A Thinking Reed

Category: Theology & Faith

  • Further thoughts on pluralism

    Thinking a bit more about John Hick’s pluralism, spurred on by some of the excellent comments on the last post, it does seem that my original worry about Hick’s position could be stated in a stronger form.

    My question was whether it’s necessary to believe in a tradition in a non-pluralist way (i.e., to believe that my tradition gets it right about the divine, at least in essentials) in order for it to be “soteriologically efficacious.” For if I come to view my tradition as simply a culturally conditioned response to the divine, that may prevent me from fully immersing myself in it, or committing to it, in the way necessary to move from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness (to use Hick’s terms).

    But an even stronger form of the objection, it seems to me, is that, on the Hickian hypothesis, it’s not clear what justification I have for believing that my tradition is soteriologically efficacious in the first place. Since the Real is, ex hypothesi, unknowable in itself, what reason do I have to believe that my tradition constitutes a reliable guide for relating to it?

    The more traditional Christian view is that, while God remains incomprehensible, we can know certain truths about God (both through the use of natural reason and because God has revealed Godself to us). Because of this, we believe certain ways of relating to God are appropriate and others not. If we didn’t believe that such knowledge was possible, what grounds would we have for affirming the appropriateness of our (or any) traditition as a way of relating to the divine?

    This doesn’t, however, commit us to a strong form of exclusivism. For it’s possible to hold that God is known/revealed in other tradtions and also to recognize that there is no tradition-independent (or subject-independent) way of establishing the truth of a single tradition. My reasons for being a Christian, for example, depend in part on my social and cultural context, personal experiences, and evaluative judgments–which means that there is an irreducible element of personal commitment in adhering to a particular tradition. This doesn’t make it irrational, but should humble us a bit in making overly strong claims for our own tradition. It also, however, doesn’t require us to give up its truth claims.

  • Religious pluralism revisited

    One common criticism of the pluralistic view of religions–and one that I have found persuasive–is that it presupposes a “god’s eye” vantage point that seems to be ruled out by the theory itself. That is, asserting that all religions provide a partial perspective on the divine, seems to imply that the pluralist can discern clearly the Reality that the various religious traditions perceive only dimly.

    John Hick, who probably has as large a claim as anyone to putting religious pluralism on the agenda of (Anglo-American) philosophy of religion, has a response to this objection. The pluralist hypothesis, he says, is an inductive hypothesis, founded in part on the assumption that religious experience is not illusory:

    The advocate of the pluralist understanding cannot pretend to any such cosmic vision. How then does he profess to know that the situation is indeed as he depicts it? The answer is that he does not profess to know this, if by knowledge we mean infallible cognition. Nor indeed can anyone else claim to have knowledge, in this sense, of either the exclusivist or inclusivist picture. All of them are, strictly speaking, hypotheses. The pluralist hypothesis is arrived at inductively. One starts from the fact that many human beings experience life in relation to a limitlessly greater transcendent Reality–whether the direction of transcendence be beyond our present existence or within its hidden depths. […] Treating one’s own form of religious experience, then, as veridical–as an experience (however dim, like “seeing through a glass darkly”) of transcendent divine Reality–one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience which take different forms, are shaped by different conceptualities, and embodied in different institutions, art forms, and life-styles. In other words, besides one’s own religion, sustained by its distinctive form of religious experience, there are also other religions, through each of which flows the life blood of a different form of religious experience. What account is one to give of this plurality? (Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 37-38)

    Assuming that religious experience is to some extent veridical, Hick asks, is it more reasonable to think that one (and only one) tradition has discerned the truth about the divine, or that all the major traditions contain some truthful perception of that Reality? Hick’s argument is that the pluralistic hypothesis is the most reasonable.

    Most mainline Christians (Protestant and Catholic) no longer take the hard-line exclusivist stance that Christianity is true and other religions simply false. They also generally affirm that adherents of other religions can find salvation (though there’s a variety of accounts about how that’s supposed to work). But mainline theology has generally moved in the direction of “inclusivism.” What Hick contends, though, is that inclusivism is a logically unstable half-way house between exclusivism and a more thorough-going pluralism. His argument hinges on his understanding of the nature of salvation.

    For Hick, salvation is the process whereby we move from being self-centered to “Reality-centered.” That is, we become less preoccupied with our selves and move toward a universal compassion. Religion, then, is a vehicle for attaining salvation/liberation. And since, as seems evident, no one religion has a monopoly on this form of liberation, it seems reasonable to conclude that all religions with such spiritual and moral fruits are rooted in some kind of authentic experience of ultimate Reality. And it further seems to follow that no one religion can, on these grounds at any rate, claim to be the one unsurpassable truth.

    Religions–with their complex systems of symbol, myth, metaphysics, ritual, devotional practices, ethical principles, art, and social organization–are culturally conditioned responses to an encounter with “the Real”–an encounter often mediated through charismatic leaders and founders. What accounts the differences among religions is the diversity among human beings: their cultures, their histories, and other factors that shape their response to ultimate Reality. The Real as it appears in forms of religion must be distinguished from the Real as it is in itself. Different religions may reflect different aspects of the Real, but, as far as we can observe their effects, it would be presumptuous to assert that one is superior to the rest.

    Hick to some extent offers a pragmatic criterion of religious truth. Various culturally conditioned manifestations of the Real are true and good to the extent that they enable their adherents to move from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. “These many different perceptions of the Real, both theistic and non-theistic, can only establish themselves as authentic by their soteriological efficacy” (p. 44). This doesn’t mean that religions don’t make truth-claims, but that their ultimate claims–in this life at any rate–can only be evaluated by their efficacy in making salvation possible.

    I think this version of pluralism is stronger than it’s often given credit for, and Hick has responses to some of the most common objections. But one question that occurs to me is whether the “soteriological efficacy” of a particular religion depends, at least in part, on its being believed in a non-pluralistic fashion. In other words, many of the great saints of the Christian tradition seem to be those who believed most wholeheartedly in Christianity’s truth claims. By contrast, if I come to see Christianity as one among many culturally conditioned responses to the Real, might it not be harder for the Christian narrative, symbols, practices, etc. to form me in a way that makes salvation/liberation possible? Won’t I be tempted to hold them at arm’s length, having seen them as the product of human minds as much as the divine mind?

    Of course, Hick might well respond that this is simply the position that all moderately critical religious believers find themselves in. Anyone who has rejected the inerrancy of the Bible and the infallibility of church and tradition must reckon with the fact that, to some extent, their religion is man-made. It may be a response to a divine revelation, but that revelation is mediated through human language, symbols, and concepts. Wholehearted, uncritical belief just isn’t an option.

  • Addendum to previous post

    Something funky happened to that last post, and part of it got cut out. But in the version I originally wrote, I included on my list H. Richard Niebuhr’s Radical Monotheism and Western Culture. I posted a bit about it here.

  • Toward a non-anthropocentric theology

    Jeremy asked if I’d recommend any books on moving away from an anthropocentric theology. This is a question at the intersection of some perennial ATR themes, so I thought I’d post the answer here. The following list makes no pretense to be either authoritative or exhaustive, but these are some books (in no particular order) that I’ve found helpful:

    Bill McKibben, The Comforting Whirlwind: God, Job, and the Scale of Creation

    H. Paul Santmire, Nature Reborn

    Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology

    Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith

    Jay McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans

    James M. Gustafson, An Examined Faith

    Ian Bradley, God Is Green

    Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation

    Of course, a lot depends here on what we mean by “moving away from anthropocentrism.” But, at a minimum, I think it’s any theology which recognizes that the rest of creation does not exist solely for the sake of human beings and that God’s purposes encompass more than human salvation. The books above range from fairly orthodox to fairly heterodox, and I wouldn’t endorse everything in all of them, but all provide stimulating food for thought. The list doesn’t include any classic sources, which isn’t to deny that there are resources in the tradition for a less anthropocentric theology (Augustine, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Wesley and others contain material that might be richly mined, it seems to me); neither does the list include much in the way of biblical studies, but that also seems like an important area for thought on this topic.

    p.s. Other recommendations are welcome!

  • Creaturely theology

    Following on the heels of his Why Animal Suffering Matters, Andrew Linzey’s Creatures of the Same God addresses many of the same issues, but from a more explicitly theological point of view. In fact, Creatures is a collection of mostly previously published essays, expanding on and refining ideas first developed in Linzey’s other books, especially Animal Theology and Animal Gospel.

    The persistent theme of the book is religion’s–particularly Christianity’s–potential for being at the forefront of the movement for animal protection. Linzey is a cold-eyed realist when it comes to Christianity’s track record on the treatment of animals, but he’s just as firm in his insistence that the triune God loves each and every creature she has made and that human beings are called to be the “servant species,” caring for the well-being of all creation, particularly our fellow sentients.

    In the first three chapters, Linzey summarizes the theological case for animal rights. In “Religion and Sensitivity to Animal Suffering” he contends that religion provides spiritual vision and hope necessary for long-haul causes that often seem hopeless. “Theology as if Animals Mattered” highlights some of the challenges traditional theology faces if we take animals seriously as fellow creatures. And “Animal Rights and Animal Theology” traces some of the history of Christian concern for animals, which is surprisingly robust given the disregard the mainstream theological tradition has shown for the interests of animals.

    The next two chapters take a somewhat more polemical turn. In “The Conflict Between Ecotheology and Animal Theology” Linzey shows that the two movements aren’t necessarily in sync, particularly when it comes to their view of “nature.” Ecotheologians err, Linzey says, when they treat the natural world as “sacred” or as an unambiguous source of moral norms. Ecotheologians see little need for the redemption of nature. Animal theologians, with their concern for the suffering of particular individual creatures, are more willing to say that nature doesn’t reflect God’s ultimate will for creation. Thus nature, along with humanity, stands in need of redemption.

    In “Responding to the Debate about Animal Theology” Linzey engages with several critical readings of his work. Some of the points that stand out here are his frank confession that the Bible is not uniformly “pro-animal” (just as it isn’t uniformly “pro-woman”) and therefore a critical reading is necessary in order to draw out principles for expanding the circle of moral concern. This concern is rooted in the paradigm of Jesus’ self-giving love for others. He also defends his radicalization of Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Incarnation, arguing, in a lovely turn of phrase, that “the incarnation is God’s love affair with all flesh” (p. 51). In fact, he contends, this is a recovery of the patristic doctrine of the Incarnation and an affirmation of the “Cosmic Christ” in whom all things have their being and life.

    Two interesting essays in the second half of the book mine ancient Christian history for a pro-animal perspective. “Jesus and Animals” draws on certain non-canonical works to show that, at the very least, certain early Christians believed that the coming of Jesus had implications for relations with non-human animals. Some of these writings show Jesus healing animals, creating living sparrows out of clay, and restoring the edenic, non-violent, non-competitive relationship between humans and animals. Linzey suggests that some of these stories may have elements that can be traced back to the historical Jesus, and certainly depict a valuable strain of early Christian belief and spirituality that has gotten lost over the ages.

    “Vegetarianism in Early Chinese Christianity” draws on the “Jesus Sutras,” ancient manuscripts that indicate the existence of an early Chinese form of Christianity, dating back well before the arrival of Catholic missionaries. Possibly influenced by Taoism or Buddhism, these writings seem to depict a non-violent, vegetarian Christianity that flourished for some time before being wiped out. To Linzey, this suggests a path not taken, though one we might find our way back to.

    Finally, “On Being an Animal Liturgist” is a slightly more biographical piece, detailing the responses to the publication of Linzey’s Animal Rites, a book of prayers and liturgies for animals. Animals have been largely excluded from the worship of the Christian church; even ecologically sensitive worship tends to focus on the Earth or the environment in general. But animals–particularly companion animals–are very significant parts of many people’s lives. Though roundly mocked in official church quarters, Linzey stoutly defends this endeavor as both meeting a real pastoral need and striking a blow against the starkly anthropocentric focus of so much Christian worship.

    The book concludes with an agenda for a pro-animal Christianity. This includes animal-friendly biblical scholarship, theology, ministry, and rites. Linzey makes the somewhat surprising claim that animals are not just one issue among others that theology might engage with, but a test of any adequate theology. This is because theology ought to be truly theocentric:

    Ludwig Feuerbach famously argued that Christianity is nothing other than the self-aggrandizement, even the deification of the human species. To avoid this charge, theology needs to show how it can provide what it promises–namely a truly Godward (rather than a simply anthropocentric) view of the world. Its obsession with human beings to the exclusion of all else betokens a deeply unbalanced doctrine of God the Creator. Animal theology can help save Christians from the idolarty of self-worship. (p. 15)

    I don’t have much critical to say here, since I agree with most of what Linzey writes. I do think the relationship between animal theology and eco-theology merits more exploration. I agree that Linzey has put his finger on a weakness of at least some eco-theology, which takes too rosy a view of the natural world. And yet, I’m not entirely on board with Linzey’s apparent endorsement of a “cosmic fall” to explain the disorders or predation and suffering, signs of creation’s “groaning.”

    I think a middle way is possible that affirms both the inherent goodness of the created order and its need for redemption. Denis Edwards, whom Linzey mentions favorably, is one such theologian who has tried to give an account of natural evil in an evolutionary context, but also strongly emphasizes our kinship with other animals. He avoids an excessive “holism” and the attendant moral egalitariansim that would give equal moral rights to all life-forms. Like Linzey, Edwards ascribes to human beings a special role, but one of experiencing kinship with other creatures and of caring for the earth. This is very close to Linzey’s notion of human beings as the servant species, and provides a way of thinking about our role in the world that would support both animal protection and sound ecological awareness and practices.

  • Placher on atonement, one last time

    The Christian Century recently published a posthumous article by the late Presbyterian theologian William Placher: “How Does Jesus Save?” In it, Placher wrestles, as he had in the past (including in his wonderful book Jesus the Savior), with various theories of the atonement and their shortcomings. He sees “liberals” and “conservatives” increasingly at loggerheads over “moral influence” and “substitutionary” theories of the atonement. He also criticizes the recent vogue for atonement theories based on the work of Rene Girard as insufficient for acheiving the kind of salvation we need.

    Toward the end of the piece, Placher proposes a return to–or at least a re-examination of–the theories of church fathers like Irenaeus and Athanasius, which he refers to as “mystical” or “physical” theories of salvation (Irenaeus’ version is also sometimes referred to as the “recapitulation” theory). The basic idea is that Jesus saves us by identifying himself with human life in all its glory and misery, even unto death on a cross. The Son of God identifies himself with outcasts, the sick, and the sinful and, in the “whole course of his obedience” (borrowing a phrase from Calvin), restores human nature and offers it back to God the Father:

    Only when God incarnate has welcomed sinners into his table fellowship, cured those who suffered, died the death assigned the blaspheming and seditious, even gone into the realm of those who have rejected God and exist in a hell of utter isolation (I pick up at the end a theme most eloquently presented in our time by Hans Urs von Balthasar)–only when this God incarnate has been raised can we glimpse the expansiveness of God’s work of salvation. It is only the crucified One who can save us all.

    I think one possible (and salutary) implication of this view, not mentioned here by Placher, is that it places the atonement in the context of creation. Rather than simply a forensic balancing of accounts, the incarnation is the means by which God restores humanity to the path God intended for us, within God’s good creation.

  • Creaturely Theology

    Anyone out there familiar with the anthology Creaturely Theology: God, Humans, and Other Animals edited by Celia Dean-Drummond and David Clough? I’m intrigued, but can’t seem to find much information about it online, and the cost is a bit prohibitive for buying sight unseen.

  • Acknowledging disagreement is not relativism

    The website of Lutheran Forum has become, for better or worse, all ELCA sex talk all the time. In this post, Sarah Wilson distinguishes two kinds of arguments that proponents of changing existing policy are making:

    One argument is simply this: homosexual activity is not a sin. That is, as long as it follows other biblical precepts like fidelity and lifelong commitment; but as such, it is not sinful.

    The general support for this is the argument that homosexual activity in this faithful and lifelong framework was simply not known to the biblical writers; the only kind of homosexual activity they knew was promiscuous, or idolatrous, but not the kind commended nowadays. This argument has the merit of straightforwardness. The best defender of it as far as I can tell is Chris Scharen (needless to say there are quite a number of points he makes I’d take issue with—but still, credit is due).

    The other argument, considerably more widespread, and ironically coming from most of our “teaching theologians,” is fairly garbled and incoherent, but if you can draw it out from the tangle, it says essentially: it doesn’t matter whether it’s a sin, because God forgives everything, gospel trumps law, all is grace, and (it seems hard to avoid this conclusion, though it is not said outright either) everyone will be saved anyway. The documents up for vote in a few weeks imply as much when they say we only have to agree about the gospel, but ethics don’t matter for the unity of the church—a bizarre assertion that probably wouldn’t hold if the sin in question were racist hate crimes, child molestation, or searching for nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in foreign countries.

    I agree with her that the first argument is stronger; in fact, I think it’s true and sound. Curiously, she doesn’t cite any specific person making a form of the second argument, which raises suspicions that it’s a bit of a caricature. After all, to say that “ethics don’t matter for the unity of the church” is, as Ms. Wilson rightly points out, “a bizarre assertion.” So I would be surprised to find anyone actually making such an assertion and prepared to strongly disagree with them.

    What some people have argued (including me) is that diversity on moral judgment exists, is probably inevitable, and, to some extent, should be embraced. Lutherans agree in opposing hate crimes (though, probably not on hate crime legislation), child molestation, and searching for nonexistent weapons of mass destruction (though, again, probably not on whether the Iraq war might nevertheless have been justified).

    The fact that she selects such obvious examples of consensus actually highlights the many areas where there isn’t consensus. I mentioned a few in my previous post: war and peace, abortion, government’s role in alleviating poverty and regulating the economy. Lutherans have traditionally seen these as matters for the first (or political) use of the law, and to be determined by human judgment informed by the best available knowledge. They aren’t matters of revealed truth.

    When it comes to the blessing of same-sex relationships and the rostering of non-celibate gay and lesbian pastors, we face a similar diversity of views. My personal view is that we have good grounds for affirming same-sex relationships, given that we know, by the observation of the lives of many gay and lesbian couples, that those relationships can exhibit the fruits of the Spirit, provide their participants with the great goods of love and companionship, provide bulwarks against sin, and build up the communities of which they’re a part. Just like heterosexual marriages.

    But, as we all know, there are many folks in the church unconvinced by this, either because they think the Bible condemns all same-sex relationships, not just exploitative or promiscuous ones;* they think that the traditional teaching of the church must be maintained; or for other more discreditable reasons. Where we can, we should assume good faith on the part of those who uphold the traditional teaching (and hope they’d extend the same charity). Hence, we should all look for ways of living together that respect the different conclusions we’ve arrived at here as in other areas.

    I think the policy being considered by the ELCA is best understood both as an attempt to permit us to continue to live and worship and serve together and as an attempt to open up spaces where new ways of living as Christians can be tested. As St. Paul says: “Test all things; hold fast what is good.”

    Just as in a federal system of government, states can function as “laboratories of democracy,” we might see “structured flexibility” as an attempt to create laboratories of the spirit–spaces where the goodness of same-sex relationships, supported by their congregations, can be shown forth to the rest of the church.

    This isn’t–or at least it shouldn’t be–a matter of straight people generously “including” LGBT people in the church. Christ has already done that through baptism and the Spirit. This, fundamentally, is why the church should find ways to provide structures of support to LGBT individuals and couples, while respecting, where appropriate, the “bound consciences” of those who differ. This is not some vulgar moral relativism, but an honest recognition of where we disagree and how we might move forward as a church.

    One might observe at this point the patience being displayed by many of our LGBT members here. We heterosexuals aren’t under the burden of “proving” the value or legitimacy of our relationships to the wider church. Even the minimal standards that heterosexuals are expected to observe are rarely enforced (what is the attitude of most ELCA congregations toward straight couples who live together before marriage, for instance?). Meanwhile, gay people have their lives put on trial. In fact, I feel like I’m being presumptuous even writing about this because it’s not my relationship (or calling) that’s at stake, and I certainly don’t have the authority to speak on any else’s behalf. But I do think it’s important to be clear that what’s being proposed is not some lapse into antinomianism.
    ————————————————-
    *Though, as Lutheran biblical scholar Arland Hultgren has pointed out, even if the exegetical judgment that the Bible does not condemn same-sex relationships per se turns out to be wrong, we still need a consistent hermeneutic. He cites in particular the church’s changed attitude toward divorce and remarriage. See: Being Faithful to the Scriptures: Romans 1:26-27 as a Case in Point.

  • Bp. Chilstrom’s letter

    Herbert Chilstrom was the first presiding bishop of the ELCA, from its inception until 1995. Here he responds to an open letter from the group Lutheran CORE, which was signed by a number of theological heavyweights (Braaten, Jenson, etc.), opposing the proposed changes to the church’s policy on same-sex relationships.

  • Links: food, animals, the environment, etc.

    This piece from the Boston Globe looks at the tensions between an increasing sense of idealism among zoo officials–they want to treat their animals better and raise awareness of wildlife conservation–and the undeniable need to entertain zoos’ human visitors.

    James McWilliams writes on the recent report out of the UK which found that organic foods are not necessarily more nutritious than their conventionally grown counterparts. McWilliams says that this debate misses the point: organic consumers make up a tiny percentage of the population, and the categories of conventional and organic are themselves too heterogeneous for comparisons to be useful. We should focus instead, he says, on things that we know will improve our health and benefit the environment. Like eating less meat.

    Derek wrote a good piece for Episcopal Cafe on what beets (and seasonal food generally) can teach us about God’s gifts.