One common criticism of President Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq is that the UN-imposed sanctions were “working” – i.e. containing Saddam Hussein’s expansionist ambitions and his drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction. That fact that the U.S. has indeed not found the dreaded WMD seems to confirm this.
While the efficacy of the sanctions certainly needed to be taken into account in assessing any possible threat posed by Saddam’s Iraq, it is eminently debatable whether sanctions are morally preferable to going to war, or even morally permissible at all.
Accounts differ, but most people agree that the toll of the sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq from the end of the first Gulf War until the re-commencement of hostilities in 2003 was anywhere between 500,000 to over a million deaths, largely due to lack of access to clean water, food, and medical supplies (excacerbated by the probably unnecessary destruction of Iraqi infrastructure during Gulf War I).
So, in sheer quantitative terms, sanctions rival or exceed war as a tool of policy. Moreover, sanctions are among the least discriminating ways of punishing another country for failing to comply with one’s demands. The political elite are usually the last to feel the punishing effect of sanctions, and ordinary people suffer the most. Sanctions intrinsically violate the principles of just warfare.
In fact, sanctions are essentially a form of siege warfare, so “let the sanctions work” was not exactly an “anti-war” stance. It may instead have been a policy for a silent, but more deadly, form of war.