Then I said truly, Polus that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two. — Socrates
Despite their disagreement on the permissibility of war, the pacifist and just war traditions agree on a fundamental point that puts them at odds with all “realist” or “survivalist” versions of morality: that it is worse to do evil than to have evil done to oneself. The result, as Hauerwas says, is that both pacifists and just warriors must concede that the innocent will suffer at times as a result of their convictions. For instance, if we refrain from targeting civilians, wars may be dragged out, more of our troops might die, and the total amount of suffering may even be greater.
It’s considerations like this that often motivate a more “realistic” position with respect to warfare. War is hell, we might say, and better to get it over with quickly by whatever means necessary. This it the kind of reasoning that has been used to justify the obliteration of cities, the torture and killing of prisoners, and other acts widely regarded as war crimes. The motivation is not necessarily sadism, or indifference to suffering, but precisely the opposite: a desire to minimize suffering (although often confined to avoiding suffering on our side).
The root of such “realism” seems to be the belief that death or defeat is the worst possible outcome in any conflict. If our lives or freedom are threatened, then we may legitimately employ whatever means are necessary to protect them. In extreme situations this may involve transgressing what previously appeared to be inviolable moral norms, such as the direct killing of the innocent.
By contrast, the just war and pacifist positions agree in saying that there are some things we can’t do even if they appear to be the only means of avoiding defeat. This implies, for example, that it would be better to surrender than to murder civilians if that was the only way to win.
Too often, I think, just war theorists don’t make explicit their disagreement with the “survivalist” ethos that underlies much thinking about war. For once that premise is accepted, the pressure to override moral constraints in war will become nearly irresistible. Moreover, as history shows, the bar for what means are “necessary” has a tendency to be lowered.
This concession to “survivalism” also allows just war theorists to present themselves as much more “realistic” than those dewy-eyed pacifists. But, just war theorists can, on their own premises, never subordinate the moral law to the survival of a particular nation or the success of a particular cause. When strictly adhered to, just war theory can look almost as “idealistic” and otherworldly as pacifism.