Category: Politics

  • The Humane Society vs. the farm bill

    The Humane Society is opposing section 123 of the proposed 2007 Farm Bill which is supposed to be voted on by the House very soon.

    The section says that:

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no State or locality shall make any law prohibiting the use in commerce of an article that the Secretary of Agriculture has—
    (1) inspected and passed; or
    (2) determined to be of non-regulated status.

    The HSUSA interprets this to mean that states and localities would be prohibited “from banning activities they deem to be contrary to public health, safety, and morals. Section 123 would undo bans on horse slaughter, intensive confinement of pigs and calves raised for veal, force-feeding of ducks and geese to make foie gras … [etc.]”

    This piece at Grist describes further implications of this provision:

    [T]his broad statement basically says that if the USDA says something is safe, a state or local government is not allowed to regulate it. For example, there have been a number of counties around the country that have banned genetically modified organisms from being produced within their borders. This preemption-style language, if it’s passed in the Farm Bill, would void those local laws.

    This seems to me to be a bad idea both substantively and on grounds of democracy and local control. The HSUSA encourages people to contact the congressional representative about the provision here.

  • Fraser: against centralization

    Giles Fraser writes (perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek?) about his recent “turn to the Right”:

    Over the past few months, I have had something of a conversion to the Right. I no longer believe that the Left is capable of delivering on its progressive promises. I no longer trust the Left to sustain an inclusive vision of human togetherness. The culture wars in global Anglicanism have brought me to this.

    The trouble with the Left is that it is always looking for the big picture, the overarching narrative of human community — hence big government. The problem is that the grand plan frequently involves casualties and betrayals. Ordinary people are squashed in the search for a utopia. But, because the cause is so noble, the casualties are easily justified. There is nothing more dangerous than people who are convinced of their own virtue.

    The latest grand plan for Anglicanism is called the Covenant. The Primates of the Communion have fallen out, and have refused to share communion with each other. Their answer to this situation is that we vote them more decision-making power. It is like trying to put out a fire with petrol. But, because these Primates have whipped up an atmosphere of panic, they are persuading some people that theological martial law needs to be imposed.

    My turn to the Right persuades me that Anglicanism does not need bigger church government. It does not need a new internationalism imposing uniformity top-down from a committee of Primates. My text is 1 Samuel 8: God instructs Samuel to tell his people that if they put too much power in one place, it will return to bite them. “When that day comes, you will cry out because of the king that you have chosen; but the Lord will not answer you.”

    To the extent that I take an interest in intra-Anglican ecclesiastical conflicts (which is to say: not that much), I’m generally with Fraser here. I’m very cautious of imposing some kind of ecclesiastical “big government” as he puts it. And it strikes me as more than a little bit ironic that Anglicans would be in a rush to institute a centralized form of church governance given the origins of Anglicanism.

    It’s also ironic, however, that, at least in recent US history, the nominal party of the Right has been characterized by increasing centralization. I was very much convniced by the kind of anti-centralization arguments offered by conservative and libertarian thinkers when I was first exposed to their ideas. It’s just that I don’t see that understanding much reflected in the current GOP.

  • Economics as if people (and other living things) mattered

    I’m in Indianapolis visiting family, and one of the things I like to do whenever I’m here is make a trip to Half Price Books.

    Yesterday I picked up a copy of For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future by World Bank economist Herman Daly and process theologian John Cobb.

    My views on economics have been in flux for the past few years. I was at one time attracted to the libertarian exaltation of the free market, but I’ve become increasingly convinced of the limitations of that view.

    The conservative side of me is skeptical that a system based on acquisitiveness can really be conducive to virtue, especially as the logic of the market threatens to take over more and more areas of life. The liberal side of me is unconvinced that the rising tide will really lift all boats, at least at a rate fast enough to forestall ecological disaster. As I’ve become more interested in environmental issues I’ve been exposed to the arguments of those who maintain that unlimited growth is a dead end, literally.

    Daly and Cobb seem to be following in the footsteps of thinkers like E.F. Schumacher. They embrace the market and recognize that central planning is unworkable, but they also want to situate the market within a social and moral framework that respects the integrity of communities, both national and more local ones.

    In this respect their project seems to hark back to the decentralized “humane economy” of conservative Swiss economist Wilhelm Roepke, a thinker I admire a lot. Their goal is to rethink economic policy in a way that treats human beings as more than an abstract homo economicus, as well as being sensitive to what, following Wendell Berry, they call the “Great Economy” of all life on Earth.

    I’ve only read the introduction, but I’m eager to see where Daly and Cobb go with their project and will probably post more on these ideas as I go.

  • Progs for Paul?

    The rather odd premise of this Reason article is that libertarian “constitutionalist” GOP candidate Ron Paul may have appeal to disaffected progressives.

    Now, this may be true in the broad sense that progressives will likely find themselves agreeing with Paul on the war, the PATRIOT Act, the war on drugs, etc. but what is the upshot supposed to be here? That progressives are going to cross party lines en masse to vote for Paul in the GOP primary?

    After all, it’s virtually a foregone conclusion that Paul won’t get the GOP nomination (especially when an astonishing 65% of Republicans still say that President Bush is doing a good job according to a recent poll). So there’s really no question of Paul appealing to progressives and liberals in the general election.

    And besides, if progressives want to vote for a longshot candidate who shares their views on the war, they’ve got Dennis Kucinich with whom they’re likely to agree about much else. Ron Paul’s vision of an ultra stripped down nightwatchman state is likely to send big-government liberals running for the hills.

  • Competition for thee but not for me

    Grist has a discussion of the recent FTC objections to the proposed Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger and points out that the government has been curiously indifferent to what seems to be the more serious issue of big agribusiness consolidation and market concentration. Slate also ran a piece criticizing the government’s opposition to the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger a few days ago.

  • How animal rights gets a bad name

    It seems to me that there a few reasons that animal rights groups get a bad reputation, even among those who might be expected to be sympathetic to the cause of better treatment for animals.

    First, animal rights groups, like activist groups of all stripes, have a tendency to use rhetoric that is imprecise at best and inflammatory at worst. “Meat is murder!” and “Animal Liberation” are slogans that lack nuance.

    This creates the impression that AR-ists value animal life equally with human life. While this may be true among a tiny minority, it certainly doesn’t represent the mainstream AR view. Certainly no organization I’m familiar with, even those that advocate legal rights for animals, has suggested that killing an animal is or ought to be treated as just as serious a crime as killing a human being.

    This becomes even clearer when one turns to the “theoreticians” of the AR movement. In fact, given the charges often made against the AR position, one wonders if the critics have ever bothered to read the works of the primary thinkers associated with AR. Peter Singer, for one, doesn’t categorically reject all human use of animals, nor does he regard animal life as morally equivalent to human life (though there are borderline cases, such as an adult gorilla vs. a newborn human infant, where, on utilitarian grounds, he seems to draw an equivalence).

    Tom Regan, who takes a more rights-based approach, categorically denies that an animal life is morally equivalent to a human life, and even goes so far as to say that a virtually unlimited number of animals could be sacrificed to save a single human life.

    Part of the confusion no doubt comes from the term “speciesism” which seems to imply that any moral distinction between humans and animals is akin to unjustified prejudices like racism and sexism. This was probably an ill-chosen term since what most people who use this term want to say is that animal suffering that is equivalent to human suffering shouldn’t be disregarded simply because it’s animal suffering. In other words, animals aren’t equivalent to humans, but some kinds of animal suffering are equivalent to some kinds of human suffering, and so deserve to be taken into account in any moral calculus.

    It’s not surprising that the AR movement, like so many other movements to social change, are more concerned about effectiveness than philosophical clarity and fine distinctions, but this is a case where I think a lack of clarity has hurt their cause. To the extent that the rhetoric of AR seems to connote a moral equivalence between animals and humans it will fail to win over the majority of people.

    It’s noteworthy that a book like former Bush speechwriter Matthew Scully‘s Dominion received favorable, if not entirely uncritical coverage in major conservative publications like National Review, the Weekly Standard, and the American Conservative. Political conservatives are rarely seen as sympathetic to AR. And yet Scully’s language of stewardship, mercy and compassion for animals tapped into a moral tradition that is much more amenable to the mainstream of Western political and religious thought. This doesn’t mean that everyone will agree with the AR agenda, but AR-ists shouldn’t give critics such an easy target by allowing themselves to be caricatured as holding the simplistic view that “a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy.”

    A second, and more discreditable, reason that AR-ists are often dismissed as extremist wackos is that groups regarded as extremists like the Animal Liberation Front and Earth First! are taken (often disingenuously one suspects) to be representative of the broader animal rights and environmental movements.

    I say this is discreditable because virtually every social movement of any significance inevitably attracts extremists, some of whom resort to violence. But this by itself hardly shows that the concerns of the broader movement are illegitimate, though opponents often try to use the actions of the extremists to discredit them. Few would seriously argue that John Brown, the Black Panthers, Eric Rudolph, or violent anti-war and anti-globalization protesters somehow show that the causes they were associated with were or are mistaken. So why should the existence of the ALF show that AR concerns are ipso facto unimportant? Those causes have to be debated on thier merits. Of course, representatives of those broader movements should disassociate themselves from and condemn those extremists who try to use violence to bring about social change*, and to the extent that they fail to do that they may justly bring public suspicion upon themselves.

    ——————————————————-
    *Leaving aside the interesting question whether violence as a tool for social change is ever justified when other means have been exhausted.

  • Brownback vs. Darwin?

    I don’t think I’m saying anything wildly controversial when I say that it’s extremely unlikely that Sam Brownback will be our next president. And given his general philosophy of “compassionate conservatism” on steroids, I think that’s probably a good thing.

    Still, it’s interesting that Brownback felt the need to take the pages of the NY Times to explain his position on evolution:

    If belief in evolution means simply assenting to microevolution, small changes over time within a species, I am happy to say, as I have in the past, that I believe it to be true. If, on the other hand, it means assenting to an exclusively materialistic, deterministic vision of the world that holds no place for a guiding intelligence, then I reject it.

    What’s noteworthy here is that these two options hardly exhaust the possibilities. It’s possible, and I believe true, that there has been not only change within species but between species and that this doesn’t imply “an exclusively materialistic, deterministic vision of the world that holds no place for a guiding intelligence.”

    It seems that Brownback shares the concern of many religious believers that accepting “macro” evolution would undermine the uniqueness and worth of human beings:

    I am wary of any theory that seeks to undermine man’s essential dignity and unique and intended place in the cosmos. I firmly believe that each human person, regardless of circumstance, was willed into being and made for a purpose.

    In fact, I’d be willing to speculate that this, more than worries about literal vs. symbolic interpretations of the Bible, is the source of much religious anxiety about evolution.

    Though it may sound plausible on the surface, I’m not sure that this is really a problem. Each individual human being comes into existence by way of natural processes, but that in no way justifies treating their individual worth as somehow diminished. So why should the fact that the species came into being by natural processes diminish the worth of human beings as such? If we can say that God intends my particular existence, even though I came into being through natural processes, then why can’t we say that God intended to bring human beings as a species into existence by means of natural processes?

  • Let the peaceniks have their say!

    Good article at Reason on the Ron Paul-Rudy Giuliani showdown:

    No one knows precisely what morbid formula inspired the Sept. 11 attacks. Most likely, it was some mix of U.S. foreign policy exacerbating radical Islamists’ already deep-seeded contempt for Western values.

    But to suggest that we shouldn’t even consider that our actions overseas might have unintended consequences is, frankly, just ignorant. And to attempt to silence anyone who says otherwise by attempting to define them as the lunatic fringe of political debate is not only ignorant, it’s an embrace of ignorance—a refusal to even hear ideas that might challenge your own perspective.

  • Just War theory and the “charism of discernment”

    This post from Catholic theologian William Cavanaugh revisits some of the arguments of pro-Iraq war Catholics, in particular papal biographer George Weigel (link via Eric).

    Weigel’s notion of a “charism of political responsibility/discernment” is muddled at best. Here’s the relevant passage from his “Moral Clarity in a Time of War”:

    If the just war tradition is indeed a tradition of statecraft, then the proper role of religious leaders and public intellectuals is to do everything possible to clarify the moral issues at stake in a time of war, while recognizing that what we might call the “charism of responsibility” lies elsewhere-with duly constituted public authorities, who are more fully informed about the relevant facts and who must bear the weight of responsible decision-making and governance. It is simply clericalism to suggest that religious leaders and public intellectuals “own” the just war tradition in a singular way.

    As I have argued above, many of today’s religious leaders and public intellectuals have suffered severe amnesia about core components of the tradition, and can hardly be said to own it in any serious intellectual sense of ownership. But even if today’s religious leaders and public intellectuals were fully in possession of the tradition, the burden of decision-making would still lie elsewhere. Religious leaders and public intellectuals are called to nurture and develop the moral-philosophical riches of the just war tradition. The tradition itself, however, exists to serve statesmen.

    There is a charism of political discernment that is unique to the vocation of public service. That charism is not shared by bishops, stated clerks, rabbis, imams, or ecumenical and interreligious agencies. Moral clarity in a time of war demands moral seriousness from public officials. It also demands a measure of political modesty from religious leaders and public intellectuals, in the give-and-take of democratic deliberation.

    Now, you could legitimately argue, I think, that public officials have the unique responsibility for making decisions to go to war, but that’s no reason to suppose that they are given a unique gift of discernment or judgment. It’s true that they will often have access to privileged information (though, fat lot of good it did ‘em in the case of Iraq) but that’s a separate issue.

    What Weigel seems to imply is that public officials are granted almost supernatural aid in deciding whether or not a given war is just. I can’t imagine what in the tradition would support this claim unless we’re reverting to the idea of the king as God’s anointed.

    Cavanaugh puts it well:

    Regardless of the facts of this particular case, moral judgments about war, like all moral judgments, are not primarily a matter of good information. Good information is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sound moral judgments. Sound moral judgments depend on being formed in certain virtues. Why a Christian should assume that the president of a secular nation-state would be so formed – much less enjoy a certain “charism” of moral judgment – is a mystery to me. “Charism” is a theological term denoting a gift of the Holy Spirit. To apply such a term to whomever the electoral process of a secular nation-state happens to cough up does not strike me as theologically sound or practically wise.

    It’s also worth pointing out that the Constitution envisioned war being declared by Congress, not the President (Article I, Section 8). While again it’s true that public officials have a unique responsibility for making these decisions, they aren’t guaranteed a special wisdom. It seems to me that only an inflated, quasi-monarchical concept of the presidency would even be tempted to impute this kind of “charism” to the occupant of the Oval Office. If the decision to go to war was kept with Congress (or, heck, with a plebiscite), there would probably be much less temptation toward this kind of obscurantism.

  • Hysterical liberal watch

    Chris Hedges has an astonishingly evidence-free article at Alternet purporting to demonstrate that “The battle against abortion is a battle to build a society where pleasure and freedom, where the capacity of the individual and especially women to make choices, and indeed even love itself[!!], are banished.” The “argument” rests almost entirely on armchair psychologizing of vast swaths of people in the pro-life movement whose commitment to that cause can, according to Hedges, only be understood as a bid to contain the “brokenness, desperation and emotional turmoil” these people feel because all the good manufacturing jobs have left the country. In Hedges’ universe it’s impossible for anyone to have sincere moral objections to abortion. They can only be masks for some deeper cause – economic disfranchisement in this case.

    The supposed knock-down argument that “demonstrates” that it’s “really” fear and hatred of sex and pleasure, not a desire to protect life, that motivates the pro-life cause is that some pro-lifers also oppose birth control. Now, in the real world there are two reasons this might be the case. One is that many pro-lifers are also committed Catholics. The other is that some pro-lifers have become convinced that certain forms of birth control, including the Pill, are abortifacient because they can act to prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum. My understanding of this is extremely imperfect, but the impression I have is that it remains uncertain whether various kinds of birth control Pill ever do in fact act to prevent implantation in cases where fertilization occurs, but I don’t think it’s crazy for someone of scrupulous conscience to worry about them for that reason. None of this comes anywhere close to showing that pro-lifers are opposed to sex or pleasure or happiness. In fact, you might think that given the pro-natalist stance of many pro-lifers that they are in fact quite in favor of sex.

    All this aside, what’s so annoying about Hedges’ article is that he’s not willing to see pro-lifers as people who might have moral convictions just as sincere and, dare I say, well-informed as his own. They aren’t fellow citizens with whom to enter into respectful dialogue, but crazed hordes who want to banish love itself!This is the mirror image of the manichean worldview held by some on the Right who see liberals as godless baby killers.