Democrats’ weekly radio address. “Here in America we don’t sacrifice science for ideology. We are a land of discovery, a place where innovators and optimists are free to dream and explore.”

“We know that progress has always brought with it the worry that this time, we have gone too far,” Kerry said. “Believe it or not, there was a time when some questioned the morality of heart transplants. Not too long ago, we heard the same kind of arguments against the biotechnology research that now saves stroke victims and those with leukemia.”

Such work, Kerry said, is too important to risk for an ideological base and must be “a priority” in the nation’s medical community.

“People of good will and good sense can resolve the ethical issues without stopping life-saving research,” he added. “America has long led the world in great discoveries, always upholding the highest standards, with our breakthroughs and our beliefs always going hand-in-hand. And when it comes to stem cell research, we will demand no less.”

What I take issue with here is not so much Kerry’s position on stem cell research (which is defensible, though, I think, wrong). Rather it’s the way he tries to hide the fact that he’s taking a moral position by wrapping himself in the mantle of “science.”

Kerry sidesteps the moral argument by setting up a false dichotomy between “science” and “ideology.” Science as such doesn’t give us moral guidance. It tells us what we can do, but not what we should or shouldn’t do. Moral norms have to come from elsewhere. So “science” can’t tell us if it’s right to destroy human embryos in order to harvest their stem cells. Surely Kerry knows this. Heck, I know it, and I didn’t even go to Yale.

I’ve had people tell me that despite the campaign rhetoric, they know that “in his heart” Kerry opposed the war in Iraq.

This theory appears to verge on the unfalsifiable. For instance, you have to ignore things like this from Sunday’s Washington Post:

Knowing then what he knows today about the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Kerry still would have voted to authorize the war and “in all probability” would have launched a military attack to oust Hussein by now if he were president, Kerry national security adviser Jamie Rubin said in an interview Saturday. As recently as Friday, the Massachusetts senator had said he only “might” have still gone to war.



Of course, it’s possible that Kerry does oppose the war despite what he says, how he votes, etc. But what exactly does it mean to oppose something “in your heart” when it seems to have no effect whatsoever on your actions? And aren’t actions all we have to go on in judging political figures?

“There is one consideration [in political philosophy] which has something like the position of absolute zero or the velocity of light in current physics. It cannot possibly be an exercise of civic authority deliberately to kill or mutilate innocent subjects.” — G.E.M. Anscombe

About eight days after Jesus said this, he took Peter, John and James with him and went up onto a mountain to pray. As he was praying, the appearance of his face changed, and his clothes became as bright as a flash of lightning. Two men, Moses and Elijah, appeared in glorious splendor, talking with Jesus. They spoke about his departure, which he was about to bring to fulfillment at Jerusalem. Peter and his companions were very sleepy, but when they became fully awake, they saw his glory and the two men standing with him. As the men were leaving Jesus, Peter said to him, “Master, it is good for us to be here. Let us put up three shelters–one for you, one for Moses and one for Elijah.” (He did not know what he was saying.) While he was speaking, a cloud appeared and enveloped them, and they were afraid as they entered the cloud. A voice came from the cloud, saying, “This is my Son, whom I have chosen; listen to him.” When the voice had spoken, they found that Jesus was alone. The disciples kept this to themselves, and told no one at that time what they had seen. (Luke 9:28-36)

Bill Keezer has a couple of good posts, both touching on matters that have been much on my mind recently. First, Bill addresses the difficulty of applying moral absolutes in particular instances. Secondly, he has some harsh words for the presiding bishop of his (and my) church, Bp. Mark Hanson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, for making some ill-advised remarks of a political nature. I don’t know specifically what comments of Bp. Hanson’s Bill has in mind, but knowing the ELCA I could probably make an educated guess.

Bill’s comments (so to speak!) raise some interesting questions. How do we apply our moral maxims to concrete cases? How should moral principles be expressed in the political sphere? How should religious belief influence the principles we bring to bear on making political judgments?

A typical moral argument will have two premises followed by a conclusion. The major premise will usually be a general moral principle. The minor premise will be a claim that a particular instance falls under (or fails to fall under) the general principle. And the conclusion will be a judgment about the moral rightness or wrongness of the particular instance. For example:

1. For war to be justified, the threat must be lasting, grave and certain.

2. The threat from Iraq was not lasting, grave and certain.

3. Therefore, the war in Iraq was not justified.

or:

1. The taking of innocent human life is wrong.

2. Abortion is the taking of innocent human life.

3. Therefore, abortion is wrong.

or:

1. We are obliged to help the poor.

2. Welfare programs help the poor.

3. Therefore, we should support welfare programs.

What religion usually provides us with are general moral principles like those used as major premises in the above arguments. Take, for example, Jesus’ command in Luke 6: “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who mistreat you.” This commandment doesn’t tell us who our enemies are, or what it means to do good to them. These are judgments we have to make in particular cases.

In each of the arguments above, the minor premise is a judgment about some state of affairs in the world. And in each case different people can and have come to different conclusions about the truth of these premises. The judgments we make will depend on, among other things, the evidence available to us, how we weigh various pieces of evidence, which authorities we find trustworthy, and so on. Religious beliefs are of little direct help here, except insofar as they form our conscience so that we are inclined to make honest, informed judgments about the cases before us.

So, if Bp. Hanson, say, were to judge that the threat from Iraq was not lasting, grave, and certain, he would not be making that judgment qua religious leader, but rather in his capacity as a private citizen. Religious belief gives no special insight into such matters of fact. However, he may, qua religious figure, say that Christians should love their enemies and do good to those who hate them. And, as such, he may ask his flock to judge if their leaders are living up to these standards, especially those who profess to be Christians.

So, the Democrats have been bellyaching for the last 3-and-a-half years about George Bush’s “stolen” election. Well, here in Pennsylvania at least, they’ve decided that turnabout is fair play. Local Democrats are pulling out all the stops to keep independent candidate Ralph Nader off the presidential ballot.

Nader’s campaign has reportedly collected over 40,000 signatures, almost twice the number needed to get on the ballot. But Democrats from the state House of Representatives have vowed to challenge those signatures in court. H. William DeWeese, the minority floor leader, is mounting a legal challenge to Nader’s petitions with backing from the AFL-CIO.

The irksome thing about this is the assumption that any potential Nader votes naturally belong to John Kerry, as if by divine right. And that the hapless voters are too stupid to vote in their own best interest.

This may come as news to the Democrats, but tere are any number of reasons that a potential Nader voter might not vote for Kerry even if the Nader option was precluded. Maybe he wants to cast an anti-war protest vote, and voting for Kerry, who supported the Iraq war, would hardly be an effective way to do that. Maybe he’s concerned about some other issue that neither of the major candidates are addressing, like civil liberties or the drug war. It’s even possible that he’s a disgruntled conservative upset with George Bush, but who can’t bring himself to pull the lever for Kerry.

In any event, maybe if the Democrats worked a little harder on making their candidate attractive to voters they wouldn’t have to worry so much about restricting our choices at the polls.

As a follow-up to the last post, here are two more counterintuitive political pieces:

“The Conservative Case for Voting Democratic” by Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute:

Complaints about Republican profligacy have led the White House to promise to mend its ways. But Bush’s latest budget combines accounting flim-flam with unenforceable promises. So how do we put Uncle Sam on a sounder fiscal basis?

Vote Democratic.

Democrats obviously are no pikers when it comes to spending. But the biggest impetus for higher spending is partisan uniformity, not partisan identity. Give either party complete control of government, and the Treasury vaults are quickly emptied. Neither Congress nor the President wants to tell the other no. Both are desperate to prove they can “govern”—which means creating new programs and spending more money. But share power between parties, and out of principle or malice they check each other. Even if a President Kerry proposed more spending than would a President Bush, a GOP Congress would appropriate less. That’s one reason the Founders believed in the separation of powers.

and “The Case for George W. Bush” by liberal writer Tom Junod (link via Presence of Mind):

As easy as it is to say that we can’t abide the president because of the gulf between what he espouses and what he actually does , what haunts me is the possibility that we can’t abide him because of us—because of the gulf between his will and our willingness. What haunts me is the possibility that we have become so accustomed to ambiguity and inaction in the face of evil that we find his call for decisive action an insult to our sense of nuance and proportion.

Lotsa good stuff out there:

Arnold Kling (who’s rapidly becoming one of my favorite commentators) on the “happiness police.”

Peter Hitchens (Christopher’s antiwar Tory brother – weird family I guess) has a provocative essay on the “parental state” and the erosion of the rule of law.

The American Enterprise has two items of note from its current issue:

– sociologist Rodney Stark on “Fact, Fable, and Darwin”

– an interview with Thomas Sowell

A hilarious article from the New York Press: “The Liberal Case against Kerry”, and in the interest of fairness, also see “The Conservative Case against George W. Bush.” (links via Lew Rockwell)

Earlier I argued that our intuitive apprehension of certain moral principles justified us in adhering to a form of moral realism. I maintained that most people would assent to certain moral truisms, and that these judgments are independent, epistemologically speaking, of whatever theory about the nature of morality we happen to hold. In other words, my view is that first-order moral judgments don’t necessarily require backing from some second-order theory in order to be justified. Moral realism should be our default position, barring overwhelming reason to reject it. The burden of proof lies on those who would have us overturn our practice of making moral judgments, just as the burden of proof would lie on someone asking us to give up making perceptual judgments.

This position might appear at first to commit us to an extreme moral conservatism. If we take our unreflective first-order moral judgments as given, how can we make moral progress? But this worry comes from confusing first-order judgments with second-order theorizing. I can make adjustments in my first-order moral judgments independently of whatever ethical theory (if any) I might hold. Suppose I believe (as I do) that it’s (prima facie at least) wrong to take an innocent human life. Now suppose I become convinced that a fetus counts as an innocent human life. I will then draw the conclusion that abortion is wrong. All of this moral reflection can take place regardless of whether I take my moral principles as expressing a universal duty, the good of the greatest number, the will of God, or whatever.

Moreover, we should be aware of the fact that often in debates about morality, it’s not general moral principles that are being contested. In the debate about abortion, for example, nearly all parties accept the principle that it’s wrong to take an innocent human life. The debate usually revolves around whether a fetus counts as an innocent human life in the relevant sense. So, a judgment like “abortion is murder” is derivative of some more general moral principle along with certain other premises about the status of the fetus.

So, the position sketched is “conservative” only in the sense of claiming that there are certain unchanging universal moral principles. But it still allows for moral development and self-criticism, and may, in fact, lead us to quite radical positions. For instance, as the late James Rachels said in arguing for vegetarianism, “The rule against causing unnecessary pain is the least eccentric of all moral principles, and that rule leads straight to the conclusion that we should abandon the business of meat production and adopt alternative diets. Considered in this light, vegetarianism may be thought of as a severely conservative moral stance.”